Pursuing ideological passion in Islamic radical group's insurgency: a case study of Negara Islam Indonesia

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Abstract

This study seeks to investigate the ideological passion of those who join a religion-based insurgency group. Religion-based insurgencies continue to exist even after being dispersed, whereas region-based insurgencies typically end after government defeat. Having an ideological hatred for the state's ideology is the primary motivation for insurgents to fight tenaciously for their movement. This study focuses on the ideological passion formation process in the context of the

Indonesian Muslim insurgency known as Negara Islam Indonesia. (NII). NII is a religion-based insurgency in Indonesia that continues to operate clandestinely and is the progenitor of radical movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Using a qualitative approach and a case study procedure, the method was applied. The participants included 21 former NII members. Using thematic analysis, the data was examined. Previous research on religion-based insurgency focused primarily on the role of extremist religious ideology as the movement's foundation. However, it remains unclear as to how ideology influences the selection of an insurgency strategy and the desire to continue the movement. Formation of ideological passions may cast light on the dynamics of religious insurgency. The findings indicate that the ideological passion of religion-based insurgency is comprised of five primary themes. These five themes are rumination, ideology valuation, movement dedication, social interactions, and ideology internalization. This study highlights the role of ideological passion in the formation of insurgencies. This ideological passion can also play a significant role in the disengagement procedure of insurgents, which includes social interactions and internalization.

Studi ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi gairah ideologis individu dalam bergabung dengan kelompok makar berbasis agama. Jika makar berbasis wilayah biasanya berakhir setelah dikalahkan pemerintah, makar berbasis ideologi lebih bertahan lama meskipun sudah dibubarkan. Memiliki gairah ideologis yang bertentangan dengan ideologi negara adalah motivasi dasar bagi pelaku makar untuk memperjuangkan gerakannya secara persisten. Fokus studi ini adalah proses pembentukan gairah ideologis dalam konteks sebuah gerakan makar Muslim Indonesia yang disebut dengan Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). NII adalah makar berbasis agama di Indonesia yang masih berjalan secara tersembunyi dan menjadi orang tua dari gerakan radikal yang bermunculan di Indonesia seperti Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Studi ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan metode studi kasus. Partisipan berjumlah 21 orang mantan anggota NII. Data dianalisis menggunakan analisis tematik. Studi-studi sebelumnya tentang makar berbasis agama lebih banyak berfokus pada peran ideologi agama ekstrem sebagai dasar gerakan. Namun, bagaimana ideologi berkontribusi dalam pemilihan strategi makar dan hasrat untuk terus melanjutkan gerakan belum banyak dijelaskan. Pembentukan gairah ideologis dapat membantu menjelaskan dinamika makar berbasis agama. Hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa gairah ideologis untuk

gerakan makar berbasis agama terdiri dari lima tema. Kelima tema tersebut adalah ruminasi, valuasi ideologi, dedikasi terhadap gerakan, interaksi sosial, dan internalisasi ideologi. Studi ini mengkaji peran gairah ideologis dalam pembentukan makar. Gairah ideologis juga dapat berperan dalam keluarnya pelaku dari kelompok makar yang melibatkan interaksi sosial dan internalisasi.

Keywords: *Ideology*; *Passion*; *Insurgency*; *Radical movement*

Introduction

There are at least two distinct motivations for insurgency movements that seek to alter or seize power from the existing authority. The first is region-based insurgency, which is an insurgency based on a struggle for geographical territory. An example in Indonesia is the Free Papua Organization (OPM). The second type is ideologically motivated insurgency, which is primarily driven by political or religious ideology.

The proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) in 1959 is an example of an ideologically motivated rebellion. Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, the Islamic State of Indonesia has been the first Islamist uprising. Even though the government abolished NII in the 1960s, the organization persisted. There are still covert portions of the NII in operation today.[1] These NII components indicate that the concept of applying Islamic law in Indonesia persists. To take preventative measures and completely disband the movement, the state and government must first comprehend the psychological and social causes of insurgencies. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the sociopsychological factors that contribute to the development of faith-based insurgencies.

Previous studies have demonstrated how insurgency studies misrepresent religious beliefs.[2] According to other studies, political issues play a

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[1]Media Indonesia, *MUI ungkap anggota HTI masih lakukan gerakan bawah tanah*, 17 September 2019.

[2]Isidore Nwanaju, "Religious Insurgency: Pathway to Disintegration in Nigeria", *IOSR*

significant part in this religion-based insurgency.[3] Thus, while religion does not immediately contribute to the occurrence of insurgency, it does serve as the foundation for the formation of structural connectivity in the formation of insurgency.[4] Religious insurgency is motivated by interactions between religious understanding and socioeconomic and societal issues, as well as government failure.[5] The previous studies concentrated on structural and political factors, but they did not properly address psychological mechanisms of insurgency. This research will concentrate on a religiously motivated insurgency organization in Indonesia, specifically the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The origin of Islamic insurgency: Islamic radical group

The Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) was a religiously inspired insurgency movement, particularly Islam. Religious insurgency is distinct from region-based insurgency, which focuses more on the geographical and historical circumstances of the country. There are also ethnic insurgencies that frequently intersect with religious conflicts. Nonetheless, ethnic insurgencies are typically based on cultural contexts and previous historical conflicts, not on ideological issues. Compromising and negotiating are more challenging in a religious context than in one based on political ideology, economics, or ethnicity, due to the strong connection between the interpretation of religious values and the essence of insurgency.[6]

Journal of Research & Method in Education, Volume 7, Number 4 (2017), 63–67.

[3]Seun Bamidele, "Understanding Insurgency in Nigeria: Interrogating Religious Categories of Analysis", *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, Volume 22, Number 2 (2018), 154–66.

[4]Anoop Sarbahi, "The Structure of Religion, Ethnicity, and Insurgent Mobilization: Evidence from India", *World Politics*, Volume 73, Number 1 (2021), 82–127.

[5]Stephen Onakuse & Victor Jatula, "Radical Islam and Insurgency in Northern Nigeria: Tensions and Challenges", *Religions*, Volume 12, Number 10 (2021), 888.

[6]John le Beau, "Examining Twenty-First Century Insurgencies and Government Responses", *Connections*, Volume 7, Number 1 (2008), 154–166.

A religious insurgency is driven by religious and ideological factors.[7,8] The role of ideology is explained by at least two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is the rigidity of the right hypothesis, which states that certain ideologies can encourage people to become insurgents,[9,10] such as conservatism,[11,12,13] and religious fundamentalism[14,15,16]. However, this hypothesis only distinguishes ideologies on the basis of their type and does not explain the extent to which individuals hold these beliefs.[17] Then, the extremity hypothesis was formulated, which states that all ideologies have the same potential to engage in insurgency, particularly when adherents to certain ideologies hold extreme beliefs.[18]

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[7]Tito Karnavian, *Explaining Islamis Insurgencies: The Case of Jamaah al-Islamiyyah and the Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict*, London: Imperial College Press, 2015.

[8]Matthew Luttig, "Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volume 81, Number 4 (2017), 866–895.

[9]John le Beau, "Examining Twenty-First Century Insurgencies and Government Responses"...

[10]Paul Davis, Eric Larson, Zachary Haldeman, Mustafa Oguz, and Yashodhara Rana, *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012.

[11]David Coppini, Megan Duncan, Douglas McLeod, David Wise, Kristen Bialik, and Yin Wu, "When the Whole World Is Watching: A Motivations-Based Account of Selective Expression and Exposure", *Computers in Human Behavior*, Volume 75 (2017), 766–74.

[12]John Jost, Jack Glaser, Arie Kruglanski, and Frank Sulloway, "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition", *Psychological Bulletin*, Volume 129, Number 3 (2003), 339–75.

[13]Chris Sibley and John Duckitt, "Personality and Prejudice: A Meta-Analysis and Theoretical Review", *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, Volume 12, Number 3 (2008), 248–79.

[14]Olabanji Akinola, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Between Islamic Fundamentalism, Politics, and Poverty", *African Security*, Volume 8, Number 1 (2015), 1–29.

[15]Mashood Omotosho, "Dynamics of Religious Fundamentalism: A Survey of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria", *Journal of Philosophy, Culture, and Religion*, Volume 4 (2015), 8–15.

[16]Andrew Tan, "Terrorism, Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia", *Defence Studies*, Volume 8, Number 3 (2008), 311–25.

[17]Thomas H Costello, Thomas H, Shauna M Bowes, Matt W Baldwin, Ariel Malka, and Arber Tasimi, "Revisiting the Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis: A Meta-Analytic Review", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (November 3, 2022), 1-25.

[18]Tito Karnavian, *Explaining Islamis Insurgencies...*

The extreme hypothesis explains insurgency with ideological passion. Despite prior studies on ideological passion, particularly obsessive passion, in violent extremism, it is still important to study how this passion becomes an insurgency movement.[19] The 3N model (need, narrative, and network) can explain this process, as it did radicalization.[20] The 3N model accounts for ideologies in social network stories dissemination. The researcher uses the 3N paradigm to describe ideological passion in Indonesian insurgency. The three components of the ideological passion—valuation, commitment, and internalization—only explain some of the network and narrative features of the 3N model. This study implies that rumination, a thought process associated to group growth, is the fourth stage of ideological passion. Insurrection-related interactions represent the network.

Ideological passion from the perspective of the 3N model

The 3N model (need, narrative, and network) was developed to explain how individuals can become radicalized. This model is utilized to explain radicalization through the individual's underlying needs (need), the ideological context of the individual's culture (narrative), and the impact of the extant social environment (network).[21] In addition to explaining radicalism, the 3N model is also applied to religion, [22] which can be

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[19] Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Jais Adam-Troian, Claudia F. Nisa, and Birga M. Schumpe, "Ideological Passion and Violent Activism: The Moderating Role of the Significance Quest", *British Journal of Psychology*, Volume 113, Issue 4 (2022), 917-937.

[20] Arie W. Kruglanski, Erica Molinario, Katarzyna Jasko, David Webber, N. Pontus Leander, and Antonio Pierro, "Significance-Quest Theory", *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, Volume 17, Issue 4 (2022).

[21] Kataryna Jasko, David Webber, Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand, Muh Taufiqurrohman, Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna, "Social Context Moderates the Effects of Quest for Significance on Violent Extremism", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Volume 118, Number 6 (2020).

[22] Ewa Szumowska, Aneta Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, Małgorzata Kossowska, Szymon Król, and Arie W. Kruglanski, "Truth and Significance: A 3N Model (Needs, Narratives, Networks) Perspective on Religion", in Kenneth Vail III (eds.), *The Science of Religion, Spirituality, and Existentialism*, San Diego: Elsevier Academic Press, 2020, 225-242.

viewed as a component of epistemic needs and meaningfulness (needs), as a foundation for behavior (narratives), and as a social phenomenon and shared reality [social phenomenon] (network).

In the context of Indonesia, with its strong culture of collectivism, the need to attain meaning as a group is more important than individual needs. An orientation toward these groups may be based on religious groups, ethnic groups, or other groups with similar characteristics. Therefore, the researcher proposes using the 3N model as a novel approach to explain the dynamics of ideological passion in the formation of insurgencies.

Ideological passion is derived from the self-determination theory's dual model of passion, which is divided into harmonious and obsessive passion.[23] Typically, passion originates with a valuation of particular things; in this case, it is ideology. This ideology can take the form of a desire for group sovereignty, or be more focused on a specific religion, such as a passion for Islam.[24] In the context of insurgency, this ideological valuation can be associated with the objective of launching the movement and enacting the ideology in which the insurgents have a firm belief. When an individual upholds an ideology, he or she will devote himself or herself to its realization. Various effective strategies will be implemented in earnest as part of the efforts to attain the objectives. After exerting effort to attain one's ideology, the individual will be able to internalize his or her ideology and identity, also known as internalization.

In previous studies conducted in Canada, Pakistan, Spain, and the USA, social alienation (need) was found to encourage support for political violence (narrative), which then leads to a tendency to join a radical group

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[23]Robert J. Vallerand, *The Psychology of Passion: A Dualistic Model. The Psychology of Passion: A Dualistic Model*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

[24]Blanka Rip, Robert J. Vallerand, and Marc André K. Lafrenière, "Passion for a Cause, Passion for a Creed: On Ideological Passion, Identity Threat, and Extremism", *Journal of Personality*, Volume 80, Number 3 (2012).

(network).[25] Meanwhile, a study on 365 Muslims in Spain showed that those who live in conflict-prone environments are more likely to experience a loss of meaning (need). Then they find meaning in a religious place (network) that makes them justify acts of terrorism based on religion (narrative).[26] In Indonesia, a study on 137 terrorist detainees showed that group identity and ideology could explain the role of significance in violent extremism.[27]

Similarly to radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism, the interactions between need, narrative, and network can help explain the dynamics of insurgency movement formation. To gain a better understanding of how the 3N model can explain the process of ideological passion in the acts of insurgency in Indonesia, the researcher conducted interviews with 21 former members of a religion-based insurgency group, specifically the Islamic State of Indonesia, and analyzed secondary documents. In this case study, a thematic analysis was used to identify patterns in the obtained data.[28] This study contributes to the evolution of the 3N model and the study of ideological passion by explicating the mechanism of insurgent acts.

According to the results of the analysis, there are five themes in the process of developing ideological passion in nonviolent insurgency acts. Religious-based reflection, ideology valuation, devotion to the movement,

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[25]Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Manuel Moyano, Hayat Muhammad, Lindsy Richardson, Marc André K Lafrenière, Patrick McCaffery, Karyne Framand, and Noëmie Nociti. "Radicalization Leading to Violence: A Test of the 3N Model", *Frontiers in Psychiatry*, Volume 10 (2019).

[26]Roberto M Lobato, Manuel Moyano, Jocelyn J Bélanger, and Humberto M Trujillo. "The Role of Vulnerable Environments in Support for Homegrown Terrorism: Fieldwork Using the 3N Model", *Aggressive Behavior*, Volume 47, Number 1 (2021), 50–57.

[27]Mirra Noor Milla, Whinda Yustisia, Muhammad Abdan Shadiqi, and Haykal Hafizul Arifin. "Mechanisms of 3N Model on Radicalization: Testing the Mediation by Group Identity and Ideology of the Relationship between Need for Significance and Violent Extremism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2022).

[28]Albert J Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe, eds. Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.

social interactions, and ideology internalization are the themes that emerge. The five themes are examined based on the two phases of non-violent insurgents' involvement: when they joined the non-violent insurgency movement and their process of transformation after leaving the movement. Both phases demonstrate that the ideological passion for upholding Islamic law remains powerful. However, what differentiates them is the selection of distinct strategies to achieve their objectives. If the first group continues to employ a government-opposing strategy, the second group modifies its strategy by attempting to uphold Islamic law through democracy and by joining the government.

Religious group-based rumination

The journey of joining in an act of insurgency begins with anxiety and reflection on the condition of Islamic society. They interpret their religious teachings with the narrative that Islam is the most perfect religion and the solution to world peace. However, they observe that factions and conflicts exist even within the Muslim community. Therefore, as members of the Muslim community, they are dissatisfied with Islam's declining positive reputation.

> P05: I see these (Muslim) groups wrongly blaming each other and even insulting and swearing at each other.

> P07: Why are most people who are fellow Muslims different and walk on their own paths, even though the God is the same, the Prophet is the same, the Holy Book is the same, and the goal is the same? And why can't other Shari'a be enforced? Apparently, it is because Muslims do not have a leader.

This dissatisfaction can be divided into two categories: first, that which is directed more towards the group; second, that which is directed more towards the individual. Those who are more group-oriented are more

influenced by the notion that Muslim group unity is in crisis. They view it as ironic due to the fractures within the Muslim community and see the need to unite the Muslim community in various ways and enforce Islamic law without exception (*kaffah*) in their nation. This can be accomplished, for instance, by searching out groups that carry out teachings as a whole and Islamic movement leaders in Indonesia who represent religious values.

Those who seek a personal approach, on the other hand, concentrate more on how to put Islamic teachings into practice in daily life. They perceive a lack of Muslims who engage in actions contrary to Islamic teachings. Thus, they pursue the spiritual value of truth, which refers to the teachings they adhere to, such as seeking Allah's blessing and locating a path that is consistent with the Qur'an and Sunnah.

This reflection on the loss of self-worth among Muslims can serve as a starting point for those planning an insurrection. The desire to attain Islamic unity is the driving force behind their actions to realize this objective. In addition, it is essential for them to live in accordance with the teachings of their religion. This causes them to prioritize religion in all aspects of life management, including politics.

The study findings demonstrate that ideological passion entails thinking about one's religion, which frequently leads to negative feelings that are referred to as rumination. These unfavorable circumstances are frequently connected to the political system in the context of insurgency.[29] On a social level, a nation's low income,[30] geographic problems,[31] cultural, social, and economic

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[29]Katarzyna Jasko, Marta Szastok, Joanna Grzymala-Moszczynska, Marta Maj, and Arie W. Arie W. Kruglanski, "Rebel with a Cause: Personal Significance from Political Activism Predicts Willingness to Self-Sacrifice", *Journal of Social Issues*, Volume 75, Number 1 (2019).

[30]Mahendra Lawoti, and Anup Kumar Pahari, *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Routledge, 2009.

[31]Michael J Watts, "Frontiers: Authority, Precarity, and Insurgency at the Edge of the State", *World Development*, Volume 101 (2018), 477–88.

problems,[32] power disparities,[33] and bloodlust[34] can increase opportunities for society to make social changes, which then fuel insurgencies.[35,36,37] Although the conditions of the group and perceptions of the relationship between the in-group and their country can also play a role in steering an insurgency movement, the studies above are focused on the conditions of the country in which they live. People will presume that their group's important demands cannot be met when they see that the country's political structure does not support the ideology they subscribe to (loss of significance).

Islam politics as the ideological value orientation

Prior contemplation on the significance of upholding Islamic law led the insurgents realizing that Islam is also the primary guiding principle in the political system and government. They believe that religious teachings govern every aspect of their existence. Religious teachings are highly esteemed; consequently, they must be implemented in daily life. As motivation for defending their movement, they typically cite religious texts such as the Quran and Hadiths.

> P18: Because human life is *wa maa kholaqtul jinna wal insa illa liya'buduun* (I did not create spirits and humans except to worship me), this life is only temporary. If you don't want to worship, what else can you do? That is what leads to the afterlife..

[32]Aurel Croissant, "Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 19 (2007), 1–18.

[33]Ambreen Javed, "Resistance and Its Progression to Insurgency", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 30, Number 1 (2010), 171–86.

[34]Imaji Zekeri Ojonumiache Sule, Ranjit Singh a/l Darshan Singh, and Muhammad Fuad Othman, "Governance and Boko Haram Insurgents in Nigeria: An Analysis", *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Volume 4, Number 2 (2015), 35–44.

[35]Erica Chenoweth, and Jonathan Pinckney, "Insurgency", in *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2015), 221–26.

[36]Aurel Croissant, "Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand"...

[37]Biswajit Ghosh, "Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura", *Sociological Bulletin*, Volume 52, Number 2 (2003), 221–43.

Some believe that Islamic politics can influence Islam holistically, while others are more concerned with the spiritual aspect. Those who believe in a more holistic understanding of Islam, also known as *kaffah* or fullness, argue that the glory of Islam can be attained through collective prayer. They view division as factions and lack of unity as a grievous sin. In addition, they observe that the current government system is inconsistent with the Quranic verses they interpret.

P10: Whoever is not judged by the laws that Allah has sent down, then he is among the wrongdoers, disbelievers, and wicked.

Those with a focus on spiritual development are more concerned with incorporating Islamic teachings into their daily lives. They cite religious value verses that teach goodness and harmony. They are more concerned with adapting to the conflict than with the actual conflict itself. In general, they prefer implementing Islamic law in accordance with the laws of their nation. For instance, they might select a state leader who is regarded as the most representative of Islam or who is closely associated with it.

Islamic political ideology plays a role not only for those who engage in insurgency but also for those who support the government. Whether a person participates in an act of insurgency depends on their religious beliefs and how they balance the values of peace versus conflict. This tendency to uphold political Islam's ideology serves as the foundation for subsequent actions.

Strong religious convictions can serve as the foundation for ideological passions. The insurgents uphold their religious values. They adhere to the ideology of political Islam, which holds that Islam is not only a guide for daily life but also a foundation for political life. This finding elucidates the extremity hypothesis, which states that when individuals adhere to a particular ideology in an extreme manner. They will implement that ideology in every aspect of their existence.[38] This concept is also consistent

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[38]Leor Zmigrod, "The Role of Cognitive Rigidity in Political Ideologies: Theory, Evidence,

with a type of obsessive passion[39] in the ideological passion theory, which demonstrates an excessive valuation of certain ideologies that can be destructive and harmful to oneself or others.

Dedication to the movement: violent versus nonviolent

When insurgents already hold the fundamental belief that religion is the center of life, all of their actions are motivated by this conviction. The belief that Islam must be manifested in a *kaffah* manner and become the foundation of the state prompted them to join the insurgency group and fight alongside them for Islamic values. They view the actions as a component of their efforts to uphold Islamic law.

The insurgents would commit themselves to assisting their group's movement in achieving its objectives. They emphasize the importance of obeying the authorities, as well as, most importantly, the prophet and God. The commitment to heed a leader begins with a pledge of obedience or allegiance witnessed by the movement's leader. After taking an oath, they pledge their lives to the group's advancement.

> P04: As stated in Surah An-Nissah, verse 59 of the Quran, all of our daily acts of worship are regarded as acts of worship when we obey Allah, the Prophet of Allah, and Ulil Amri.

In addition, they try to support the insurgency in the areas that are most vital to them, such as the economic and educational sectors. They accomplish this by selling items or conducting other enterprises, engaging in routine activities, and recruiting new members. They are willing to make time and effort sacrifices to contribute to the movement. They believe

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and Future Directions", *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, Volume 34 (2020), 34–39.

[39]Jocelyn J Bélanger, Blaine G Robbins, Hayat Muhammad, Manuel Moyano, Claudia F Nisa, Bargi M Schumpe, and Michelle Blaya-Burgo, "Supporting Political Violence: The Role of Ideological Passion and Social Network", *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Volume 23, Number 8 (2020), 1187–1203.

their actions constitute a form of obedience to their leader.

There were at least two categories of self-transformation among former insurgents after leaving the NII. First, there are those who continue to propagate Islam, albeit in a different manner. Many of them are members of organizations with similar goals, such as Hizbut Tahrir, which seeks to uphold Islamic law. Second, they transformed by becoming independent, and then some of them joined other, more moderate groups. Typically, they are more concerned with enhancing their own spiritual quality. (self-oriented). They frequently emphasize that worship must begin with oneself and those nearest to one.

P04: First, I preached at home to my family, my own children, … [then] I preached to other people.

The primary objective of the insurgents, both before and after joining the movement and after abandoning it, is to strengthen Islam. The objective of advancing Islam is interpreted differently by those who continue to feel at odds with the government and by those who follow a legal path to alter the system. Those who switched to the legal course began to support Islamic parties or leaders who were viewed as more receptive to Islam. This dedication and resolve to uphold Islamic law are bolstered by having a social environment consistent with this objective.

The insurgents had the courage to devote and dedicate themselves to the insurgency movement because of the process of reflection and the tendency to uphold the adhered ideology. This begins by studying the ideology and movements in greater depth, approaching people who share the same views, and becoming directly and indirectly involved in acts of insurgency. The insurgents' devotion is a form of attitude and behavior that is manifested as part of the expression of their ideology.[40]

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[40]Paul H.P Hanel, Lukas F. Litzellachner, and Gregory R. Maio, "An Empirical Comparison of Human Value Models", *Frontiers in Psychology*, Volume 9 (2018).

Tendency for insurgency actions through radical social circles

Insurgents typically have close friends who support Islamic law. They seek out like-minded people and avoid other people to grow their social network. Being in a shared reality can enhance their faith. Some participants began their social interactions by expressing admiration for ideological figures. They revere leaders of international, national, and local or regional religious movements. This devotion compels them to investigate the ideology further and join the movement.

P03: On TV, there was a figure named Imam Khomeini. He was a prominent Iranian Islamic scholar. He had the courage to uphold Islam in Iran. I became interested in *harakah*, to that movement when Imam Khomeini was around.

From that interest, they begin to look for circles that show a similar understanding. After finding people who are of the same mindset, they communicate intensely to deepen their beliefs and start taking real action. They are more likely to trust and follow people they think have the same goal as them, which is to fight for Islam.

P15: I found the NII brotherhood. ... After 6 months of being active in it, I was initiated.

Several pro-government participants appear to have a more diverse social network than the remaining insurgents, who appear to have a limited social network consisting primarily of individuals who share their views. They are not only intimate with individuals who hold radical views, but also have relatives who hold moderate views. This includes relatives who work for the government as civil servants, military personnel, or police officers, as well as those who join moderate religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah.

The process of social interactions between insurgents and the people around them corroborates previous research highlighting the role of

radical networks in bolstering an individual's desire to engage in violent movements, whether through obsessive pursuits,[41] social alienation,[42] or an ideological quest for significance[43]. One study compared the responsibilities of ideological and operational leaders in terrorist groups and discovered that operational leaders have a denser network.[44] According to the findings of this study, most participants joined NII on the advice of individuals they know and trust.

Several participants expressed admiration for religious figures who could serve as sources of inspiration. This study complements previous research by describing the role of admired ideological leaders.[45,46] Previous research has investigated the relationship between admiration for charismatic leaders and political participation, such as voting behavior.[47] In addition, the veneration of certain role models can initiate an individual's participation in violent extremism.[48] Consequently, it remains uncertain why the idolization of a leader figure can affect both violent and nonviolent

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[41]Jocelyn J Bélanger et. al., "Supporting Political Violence"...

[42]Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Manuel Moyano, Hayat Muhammad, Lindsy Richardson, Marc André K Lafrenière, Patrick McCaffery, Karyne Framand, and Noëmie Nociti, "Radicalization Leading to Violence: A Test of the 3N Model", *Frontiers in Psychiatry*, Volume 10 (2019).

[43]Mirra Noor Milla, and Joevarian Hudiyana, "The Protective Role of Friendship: Cross-Group Friendship Mediates the Effect of Ideological Quest for Significance on Commitment to A Radical Group", *Psychological Research on Urban Society*, Volume 2 Number 2 (2019), 98.

[44]Mirra Noor Milla, Joevarian Hudiyana, Wahyu Cahyono, and Hamdi Muluk, "Is the Role of Ideologists Central in Terrorist Networks? A Social Network Analysis of Indonesian Terrorist Groups", *Frontiers in Psychology*, Volume 11 (2020).

[45]Angel Gómez, Jocelyn J Bélanger, Jesus Chinchilla, Alexandra Vázquez, Bargi M Schumpe, Claudia F Nisa, and Sandra Chiclana, "Admiration for Islamist Groups Encourages Self-Sacrifice through Identity Fusion", *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, Volume 8, Number 1 (2021).

[46]John W. Michel, Devin L. Wallace, and Rachel A. Rawlings, "Charismatic Leaders: The Role of Admiration and System Justification", *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, Volume 34, Number 5 (2013).

[47]John W. Michel, Devin L. Wallace, and Rachel A. Rawlings, "Charismatic Leaders...

[48]Mirra Noor Milla, Joevarian Hudiyana, Wahyu Cahyono, and Hamdi Muluk, "Is the Role of Ideologists Central...

strategies among political activists. Using identity fusion, a study was conducted to explain how reverence for group members can inspire self-sacrifice.[49] The preceding studies indicate that a leader's choice of action can also influence the selection of individual strategies.

One study compared the role of radical versus moderate networks in the relationship between obsessive versus harmonious pursuits and support for political violence.[50] If a radical network can explain the role of obsessive addiction to support violence, a harmonious passion accompanied by a moderate network has a negative relationship with support for violence. This radical versus moderate network dynamic also details the variations of the participants. Even though both groups were recruited into radical networks, the group that transformed to be pro-government proved to have a more varied network. They are not only close to people with radical leanings, but they also have relatives who are moderately inclined. Meanwhile, groups that are still affiliated with movements like insurgency have more limited social networks.

Internalizing ideology and identity: hope for sovereignty

The process of internalization between the ideology and identity carried out by the participants is reflected in their desire to uphold Islamic law. The insurgents assume that the ideology they believe in is correct and the outgroup is wrong. This belief is validated by one's social network and then becomes one's main goal in life.

> P04: *One, Islam must have Islamic leaders that can perfect the implementation of Islamic teachings. Two, prayer life for Muslims is obligatory and the way to follow is the Khilafah led by a Caliph as exemplified by the predecessors*

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[49]Angel Gómez, Jocelyn J Bélanger, Jesus Chinchilla, Alexandra Vázquez, Bargi M Schumpe, Claudia F Nisa, and Sandra Chiclana, "Admiration for Islamist Groups Encourages Self-Sacrifice...

[50]Jocelyn J Bélanger et. al., "Supporting Political Violence"...

of Islamic fighters. Three, Islamic brotherhood can only be applied in group prayer life. Beyond that, brotherhood is pseudo. Fourth, Islam is a religion of compassion, so we consider fellow Muslims to be brothers in faith.

They also tend to experience controlled internalization, which shows the characteristics of obsessive passion. The thing that becomes one's control is the promise to the leader and his organization or what is commonly called *Bai'at*. Efforts to enforce Islamic law are still being carried out after they leave NII and join other groups that have a similar goal. Although they are not openly against the government, they often experience conflicts between Islamic law and the existing government system. In conditions that require them to do something that is contrary to the teachings of their religion, they will reject it and try to avoid it. For example, during general elections, they generally do not exercise their right to vote.

Meanwhile, the second group prioritizes strengthening self-quality as an internalization of the ideology they adhere to. This focus on the self indicates a more autonomous internalization process. They want to promote Islam by spreading the values of peace such as *rahmatan lil alamin* (love for the universe).

After leaving NII, although their passion for fighting for Islamic law still exists, they saw the need for change in strategy. The main strategy is to try to implement Islamic law under the auspices of the current government. For example, it can start from the smallest environment around the house, such as by electing state leaders who are considered more pro-Islam and being involved in legislative institutions to include Islamic law as part of regulations and policies.

There is an expectation to uphold their ideology as part of the process of internalizing ideology into their identity. They have confidence that the group's goal of upholding their ideology will be actualized. This collective belief is in line with previous studies that examined group efficacy. In

the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA), group efficacy together with perceptions of injustice and politicized identities can direct collective action.[51] After SIMCA, there was EMSICA [52] that explained the flow of alternative relationships between the three factors previously described by SIMCA and stated that expectations play a role in the relationship between group efficacy and collective action.[53]

Figure 1. Ideological Passion Conceptualization Based on the 3N Model

Conclusion

This study aims to explore the insurgents' experiences in realizing their ideological passions. The formation of ideological passions in individuals can be started by ruminating on the loss of significance in the group, the tendency to prioritize the adhered ideology (valuation), self-dedication

[51]Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears, "Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives", Psychological Bulletin, Volume 134, Number 4 (2008).

[52]Emma F. Thomas, Kenneth I. Mavor, and Craig McGarty, "Social Identities Facilitate and Encapsulate Action-Relevant Constructs: A Test of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action", *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, Volume 15, Number 1 (2012).

[53]Caitlin Furlong, and Vivian L. Vignoles, "Social Identification in Collective Climate Activism: Predicting Participation in the Environmental Movement, Extinction Rebellion", *Identity*, Volume 21, Number 1 (2021).

to the struggle (dedication), interactions with people involved in the movement, and integrating ideology into their identity (internalization). Through this process, we can see how an ideological passion is formed in the insurgents, starting from personal contemplation to being involved in the acts of insurgency and internalizing it into their identity. This finding complements the process of an ideological pursuit, which previously only consisted of three stages: valuation, dedication, and internalization.[54] In more detail, there are several contributions, which can be explained as follows.

The results of this study show how ideological passion plays a part in a nonviolent insurgency movement. Previous studies on ideological passion only described three components: valuation, dedication, and internalization. This study delved more deeply into the process of ideological passion in the context of insurgency using the concept of beliefs, attitudes, and values, namely the rumination process and the 3N model perspective, specifically the role of social networks. Thus, the process of forming ideological pursuits in insurgency consists of rumination about the meaninglessness of the self and the group, valuation involving the ideology of religious fundamentalism and the role of a leader figure, dedication to the movements carried out and the leader's instructions, interactions with radical networks, and internalization of the ideology and identity. By understanding this process, it is hoped that it can contribute to the disengagement process for insurgents who use non-violent strategies by applying ideological passion as part of their intervention.

This study also provides an explanation of the transformation process of ideological passion in non-violent insurgents. A limitation in this study, as with qualitative studies in general, is the number of participants. This

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[54]Blanka Rip, Robert J. Vallerand, and Marc André K. Lafrenière, "Passion for a Cause, Passion for a Creed: On Ideological Passion, Identity Threat, and Extremism"...

can be a challenge to generalize about similar insurgent subjects, such as regarding violent extremism or the general public who are prone to exposure to radicalism. Thus, further research may consider a quantitative study to see the role of ideological passion and other variables on the formation of non-violent insurgency.

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