

Islamism without commotion: the religious transformation of *Tuak* Kampong in West Lombok

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Abstract

The Islamic revival movement is often considered a threat to other religious groups. Many studies on the issues have presented the dark sides of religion, wherein Islamic movements often turned into political ones leading to religion-based fundamentalism, violence, and terrorism. The current research explicates the process and characteristics of Islamism in a democratic climate by investigating a case of religious transformation in a traditional kampong formerly known for producing *tuak* in West Lombok. The Islamic movement, or to be precise, purification, is recently quite prevalent in the area. It relates to the early history of Islamization in

Lombok, which pitted Islam against Hinduism and other local traditions. Such confluences generated rules and regional Islamic variants that are often considered heretic. Qualitative data for this study was gathered through observations, desk study, and interviews. This research found that the Islamization process observed in the *tuak* kampung displays unique characteristics different from those that commonly portray Islamic movements. Islamization in West Lombok was carried out without any commotion due to its non-coercive, outward-looking, and rational factors. These attributes are apparent in the three processes of transformation, the first is non-coercive cultural transformation through education and awareness, the second refers to structural change achieved through legal arrangement, and the third is rational transformation through community empowerment programs.

Gerakan kebangkitan Islam sering dianggap sebagai ancaman bagi kelompok agama lain. Berbagai kajian tentang isu-isu tersebut telah memaparkan sisi gelap agama, di mana gerakan Islam sering berubah menjadi gerakan politik yang mengarah pada fundamentalisme, kekerasan, dan terorisme berbasis agama. Penelitian ini menjelaskan proses dan karakteristik Islamisme dalam iklim demokrasi dengan menginvestigasi kasus transformasi agama di kampung adat yang dulunya dikenal sebagai penghasil tuak di Lombok Barat. Gerakan Islam, atau tepatnya pemurnian, akhir-akhir ini cukup marak di daerah tersebut. Hal ini berkaitan dengan sejarah awal Islamisasi di Lombok yang mengadu domba Islam dengan Hindu dan tradisi lokal lainnya. Pertemuan-pertemuan tersebut melahirkan aturan-aturan dan varian-varian Islam daerah yang sering dianggap sesat. Data kualitatif untuk penelitian ini dikumpulkan melalui observasi, studi pustaka, dan wawancara. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa proses Islamisasi yang diamati di kampung tuak menampilkan karakteristik unik yang berbeda dengan gerakan Islam pada umumnya. Islamisasi di Lombok Barat dilakukan tanpa gejolak karena faktor non-koersif, berwawasan ke luar, dan rasional. Atribut tersebut tampak pada tiga proses transformasi, yakni transformasi budaya non-koersif melalui pendidikan dan penyadaran; perubahan struktural yang dicapai melalui penataan hukum, dan transformasi rasional melalui program-program pemberdayaan masyarakat.

Keywords: *Islamism; Tuak kampung transformation; Community empowerment; Islamization*

Introduction

Religion and theological reasoning will be replaced by rational judgement; meanwhile, religions in the modern world will disappear.¹ Faith will be confined in an underground dungeon and eventually cease to exist. If not, religion will merely be present in personal spaces and become spirituality without institution.² Habermas notes that a “post-secular age” phenomenon will emerge, where religion is present in public areas, but the religions that appear discard their religious symbols and use elements of rationality.³ The such prediction has yet to happen, and society is developing toward “turning to religion.” Especially that concerns with Islam, we are witnessing the rise of religions in the form of Puritanism and the islamization of public space movements.⁴ In some places, religious and social movements emerged by promoting fundamentalism, such as in the Republic of Dagestan.⁵ There is growing concern that Islamism as a political movement will turn into radical and fundamental trends that have no intention to compromise in implementing sharia. Studies on religious revival have shown that such actions often develop into fundamentalism and radicalism.⁶ Even the Islamic revitalization movement in Indonesia

¹Kenneth S. Sacks, “Auguste Comte and Consensus Formation in American Religious Thought,” *Religions*, Volume 8, Number 147 (2017), 1–22.

²Brimadevi van Niekerk, “Religion and Spirituality: What are the Fundamental Differences?”, *HTS Theological Studies*, Volume 74, Number 3 (2018), 1–11; Penny Long Marler and C. Kirk Hadaway, “‘Being Religious’ or ‘Being Spiritual’ in America: A Zero-Sum Proposition?”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Volume 41, Number 2 (2002), 289–300.

³Jurgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society”, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Volume 24, Number 5 (2008): 17–29; Jurgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” *European Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 14, Number 1 (2006), 1–25.

⁴Sumantra Bose, *Secular State, Religious Politics: India, Turkey, and the Future of Secularism*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 27.

⁵Irina Starodubrovskaya, “Informal Institutions and Radical Ideologies under Institutional Transformation”, *Russian Journal of Economics*, Volume 1, Number 2 (2015), 182–198.

⁶Timur Kuran, “The Rule of Law in Islamic Thought and Practice: A Historical Perspective”, in James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson, Lee Cabatingan (eds.), *Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law*, London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2013, 87-106; Starodubrovskaya, “Informal

has brought about violence.⁷ Religious activities other than Islam offer the same patterns, however.⁸

As a proselytizing religion, Islam requires its followers to thoroughly practice Islamic teachings in all aspects of life,⁹ which often begets Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism.¹⁰ Dissemination of these values in private spaces runs without clashing with any group; while it differs in public areas, such a phenomenon often develops into clashes with other groups.¹¹ The Islamic movement in Indonesia emerged to disseminate Islamic teachings, criticize secularism and change cultures considered contradicting Islamic values.¹² In Indonesia, Islamic revival is indicated by the prevalence of Islamic symbols in public spaces. The emergence of concepts like sharia banking,¹³ halal tourism,¹⁴

Institutions” ...

⁷Fahlesa Munabari et al., “Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State”, *Jurnal Politik*, Volume 5, Number 2 (2020), 281–312; Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, *South East Asia Research*, Volume 10, Number 2 (2002), 117–154; Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?”, *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2004), 104–121.

⁸Aditi Bhatia, “The ‘Saffronisation’ of India and Contemporary Political Ideology”, *World Englishes*, Volume 39, Number 4 (2020), 568–580; Amarnath Amarasingam, “Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements,” *Contemporary Islam*, Volume 4 (2010), 347–349.

⁹Erwin Jusuf Thaib, “Problems of Da’wah in Social Media in Gorontalo City Communities”, *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies*, Volume 13, Number 1 (2019), 37–53.

¹⁰Muhammad Hizbullah, “Dakwah Harakah, Radikalisme, dan Tantangannya di Indonesia”, *Misykat Al-Anwar Jurnal Kajian Islam dan Masyarakat*, Volume 29, Number 2 (2018), 11–24.

¹¹Lee Ellis, “Religious Variations in Fundamentalism in Malaysia and the United States: Possible Relevance to Religiously Motivated Violence”, *Personality and Individual Differences*, Volume 107 (2017), 23–27.

¹²Imam Sutomo and Budihardjo, “The Rejection of Religious Nationalism towards the Secular State and the Islamic Caliphate: Indonesian Religious Figures Perspective”, *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Volume 11, Number 1 (2021), 115–137.

¹³Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Development, Social Change, and Islamic Finance in Contemporary Indonesia”, *World Development*, Volume 41 (2013), 157–167.

¹⁴Hendri Hermawan Adinugraha et. al., “Halal Tourism in Indonesia: An Indonesian Council of Ulama National Sharia Board Fatwa Perspective”, *Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business*, Volume 8, Number 3 (2021), 665–673; Alfonso Vargas-Sánchez and Mirko Perano, “Halal Tourism through the Lens of Generation Z in a Muslim Majority Country:

Islamic schools,¹⁵ Islamic housing, regional sharia laws, wearing hijab, Islamic medication, and Islamic films proves that the Islamism movement is present in Indonesia. The landscape of the Islamic world in Indonesia seems to be experiencing a transformation toward new public spaces with a more Islamic taste.¹⁶

Lombok is one of the regions where the Islamic movement adorns its public spaces. Iconized as the island of thousand mosques, Lombok promotes Islamic concepts, like halal tourism, zakat kampong, and tourist destination 99 (referring to the 99 names of Allah), flourishing throughout the island. However, Lombok also has indigenous cultures originating from the pre-Islamic period and even growing through acculturation and assimilation with Islam, Hinduism, and other local traditions. The *topat* war and other traditions derived from *Islam Wetu Telu*, commonly seen as contradicting the Islamic tradition, are good illustrations for portraying such cultures.

One example of the traditions that contradict Islamic teachings is the production and consumption of *tuak towa*, an alcoholic beverage traditionally produced from the sap of palm (*Arenga pinnata*) flower buds fermented using the bark of the Bajur tree (*Pterospermum javanicum*). *Tuak towa* is often referred to as alcoholic *tuak* or “pink lady”. This alcoholic beverage is used in Hindu rituals and sold openly in many public cafes, and who drink *tuak towa* are not limited to Hindu followers but Muslims as well. This alcoholic *tuak* is produced in several kampongs throughout West Lombok. One of the most famous kampongs for *tuak* production

Implications on Tourist Services”, *International Journal of Business and Management*, Volume 13, Number 9 (2018), 36–48.

¹⁵Lukis Alam, “Becoming Modern Muslim: New Emerging Trends of Islamic Schools in Yogyakarta”, *Ta’dib: Journal of Islamic Education*, Volume 22, Number 1 (2017), 75–86.

¹⁶Syaifudin Zuhri, “The Islamic Public Sphere: Manifestations of Islam in the Contemporary Indonesia”, *Millah*, Volume 11, Number 2 (2012): 453–472.

was Kampung Longseran, Langko Village. This area used to be a center of *tuak* production. The *tuak* producers in these kampongs are of Hindu communities, but they are not the only ones. Many Muslims work as palm wine tappers and producers of *tuak* as well. However, the situation has changed following the rise of Islamic movement in the area; most Muslim tappers no longer produce *tuak*. This article aims to answer why and how the Islamization process of *tuak* kampong occurred without any uproar and did not cause any commotion, let alone violence, in the community. To address the problem stated, research was done by interviewing the people of Langko Village, particularly in Longseran Sub-village, and the policymakers. Accordingly, interviews were done with Muslim former *tuak* producers, the government of West Lombok (regent and regional office for industry), and Hindu followers. The research was conducted from September to November 2021.

West Lombok as a contiguous area between Hindu and Islam

Lombok is an island in the West Nusa Tenggara Province populated mainly by Muslim Sasak. However, several other ethnicities came to and settled in Lombok, like Balinese, Javanese, Buginese, and Sumbawans, and they are mostly Muslims except those from Bali, who are mostly Hindus. The Hindus in Lombok only reside in Mataram (14.17%) and West Lombok (5.20%).¹⁷ Some Bali Hinduism remnants, like temples and social traditions, remain functioning in Mataram and West Lombok.¹⁸

¹⁷Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, *Persentase Penduduk Menurut Kabupaten/Kota dan Agama yang Dianut Tahun 2018*, <https://ntb.bps.go.id/indicator/108/333/1/persentase-penduduk-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-agama-yang-dianut.html>, accessed on January 4, 2022 at 07:50 AM.

¹⁸The relationship between Bali and Lombok not only caused Hinduism's introduction to Lombok, but it had also been the start of Islam's introduction to the island of Bali; Fajri Yulia Ramdhani, Busro Busro, and Abdul Wasik, "The Hindu-Muslim Interdependence: A Study of Balinese Local Wisdom", *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, Volume 28, Number 2 (2020), 195-218.

The West Lombok and Mataram areas are confluence zones between Hinduism and Islam. Hinduism originating in Bali came across Sasak Islam centred in East Lombok. There is a good relationship between Islam and Hindus in Lombok, but there were some records of conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. These conflicts were caused, among others, by a protest expressed to complain about the loudspeaker used to welcome the *hajj* congregation during the Nyepi ceremony, a fight that broke out for reprimanding drunkards, and also the building of a house of worship without permission. When conflicts occur among both communities, religious identities prevail, replacing their ethnic identities. Under mild conditions, Sasak people call Bali Hindus Balinese; meanwhile, Balinese are called Hindus instead when conflict unfolds.¹⁹

In Lombok, the Hindu and Muslim communities do not blend in perfectly. There is segregation of regional space based on religion. The emergence of Hindu kampongs is one of the indications. The segregation of social space is one of the forms of social vulnerability as it separates areas by certain religions and ethnic groups.²⁰ Segregation in Lombok is rooted in the societal engineering product of the Karangasem Hindu Kingdom that intended to segregate the Balinese-Hindus community as nobles and Sasak-Muslims as the substratum.²¹ Acknowledging such vulnerable segregation, the West Lombok administration attempts to manage this

¹⁹Suprpto, "Religious Leaders and Peace Building: The Roles of Tuan Guru and Pedanda in Conflict Resolution in Lombok-Indonesia", *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, Volume 53, Number 1 (2015), 225-250.

²⁰Veronique Dupont, "Socio-Spatial Differentiation and Residential Segregation in Delhi: A Question of Scale?", *Geoforum*, Volume 35, Number 2 (2004), 157-175; Tommy Firman, "New Town Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: A Perspective of Spatial Segregation", *Habitat International*, Volume 28, Number 3 (2004), 349-368; Mohammad Hasan Ansori et al., *Segregasi, Kekerasan dan Kebijakan Rekonstruksi Pasca Konflik di Ambon*, Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2014, 32-36.

²¹Mustain Mustain, "Segregasi Etno-Religius: Upaya Resolusi Konflik dan Pembangunan Perdamaian", *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, Volume 21, Number 1 (2013), 71-88.

matter by maintaining the *topat* war, a tradition that symbolizes potential conflicts between Hindus and Muslims. Before any dispute unfolds, the *topat* war was introduced to encourage each party to contain themselves, be empathetic, and interact so that will no actual conflict arises.²²

Despite the segregation and conflict that sometimes occurs between Hindus and Muslims, the public spaces in Lombok are open for any group, ethnicity, or religion to express their respective traditions. Hindu ceremonies, like *ogoh-ogoh* parade prior to Nyepi, Ngaben ceremony, Hindu temples, and other identities of Hinduism, are easily found in West Lombok. Similarly, Islamic expressions in public spaces are easily found as well. Communal reading of the Quran, *azan*, Islamic calligraphies, and lampions ornamented with *al-asma al-husna* are prevalent publicly. Some government programs even use Islamic terminologies, like 99 programs, halal tourism, *madani* kampung, zakat kampung, *et cetera*. The development of numerous grand mosques also continues in Lombok.

According to “race theory,” competition between two groups will develop different identities.²³ In Lombok, the identity solidification of Islam and Hinduism also occurs as both express their own identities. Muslims make their mosques more majestic, while Hindus beautify their temples. Sometimes, such competition is intensified by a more macro-level seems to be in constant competition between Bali and Lombok. When Bali named itself the island of a thousand *pura* (temples), Lombok labelled itself as the island of a thousand mosques. In 2013, when the government hosted the Miss World event in Bali, Lombok’s Muslim community expressed

²²Suprpto, “Sasak Muslims and Interreligious Harmony: Ethnographic Study of the Perang Topat Festival in Lombok-Indonesia”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Volume 11, Number 1 (2017), 77–98.

²³Howard Winant, “Race and Race Theory”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Volume 26 (2000): 169–85. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/223441>.

their refusal to the event.²⁴ When Balinese blatantly renounced the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), several groups in Lombok expressed their position of acceptance, although the Lombok community also offered a grand sermon held by FPI.²⁵ The competition between the two communities in both islands has solidified their identities.

The Lombok community increasingly identifies itself as Muslims. The movement to disseminate Islamic teachings in Lombok also got more robust. When Lombok was overrun by foreign tourists bringing along habits that contradict Islamic values, like wearing bikinis and drinking alcohol, there was a response from the community offering the concept of alternative, *halal* tourism. The idea led to the development of sharia hotels along with the coastal areas. It seems that Lombok's landscape is experiencing a transformation toward public spaces with Islamic tastes. Social practices contradicting Islamic teachings would garner responses from the Muslim community.

The cultural transformation of *tuak* kampong through da'wah

The tradition of producing *tuak* in Lombok has existed since the Gelgel-Klungkung Hindu Kingdom in Bali expanded to Lombok in the 18th century.²⁶ Drinking *tuak* is a custom in various Hindu rituals and *tuak* is used as well as offerings to the gods. It is common that people also serve

²⁴Amri Mahbub, "5.000 FPI Lombok Akan Menyeberang Ke Bali," *Tempo.com* (September 4, 2013), <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/513280/5-000-fpi-lombok-akan-menyeberang-ke-bali/full&view=ok>, accessed on December 6, 2021 at 09:00 AM.

²⁵"Khawatirkan Provokasi, Ormas Islam di NTB Tolak Rizieq Shihab," *Bisnis.com* (January 19, 2017), <https://bali.bisnis.com/read/20170119/537/776843/khawatirkan-provokasi-ormas-islam-di-ntb-tolak-rizieq-shihab>"title": "Khawatirkan provokasi, ormas Islam di NTB tolak Rizieq Shihab", "type": "article-newspaper"}, "uris": [{"http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=a2ec74e6-2378-4fc2-85c6-6b0228d947ac"}]], "mendeley": {"formattedCitation": "Bisnis.com, \"Khawatirkan Provokasi, Ormas Islam Di NTB Tolak Rizieq Shihab,\" <i>Bisnis.Com</i> (Jakarta, January 19, 2017, accessed on January 12, 2022 at 11:34 AM.

²⁶I Wayan Wirata, "A Study of Wetu Telu Syncretism in Lombok: A Socio-Religious Approach", *Soshum: Jurnal Sosial dan Humaniora*, Volume 8, Number 1 (2018), 1-8.

tuak in a series of traditional activities like the Hindus' seven-day event following a funeral, during which anyone attending, including Muslims, consumes *tuak*.²⁷

This *tuak* is produced in traditional villages, such as Langko Village. Many people in Langko work as palm tappers, called *penyadek*. These tappers process sap water into three products: palm sugar, sweet *tuak*, and alcoholic *tuak*. Alcoholic *tuak* is the easiest to process while most profitable out of the three products. In spite of its easy production, sweet *tuak* is not highly demanded and quickly spoils. As for palm sugar, it takes longer and needs more raw materials to produce. Only 0.25 kg of palm sugar can be produced from five litres of sap water and the price fluctuates. Hence, producing alcoholic *tuak* is more profitable. This is why eighty percent of tappers in Langko produce alcoholic *tuak*.²⁸

Although Langko villagers are Muslim, they did not conduct five prayers (*salat*) as they are followers of *Wetu Telu* Islam,²⁹ which do not strictly carry out Islamic sharia, still practice ancestral traditions, and do not refrain from drinking alcoholic *tuak*. They are relatively close to the Hindus in terms of life practices. *Wetu Telu* is Islam that assimilated with Hinduism and maintained ancestral traditions.³⁰

Many tappers of the past were *Wetu Telu* Muslims who produced alcoholic *tuak*. However, such conditions have changed, and there is currently only 20 percent of tappers who still produce alcoholic *tuak*, most of whom are Hindus. Most Muslim tappers no longer want to make alcoholic *tuak*. This change began when Islamic *pesantrens* were

²⁷Interviews with informant 12 and 13, a caretaker of Narmada temple and a Hindu Lombok resident who owns palm land, October 7, 2021.

²⁸Interviews with informant 1 and 2, October 9, 2021 at Longseran Sub-village.

²⁹Interview with informant 3, an entrepreneur and the chairperson of palm processing group, October 7, 2021 at Longseran Sub-village.

³⁰Wirata, "A Study of *Wetu Telu* Syncretism".

built around Langko.³¹ Islamic propagation (da'wah) started to spread in West Lombok in 1951 with the emergence of Djama'ah Islam Narmada (DIN), a da'wah congregation that was deeply concerned about the way West Lombok Muslims practising their religion that is considered as heresy (Islam Wetu Telu). This congregation requested Islamic preachers (ustaz) from pesantrens in Pancor, East Lombok to visit the area, to teach and convey the true Islam according to the mainstream doctrines.³² The da'wa became more intensive H. Nuruddin founded Pesantren Assulamy in Langko in 1981. Four years later, this pesantren built a school serving formal education for local children. In the next two decades, three pesantrens -Nurul Hikmah, Thoha, and Ibadurrahman- emerged and followed the step of Pesantren Assulamy. These pesantrens now actively perform the da'wah in the area. In West Lombok alone, there are 98 *pesantrens*, while in West Nusa Tenggara there are 684 *pesantrens*.³³

Many children of tappers go to *pesantrens* and engage in Qur'anic study, especially after the 1980s. It is worth mentioning that they have been exposed to religious knowledge since 1985 when Pesantren Assulamy built a school and incorporated the Qur'anic studies in the school. The schools and *pesantrens* teach *Waktu Lima* Islam, strictly following mainstream Islam's doctrines. *Waktu Lima* Islam promotes the Islamic values instilled in students. In public schools, the Islamic concept taught is that of *Waktu Lima* Islam, which results in the formation of knowledge construction that *Waktu Lima* is the true Islam. This process can be considered "santrinizatioⁿ". The Muslims of Langko are directed to follow *sharia* more strictly.

³¹Interviews with informant 4, 5 and 6: community figures and common residents, October 9, 2021 at Longseran Sub-village.

³²Lalu Wajdi, *Modernisasi Pondok Pesantren Di Lombok (Studi di Ponpes Abu Darda', Ponpes Nurul Bayan, dan Ponpes Nurul Haramain)*, *Disertasi*, Mataram: Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Mataram, 2021.

³³"Statistik Data Pondok Pesantren", <https://ditpdpontren.kemenag.go.id/pdpp/statistik?id=52>, accessed on October 6, 2021 at 10:02 AM.

Waktu Lima Islam insistly teaches that the production and consumption of alcoholic *tuak* contradict Islamic law. This view was eventually disseminated among the public, and it made tappers, whose children study at *pesantren*, feel uneasy with the *kyai* and the teachers at the *pesantren* if they were to continue producing alcoholic *tuak*. These parents also did not want their sons and daughters to feel embarrassed and talked about by their peers because their fathers made a product their faith prohibits.³⁴

The transformation began when children of tappers studying at *pesantren* and the tappers themselves became embarrassed for producing alcoholic *tuak*. Da'wah delivered by *kyai* and *ustaz* (teacher) began to successfully alter the behavior of alcoholic *tuak* production. This dakwah is reinforced because the surrounding public spaces have become more Islamic. Mosques in their kampong have been magnificently built, and the children play in the mosque compound daily. The stream of Islamic teachings and the situation made tappers timid, and they voluntarily chose to no longer produce alcoholic *tuak*. Despite being less profitable, Muslim tappers now prefer to produce palm sugar or sweet *tuak*. So long as the price of palm sugar is stable and demand for sweet *tuak* remains, they will not produce alcoholic *tuak*. Only under certain conditions, when the palm sugar price drops or there is no market demand, would they have to return to producing alcoholic *tuak* secretly. This is often why alcoholic *tuak* can still be found in the market. Economic shocks and high market demand can still influence the belief of some tappers, forcing them to produce alcoholic *tuak* yet again.³⁵

The first period in the Islamic transformation of *tuak* kampong was achieved utilizing cultural means using Islamic proselytization. This movement influenced tappers' religious values, so they no longer produced alcoholic *tuak*. However, this movement alone did not entirely eradicate

³⁴Interviews with informant 7 and 8, tappers, on October 9, 2021 at Longseran Sub-village.

³⁵Interviews with informant 7 and 8, tappers, on October 9, 2021 at Longseran Sub-village.

the production and distribution of alcoholic *tuak* in West Lombok. In order to stop the distribution of alcoholic *tuak*, the government pursued a second measure, namely structural transformation, by issuing a regional regulation on alcoholic beverages.

Structural transformation through regulation

There are various regulations on alcohol distribution and alcoholic beverages in Indonesia in the form of presidential, ministerial,³⁶ and regional regulations, which are used to control and monitor the distribution of alcoholic beverages. Instead of using the word prohibition, the government uses the term monitoring alcoholic drinks distribution. There is no specific legislation on the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.³⁷ Alcoholic drinks are prohibited from being sold publicly and are only distributed in certain places with permission. According to the prevailing law, people who consume alcohol can only be apprehended when they cause harm while drinking alcohol.³⁸

The central government's policy is adopted in nearly all regional governments throughout Indonesia. Nonetheless, some regional

³⁶Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Nomor 43/MDAG/PER/9/2009 tentang Pengadaan, Pengedaran, Penjualan, Pengawasan, dan Pengendalian Minuman Beralkohol; Peraturan Menteri Perindustrian Nomor 71/MIND/PER/7/2012 tentang Pengendalian dan Pengawasan Industri Minuman Beralkohol; Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Perdagangan Dalam Negeri Nomor 04/PDN/PER/4/2015 tentang Petunjuk Teknis Pelaksanaan Pengendalian, Peredaran, dan Penjualan Minuman Beralkohol Golongan A; Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Nomor 20/M-DAG/PER/4/2014 tentang Pengendalian dan Pengawasan terhadap Pengadaan, Peredaran, dan Penjualan Minuman Beralkohol.

³⁷The draft of law on alcoholic beverages was proposed by legislative members in 2020 and the discussions have not been finalized yet.

³⁸Moch. Choirul Rizal, "Kebijakan Kriminalisasi Konsumsi Minuman Beralkohol di Indonesia", *Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan*, Volume 7, Number 1 (2018), 109-126; R Soesilo, *Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) Serta Komentar-Komentarnya Lengkap Pasal Demi Pasal*, Bogor: Politeia, 1995. kebijakan kriminalisasi yang ada saat ini masih belum mampu menjawab permasalahan pokok, yakni dampak negatif dari pengonsumsian minuman beralkohol. Dalam hal ini, tujuan pembangunan nasional berdasarkan Pancasila belum terwujud dengan baik. Studi konseptual ini fokus terhadap 2 (dua

governments have issued regulations that differ from the central government since the reform era. This is due to the regional autonomy law's implementation, which allows regency-level governments to draft their local laws. As a result, some regions have entirely prohibited the distribution of alcoholic beverages, although some regions have legalized and even developed traditional alcoholic beverages.

Regions that prohibit the distribution of alcoholic drinks entirely are Cilacap,³⁹ Purworejo,⁴⁰ Papua,⁴¹ and East Lombok.⁴² Governments in those regions implement control and ban people from producing, distributing, selling, and drinking alcohol. Venues that commonly serve alcoholic drinks are also prohibited from selling alcoholic beverages. While some regions strictly forbid the distribution of alcoholic beverages, Bali is a region that protects, maintains, develops, and utilizes traditionally made alcoholic beverages to build its local economy through Gubernatorial Regulation No. 1/2020 on the Management and Distribution of Traditional Balinese Fermented and Distilled Drinks. They legalized traditional alcoholic drinks and even developed their production as it has high economic potential and is a Balinese cultural product.

West Lombok is unique because it does not entirely ban the product despite the government's determination to control alcoholic beverages. West Lombok government considers alcoholic *tuak* as a tradition that needs to be maintained; tourists' need to consume alcoholic drinks is also accommodated. However, on the other hand, the government is still shows in effort to close down alcoholic *tuak* production operated by

³⁹Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Cilacap Nomor 7 Tahun 2000 tentang Larangan Minuman Keras.

⁴⁰Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Purworejo Nomor 6 Tahun 2006 tentang Larangan Minuman Keras dan Minuman Beralkohol.

⁴¹Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Papua Nomor 15 Tahun 2013 tentang Pelarangan Produksi, Pengedaran dan Penjualan Minuman Beralkohol.

⁴²Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Lombok Timur Nomor 8 Tahun 2002 tentang Larangan Memproduksi, Mengedarkan, Menjual, dan Meminum Minuman Keras/Beralkohol.

Muslims. Although the regional government prohibits the distribution of alcoholic *tuak* in the community, it remains outward-looking and rational by accommodating the various interests of stakeholders.

Having issued Regional Regulation No. 1/2015 on Monitoring and Controlling the Distribution and Sales of Alcoholic Beverages, The West Lombok Government legally conduct social transformation by structural means. Although the regulation does not unconditionally prohibit the distribution of alcoholic beverages in West Lombok, it prohibits the distribution of traditional alcoholic beverages other than ritual purposes. In certain places, the distribution of alcoholic beverages is permitted, but not for the traditional ones. Compared to the previous one,⁴³ the current regulation is focused more on limiting the distribution of traditional alcoholic beverages, which may only be sold for ritual or ceremonial purposes and the production is limited to no more than twenty-five liters per day and are not allowed to send outside the regency.

The above regulation is an aggressive effort made by the West Lombok government against traditional *tuak* production by way of legal litigation. The regulation increasingly put much pressure on villages producing alcoholic *tuak*. The regulation aims to minimize the number of kampongs producing traditional *tuak*, thus rendering them insignificant. The *Perda* is meant to regulate the production of alcoholic *tuak* that is only to fulfill the ritual needs of Hindus in West Lombok. The government decided to allow the production of alcoholic *tuak*, but specifically for rituals. This regulation provides Hindus with the latitude to continue practicing their belief amidst the government's effort to reduce the distribution of alcoholic beverages. While Hindus are allowed to produce and use traditional alcoholic beverages for rituals only, this restriction is expected to prevent

⁴³Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Lombok Barat Nomor 3 Tahun 1998 tentang Retribusi Izin Tempat Penjualan Minuman Beralkohol.

Muslims from producing and consuming *tuak*.⁴⁴

The West Lombok police officers and Public Order Enforcers Police (*Satpol PP*) massively socialize this *Perda* that monitor and control the distribution and sales of alcoholic beverages, including in Langko that has been well known as a main village of *tuak* production. They also did police raid regularly on the streets and on the manufacture of traditional alcoholic beverages. This systematic law enforcement caused the *tuak* manufacturer became afraid to sell its products publicly. Despite the strict monitoring on *tuak* production and distribution has caused the price of *tuak* went up drastically, oftentimes, the police still find the delivery of *tuak* on their raid.

Perda No. 1/2015 still allows hotels to provide factory-made alcoholic beverages for tourists, but not the traditional ones. The government policy allowing the distribution of factory-made alcohol is based on the consideration that a total prohibition of alcoholic beverages will only make the traditional alcoholic beverage more prevalent. Prohibiting the distribution of all alcoholic beverages will only cause a more significant increase in the illegal production and consumption of traditional alcoholic beverages. While in fact, traditional alcoholic beverages are often made without the appropriate composition, which may be hazardous to health and easily trigger a crime by those under its influence.⁴⁵ Traditional alcoholic beverages tend to make people more intoxicated than branded alcoholic drinks. Branded products provide alcohol level information, and those allowed to be consumed by hotel guests are beverages with an alcohol level of less than 5%.

Perda No. 1/2015 gives tourists visiting Lombok access to consume factory-made alcoholic beverages. The West Lombok government realizes

⁴⁴Interview with informant 9, the Regent of West Lombok, on October 9, 2021 in West Lombok.

⁴⁵Interview with informant 9, Regent of West Lombok, on October 8, 2021 in West Lombok.

that tourism is one of its economic pillars, on which they are very dependent. West Lombok's revenue from the tourism sector reaches 42.51% of the Locally Generated Revenue (PAD). The regional government is aware of this condition, and they consider the tourism sector needs to be taken seriously. The *Perda* on the regulation of alcoholic beverages still limits the distribution of factory-made alcoholic drinks for local consumers by prohibiting factory-made alcohol sellers from displaying, advertising, and selling such products in minimarkets and on street sides where they are visible.

The *Perda* regulating alcoholic beverages in West Lombok is a middle-ground solution that is rather inclusive as factory-made alcoholic drinks are only allowed to be distributed in hotels for tourists who usually consume them. In contrast, traditional *tuak* is still allowed as long as it is precisely for religious purposes. The West Lombok Muslim community is prevented from consuming alcoholic beverages by limiting the distribution of alcohol. Such an arrangement model indicates that islamization can still accommodate the interests of various individuals.⁴⁶ This arrangement model differs from the alcoholic beverage regulation imposed in some other places in Indonesia.

Transformation through a community empowerment

The transformation of *tuak* kampong through a structural approach in a ban has yet to achieve effective results. Illegal distribution of alcoholic *tuak* still occurred, which prompted the West Lombok government to take a complementary approach in community empowerment. Prohibiting alcoholic *tuak* production without providing alternative livelihoods for the producers will only fail the program. Muslim tappers have stopped producing alcoholic *tuak* due to cultural transformation, yet they are forced to produce alcoholic

⁴⁶Interview with informant 9, Regent of West Lombok, on October 8, 2021 in West Lombok.

tuak once again when palm sugar prices drop drastically. If they continue to produce palm sugar, they will incur an economic loss, returning to producing alcoholic *tuak*. To address this matter, the West Lombok government expedited the transformation by initiating a community empowerment program to prevent tappers from producing alcoholic *tuak* again.

The government has prepared a transformation program by diversifying the products and popularizing sweet *tuak* since 2016 as a follow-up to regional regulation No. 1 of 2015. They encouraged tappers to process palm sap into various products by providing them with pieces of training and introducing their brand mark to Yogyakarta and West Java. *Gula semut* (brown sugar), *serbat* (a traditional herbal drink), and *serbat kopi* (herbal coffee) are products made through these activities. These products have a higher economic value by threefold when compared to selling alcoholic *tuak* and palm sugar. This led to alternative products that people could sell instead of alcoholic *tuak*. This program responds to the situation when Muslim tappers return to sell alcoholic *tuak* when the price of palm sugar drops.

West Lombok government also provides machine assistance for product processing and packaging. However, before the government implemented the community empowerment program, local people had to initiated a community group organization. Before tappers were given the tools, they were asked to form groups. These groups are meant to ease organization and mutual learning. The activities were also aimed at establishing rules and mutual control when members still sell alcoholic *tuak*. One of the group's agreements is that they no longer produce alcoholic *tuak*.⁴⁷

West Lombok government also assists in the marketing aspect. The government functioned as an intermediary between producers and gift shops, companies, hotels, and chain stores to market the new products.

⁴⁷Interviews with informant 10 and 11, the employee and the secretary of West Lombok Regional Industry and Trade Office, on October 8, 2021.

Currently, *serbat* has been accepted by a national chain store located in Lombok. This palm sugar-based product has also been exported by utilizing the regent's connections with Indonesian embassies abroad. *Serbat* has become a new brand of food souvenir when people visit Lombok. The local government also held a Sweet *Tuak* Drinking Festival to promote various palm-based products. The local government not only prohibited tappers from producing alcoholic *tuak*, they rationally provided alternatives to replace their livelihood.

The empowerment program effectively generated successful entrepreneurs, and it has a domino effect of replication by tappers to produce *gula semut* and *serbat* to anticipate economic shocks when the price of palm sugar drops.⁴⁸ One of the successful entrepreneurs making sherbet in Langko is Pak Abdul Hadi with the LBS Mandiri Ginger Serbat brand. His sherbet products have entered markets in West Lombok and Mataram City. He produces sherbet every day so he needs palm sugar as raw material which was provided by this group of tappers in Langko Village. Interestingly, he buys pale sugar from tappers in Langko at a standard price; even though the price of palm sugar in the market is dropping he buys it at a higher price. As he admitted, this is intended to prevent tappers in their area from returning to producing alcoholic *tuak* when the price of palm sugar drops. Pak Abdul Hadi did it because he wanted to help government programs and also as a way for him to practice the Islamic teachings he had received while studying at pesantren. This condition also does not impact on economic loss for him since the price of LBS Ginger Serbat is relatively stable and not affected when the price of palm sugar drops.

⁴⁸Interview with informant 9, Regent of West Lombok, on October 8, 2021 in West Lombok; interview with informant 8, on November 4, 2021 in West Lombok.

Cultural, structural, and community empowerment transformations

The present study found that islamization can be done peacefully without causing any commotion when the primary interests of other groups are accommodated and rational approaches are employed. This finding aligns with Habermas' perception that religion can enter public spaces when it uses logical explanations.⁴⁹ However, the conclusion differs from Habermas as it suggests that religion can enter public areas without abandoning religious symbols. Religious symbols can be presented so long as all religions are given equal opportunities.

Another finding of the study is that the Islamic transformation process in West Lombok was done by three means, i.e., *first* voluntary cultural transformation by means of education, raising awareness, and da'wah. *Second*, structural transformation by means of legal arrangements relating to regulation on the distribution of alcoholic beverages still provides space for Hindus to keep their religious rituals. *Third*, rational transformation by means of economic community empowerment. By combining these three approaches, islamization without commotion was successfully achieved. Had the transformation solely relied on the structural approach, merely prohibiting the drinks, it would undoubtedly have raised protests, commotion, and the proliferation of illegal markets, as seen in the case of prostitution prohibition in Langit Biru Jambi⁵⁰ and Kedung Banteng Ponorogo.⁵¹ If only the economic community empowerment approach had been used without the cultural approach, it would not have addressed

⁴⁹Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere"...

⁵⁰Murdiyanto Murdiyanto, "Dampak Penutupan Lokalisasi terhadap Pekerja Seks Komersial (PSK) dan Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat Sekitar", *Media Informasi Penelitian Kesejahteraan Sosial*, Volume 43, Number 3 (2020), 195–210.

⁵¹Dian Suluh Kusuma Dewi and Slamet Santoso, "Sociological Impact of the Closure of Prostitution Business in Kedung Banteng to the Prostitute's Social Life", *Proceedings of the International Conference on Ethics in Governance (ICONEG 2016)*, Atlantis Press, 2017, 353–355.

the problem.⁵² However, if the social transformation were left without any regulation, it would have made the people take action on their own.⁵³

A rational and outward-looking transformation and islamization that utilizes cultural, structural, and empowerment approaches can respond to the needs of religious followers to be more religious while maintaining pluralism. The da'wa by *pesantrens* with a non-violent approach has encouraged the targeted local community to draw their attention to the true Islamic teachings that have gradually changed their notions and habits, especially regarding *tuak* production. In the next step, the government introduce structural and economic approaches with local regulation and community development programs that finally transformed the villagers. This process has highlighted that eventhough islamization is often considered frightening and closely related to fundamentalism, radicalism, and intolerance, such cultural, rational, and outward-looking Islamization attributes can cultivate communities in religious countries with diverse religious groups.

Conclusion

Evidently, the prevailing assumption that Islamism movement threatens the diversity and breeds violence is not entirely true. The current study suggests that Islamic movement in alcoholic *tuak* kampongs demonstrates its unique characteristics. Islamic movement in West Lombok was done peacefully and voluntarily by accommodating and providing space for other religious followers to carry out their rituals despite its contradiction with

⁵²"Mohan Angkat Suara Terkait Indikasi Penyalahgunaan Dana Bantuan Alih Profesi Pedagang Tuak", *TV 9 Lombok* (September 7, 2017), <http://www.tv9lombok.co.id/mohan-angkat-suara-terkait-indikasi-penyalahgunaan-dana-bantuan-alih-profesi-pedagang-tuak/>, accessed on October 7, 2021 at 10:12 AM.

⁵³Lusi Andriyani, "Kebijakan Politik Pengendalian dan Pengawasan Minuman Beralkohol di Jakarta Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 74 Tahun 2013", *Swatantra*, Volume 15, Number 2 (2017), 145-160.

Islamic values. It also presents a rational face of Islam that all can accept. Consequently, Islamic movement was carried out without any commotion when rational consideration was employed, room for differences was provided, and non-coercion was applied.

This study has its implication as it provided a new perspective and in-depth understanding of Islamism, observed from the doer's perspective. Such a perspective provided an in-depth understanding and allowed the formulation of an Islamism movement that does not provoke fear, that is rational and respects diversity. This study argue that Islamism movement does not always drive to fundamentalism and violence. However, this study has its limitations as it made no comparison with Islamization cases in other locations with different results. While in fact, a comparative study of successful and unsuccessful Islamization processes is essential to strengthening the conceptual structure of "dark" Islamism and peaceful islamization without commotion. Due to this limitation, it is strongly recommended for further empirical studies comparing Islamic movements in various locations. Henceforth, such studies will enrich a complete portrait of various Islamic movements.

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