Theologising democracy in the context of Muhammadiyah’s *ijtihād*

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**Abstract**

This article seeks to examine how the process of Muhammadiyah’s *ijtihād* has evolved, specifically in constructing the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* (the state of consensus and witness) and the arguments on which it is built. The scholarly issues that have been highlighted in this article on this specific discourse have not been done yet, the *ijtihād* in the field of *Siyar* (law of war and international relations in Islamic traditions), which has been elaborated with ideas of contemporary social sciences is very rare, and the discourse of *Siyar* has dominantly covered only the area of Middle East. Accordingly, this article confidently fulfils these gaps by applying a qualitative research method and analysis of social contextualisation. This article argues that the way of Muhammadiyah’s *ijtihād* in producing the idea of Indonesia as the state of consensus and witness is applying theologising democracy. It consists of a trajectory in which Muhammadiyah has objectified Islam and substantialised it to enhance the meaning of democracy.

Keywords: Siyar; Negara Pancasila; Dâr al-'Ahd wa al-Shahâdah; Theologising democracy; Objectification of Islam

Introduction

In 2015, Muhamadiah\(^1\) proclaimed the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-'Ahd wa al-Shahâdah (the state of consensus and witness).\(^2\) It is an idea that provides an intellectual reconciliation between the state ideology of Pancasila\(^3\) and the doctrine of Siyar.\(^4\) This notion means that Indonesia

\(^1\)Muhamadiah is the largest modernist Muslim organisation which has been considered puritan and reformist. See Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Muhamadiah,” in Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t343/e0296 (accessed May 10, 2019).


\(^4\)Siyar is a special discipline in Islamic law which terminologically means conducting Islamic or Muslim states in relation with other communities. See Majid Khadduri, “The Islamic
is the state based on Pancasila (Negara Pancasila), and since Pancasila was conceptualised through the national consensus by its founding fathers, Indonesia should be understood as the state of consensus (dār al-‘ahd)—that is, neither the Islamic state (dār al-Islām) nor the state of war (dār al-ḥarb). Through this meaning, Muhammadiyah emphasises that it supports a moderate Islamic concept of democracy. However, support is not enough; rather, it believes that guaranteeing the process of substantial democratisation and the state development of Indonesia is needed. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah adds the concept of dār al-shahādah (the state of witness). With this conceptual addition, Muhammadiyah intends that its activists and Indonesian Muslims should generally involve themselves in an agenda of state democratisation and development in order to ensure that the ideal of Indonesia becoming “the sovereign, just and prosperous state which is granted by God’s blessing” (baldatun ṭayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr) will be achieved.5

It can be emphasised here that the notion implicitly contains a discourse on democracy as Negara Indonesia itself has been projected as a democratic state. This projection has gained its place mainly in the post authoritarian era while the political climate has been more inclusive and relatively liberal. In this context, political opportunities and freedom have been widely opened. The ultimate goal of these opportunities and freedoms is to facilitate and nurture so-called civil liberty. However, it has also generated adverse effects, one of which is the massive flourishing of

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an Islamism that has tended to be conservative and even radical. In more liberal political practices, conservative and radical Muslims have likely gained benefits from the process of democratisation, although they have obviously fallen short of the ideal of democracy, which puts values of civility in a high place. Islamists have joined the political system but, at the same time, they have allegedly manipulated its substance and enforced their own ideologically monolithic system of politics that undermines the very fact of political and societal plurality. Some scholars have noted, for instance, that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) have insisted that Indonesia should be categorised as dâr al-ḥarb (the state of war), its democratic political system is kufr (infidel) and its state principles of Pancasila is thâghut (evil). As a consequence, Indonesia, in their view, must be Islamised in whatever ways that they can effect this. In so doing, they stand in opposition to others who purport to defend democracy, anti-authoritarianism and anti-dehumanisation.

In this context, while Muhammadiyah has asserted the notion of Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, it also emphasises its efforts to challenge the undemocratic political thought of Islamism. It consistently argues that Islamism threatens Indonesian democratisation and the development of Islamic thought which respects the essentials of the values of democracy. From the point of view of Islamic legal thought, this line of reasoning is a kind of ijtiḥād. As some of its activists have believed, it involve the

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7 In Islamic legal thought, ijtiḥād means “a serious intellectual effort in formulating a certain legal issue based on the scriptural texts.” Ali ibn Muhammad al-Jurjānī, Kitāb al-Ta’rīfāt, Cairo: Matba’at al-Hamiyyah al-Misriyyah, 1903, 5. Regarding the term of ijtiḥād, Muhammadiyah, more or less, follows this definition. See Asjmuni Abdurrahman, “Sorotan terhadap beberapa Masalah Sekitar Ijthid”, in Pramono U. Tanthowi (ed.) Begawan Muhammadiyah: Bunga Rampai Pidato Pengukuhan Guru Besar Tokoh Muhammadiyah, Jakarta: PSAP, 2005, 57-84. But in the process of ijtiḥād, it involves an approach of “critical hermeneutics” to ensure its way
knitting together of two conceptual yarns—the reformed Siyar and Pancasila (Indonesian democracy). The method of its knitting is what they call ‘theologising democracy.’ This article will thus focus on the process by which it has evolved and the arguments on which it is built. This article argues that, in theologising democracy, Muhammadiyah has ‘objectified’ Islam and ‘substantialised’ it to enhance the meaning of democracy.

**Muhammadiyah’s methodology of Ijtihād**

In the field of Islamic legal thought, Muhammadiyah has a special institution that has a special duty to conduct ijtihād, namely Majelis Tarjih. In this institution, Muhammadiyah’s legal experts collectively perform ijtihād. They try to find a solution for problems on which there is no guidance in the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, or from ijmā’ (consensus), qiyaṣ (analogy), istiḥsān (preference), īstimāl (the public good) or the ‘ulamā’īṣān (Islamic legal opinions). However, when they have to deal with the discourse of reconciliation between Pancasila and Islam, they have realised that this discourse relates to not only the issue of Islamic law, but also widely the issues of politics, society and culture. As a consequence, ijtihād on this specific discourse cannot be handled only by Majelis Tarjih.

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8 The specific term of “theologising democracy” that will be used here refers to Azhar Ibrahim’s conceptualisation. See Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy: Sentiments on the Idea of Democracy in Muslim Southeast Asia”, in Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World, Petaling Jaya: SRID, 2014, 121-157. In addition, the term of “objectification” refers to Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama, Budaya, dan Politik dalam Bingkai Strukturalisme Transendental, Bandung: Mizan, 2001, 307-308. Both these terms will be subsequently discussed in the next part of “Theologising Democracy.”


11 An interview with Saad Ibrahim.
needs collaboratively an intellectual action that invites all Muhammadiyah experts from various disciplines of knowledge to join in the agenda of collective *ijtiha*ād (*ijtiha*ād jamā‘i).*12*

In conducting this *ijtiha*ād, Muhammadiyah refers to general values extracted from the Qur’a*ān* and ḥadīth. In diagnosing problems, Muhammadiyah applies an interdisciplinary approach referring to various disciplines of study such as the social sciences and humanities to find the main roots of the problems. Both extracted values and the results of interdisciplinary diagnosis have specifically been noted by Muhammadiyah intellectuals.*13*

On this point, Muhammadiyah’s methodology of *ijtiha*ād is similar to that offered by Muslim intellectuals such as Fazlur Rahman, Tariq Ramadan, and Abdullah Saeed, who are concerned about excavating the ethical values of Islam in order to implement them in a certain place and time (*zeit und geit*)—indeed, after they have understood the new contextualisation.*14*

The first step that Muhammadiyah has undertaken is collecting the Quranic verses (‘*ayāt*) which are relevant to the discourse of the reconciliation between Pancasila and Islam.*15* This step has been followed by a historical inquiry into

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*13*Amin Abdullah argues, “One salient feature of Muhammadiyah movement is its critical thinking, which by its nature will enable re-interrogating the dialectical relationship between ‘text’ and ‘realities’, or between ‘normativity’ of the Quran and Sunnah and the ‘historicity’ of Muslims’ understanding of respective texts in particular periods.” Amin Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman”, in Muhammad Azhar and Hamim Ilyas (eds.), *Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman Muhammadiyah: Purifikasi dan Dinamisasi*, Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2000, 7; See also Pradana Boy ZTF, *Fatwa in Indonesia...*, 229.


*15*The selected verses that Muhammadiyah chooses are “Every Muslim has obligations to worship God (al- Qur’a*ān*, Surah al-Zāriyāt: 56, Hud: 61), to do good and avoid evil (Ali Imran:
the Prophetic traditions (aḥādīth) that are relevant to the verses.16 This step is important to evaluate the context of the verses when they were revealed (asbāb al-muẓāl). Sometimes, some ḥādīths also provide the specific explanations of why the Prophet Muhammad with his wisdom was doing something or talking about it (asbāb al-wuṣūd). These steps aim to discover the essential meanings behind both the Quranic and Prophetic texts. However, this work is not as easy as applying textual interpretation (bayāni).17 It needs a further step to find links among relevant verses and their historical contexts. These links will explain the dialectic relations between inter-textuality of the verses and inter-contextuality of the Prophetic traditions.18 These relations provide a way of extracting principal ethical values (maqāṣid al-sharā'i'ah).19

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16There are some peace accords initiated by the Prophet Muhammad that are relevant as sources of conceptualising the notion of Dār al-ʿĀhd wa al-Shahādah. In fact, one of them that was intensively discussed in the Muktamar Muhammadiyah in Makassar is the history of the Madinah Charter.


18In this step, Muhammadiyah has played the roles of the approach of rational and speculative thinking (burhāni). Ahmad Nur Fuad, Dari Reformis hingga Transformatif..., 165-166.

19The last and the most important step for Muhammadiyah in undertaking ijtihād is extracting the ethical values behind the scriptural texts. It needs a deeper intellectual reflection, wisdom and also spiritual approach (ʿirfāni) that gains benefits from the roles of intuition when mujtahid tries to seek the divine inspiration. Ahmad Nur Fuad, Dari Reformis hingga Transformatif..., 166.
However, according to Amin Abdullah, the former chairman of Majelis Tarjih, these values of *maqāsid* cannot be applied instantly. Its instant application will lead to the risk of contradicting the nature of the proposition of the legal thought, “the texts are limited and the contexts are always changing themselves” (*tanāhiya al-nuṣūṣ wa ‘adāmu tanāhiya al-waquā‘i’*), which implies that the superiority of the textual approach would marginalise the spiritual values of the *maqāsid*. In another words, this approach emphasises the form rather than the substance. As a consequence, the current realities should be comprehensively understood before the application of the values. Abdullah argues that this way of understanding needs the perspective of the social sciences and humanities to gain a better understanding of the complexities of the context, as well as its peculiar circumstances. He, furthermore, adds that this better understanding will ensure the applicability of the *maqāsid*, its compatibility with the socio-political and cultural traditions of the society, and its relevance with the spirit of the era (*zeitgeist*). When both the *maqāsid* and the comprehension of the current context are ready, the last step is conceptualisation. This conceptualisation has been conducted collectively through a congress.

**Theologising democracy**

The way of Muhammadiyah’s *ijtiḥād* in reformulating the conceptual

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21 Amin Abdullah, “A-Ta’wil al-‘Ilmi”...
23 Ahmad Nur Fuad, *Dari Reformis hingga Transformatif...*, 133-172.
reconciliation between Pancasila and Siyar can be understood as theologising democracy.\textsuperscript{24} This, according to Azhar Ibrahim, means “giving substantiation to the concept of democracy beyond its formal meaning.”\textsuperscript{25} In this context, “the virtues and efficacy of democracy... are regarded as fundamental to the nurturing of religious and humanistic values which champion justice, equality and human dignity.”\textsuperscript{26} This formulation, thus, has a dimension of education. It aims at educating Muslims about the ethos and spirit of democracy that should adhere to core Islamic values (maqāṣid). In other words, it explains that democracy is seen as “a paradigmatic value and vision”\textsuperscript{27} that provides the theological directions of Islam which deliberately respect the values of ‘adl (justice and good governance), musāwah (equality), ḥurriyyah (freedom), tasāμuh (tolerance), masʿuliyyah (public accountability) and shūra (people’s sovereignty or consultation).\textsuperscript{28} Azhar Ibrahim argues:

Obviously democracy needs no religious justification given the efficacy of its principles and spirit. But if we are dealing with a society where religious ideas and symbolism are central to its cultural and intellectual imagination, and where the religion – Islam – is perceived as a ‘system’, invariably contrasted with other competing ideologies such as liberalism, socialism and the like, then it is imperative to explicate the meanings and principles of democracy in a cultural language that people can relate to and identify with.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} In implementing this way, Muhammadiyah has elaborated the three approaches (bayañi, burhān and ‘irfān) of al-Jabiri, and also applied hermeneutics in considering the relationship between maqasid and current realities.

\textsuperscript{25} Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”..., 129.

\textsuperscript{26} Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”...

\textsuperscript{27} Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”...

\textsuperscript{28} Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”..., 131. In addition, the former general chairman of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais defines that the Muhammadiyah’s thought of democracy is “the democracy which is based on the Islamic principles of equality and accountability (persamaan dan keterbukaan).” See Amien Rais, Demi Kepentingan Bangsa, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997, 92.

\textsuperscript{29} Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”..., 122-123.
In the circle of Muhammadiyah elites, in terms of educating Muslims, Abdul Munir Mulkhan’s argument is apt:

Educating people about Pancasila is imperative, but it should be developed progressively in a social atmosphere that is dialogic – that is, aware of the objective situation of the society and its future orientation. This mission of education is not only an effort to revitalise the values of Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, but also a direction for the development of society, mainly of youth who are encouraged to be more independent and critical. These characteristics will develop a stronger mentality and culture when facing challenging realities and modernity in the future.\(^\text{30}\)

It can be considered that this theologising democracy has two ways of bridging Muhammadiyah’s notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah and its view of democracy. The first way is ‘objectification’ of Islam and the second way is substantialising it to strengthen the understanding of democracy.\(^\text{30}\)

First, Muhammadiyah has tended to objectify Islam. According to Kuntowijoyo, one of the Muhammadiyah’s leading intellectuals, the meaning of objectification is “looking at something objectively,” which means treating Islam as “an object as it is and not as it is wanted.”\(^\text{31}\) He argues that Pancasila as the Indonesian democracy is the “objectification of Islam.”\(^\text{32}\) At length, he explains:

Pancasila is neither a secular concept, nor a religion. As an ideology, Pancasila is an objectification of religions. This means that objective elements in all religions exist in Pancasila... We argue that Pancasila is an objectification of Islam. The essence of Islam and that of Pancasila

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\(^{32}\)Kuntowijoyo, *Muslim Tanpa Masjid...*; Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia*...
do not contradict each other, although the historical existence of Pancasila may be debated particularly to serve a particular social interest. However, it must be emphasised that Islam is a religion and Pancasila is an ideology. Pancasila will not become a religion and religions will not become ideologies.\textsuperscript{33}

It can also be understood that the Kuntowijoyo’s objectification is a concretisation of Islam,\textsuperscript{34} since its values are being conceptualised ‘concretely’ in the form of Pancasila as an objective language that can be understood by many people. In this context, Muhammadiyah tends to depict Pancasila as the concept of polity that is inherently Islamic due to containing the values of Islam, pre-eminently democratic values.\textsuperscript{35} Emphasising this concept, Muhammadiyah argues that the conceptualisation of the polity needs language that objectively can not only be understood by many people beyond their race, ethnicity and religion, but also be rationally debated and deliberately accepted. In their view, then, Pancasila becomes the basic state principle not only for the adherents of Islam but also all other believers. In short, it is the state principle for all Indonesians.

However, not all Indonesian Muslims agree with the effort of objectification of Islam, including even some within Muhammadiyah. As some Muhammadiyah elites have noted, the most popular reason that the rejectionists give is that because Pancasila is a kind of democracy, like democracy itself, it is the product of Western civilisation.\textsuperscript{36} Accordingly, it is perceived in this view as a concept terminologically unknown in Islamic traditions. One of the proponents of this rejectionist view is Adian Husaini, who insists that democracy is not an authentic concept of Islam.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34}Kuntowijoyo, Identitas Politik Umat Islam...
\textsuperscript{35}Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdi Wa Syahadah..., 13.
\textsuperscript{36}An interview with Saad Ibrahim.
\textsuperscript{37}Conservative wings within Muhammadiyah are not monolithic. Some tend to accept democracy, some accept it on the condition that it should have scriptural justification, and
Another one is Bachtiar Nasir, who claims that democracy is an infidel political system. Both figures are Muhammadiyah activists. Undoubtedly, the arguments and practices of democracy have been primarily developed in Western countries, and it is also the case that the Huntingtonian view of a “clash of civilisations” has induced some in the West even to believe that Islam constrains the modern values of the West. The perception of a West hostile to Islam reinforces some Muslims’ antipathy to democracy.

Nevertheless, some Muhammadiyah elites try to understand this reality. They realise that their main task is to promote a moderate idea of Islam in line with the noble ideas of both Islam and the West through a language that can accommodate different perspectives. In this regard, Pancasila becomes a concept of democracy that is offered to all Indonesians, while the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah is provided for especially Indonesian Muslims. Providing the latter notion, Muhammadiyah tries to convince Muslims to accept democracy. While Kuntowijoyo asserts that Pancasila is an objectification of Islam, Muhammadiyah argues that Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, as the

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38 A private Indonesian television, TV One, facilitated Bachtiar Nasir’s ability to speak to the public about Syirik Demokrasi (the shirk of democracy). See Bachtiar Nasir, Syirik Demokrasi, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMMVBQTdPMk (Retrieved in 20 September 2018).


40 For example, in his book, for many times Adian Husaini strongly rejects any form of the Western intellectual product and creativity. In addition, he also claims that Orientalism has encouraged public suffering for Muslims. See further, Adian Husaini, Wajah Peradaban Barat...

further intellectual elaboration of Pancasila, is also a form of it. Thus, theologising democracy, as an effort of ‘objectifying’ Islam, can be considered Muhammadiyah’s way of connecting religion and politics: Islam, democracy, the Indonesian democracy of Pancasila, and its notion of *Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah* are all intimately interconnected.

Second, Muhammadiyah attempts to substantialise Islam, by which is meant giving priority to the substantial or spiritual values of Islam rather than its formalistic and legalistic teachings, rules and rituals.42 This concept refers to Abdul Munir Mulkhan’s conceptualisation of *Sufitisasi Syariah* (‘Sufitisation’ of *Shari‘ah*).43 He elaborates that it means “…the Islamic thought...referring to the functionalisation of spiritual values of religion and their applications in the concrete life of human beings...engaging in and connecting transcendental thought and socio-cultural realm.”44 Furthermore, he argues, because the *Shari‘ah* tends to be perceived as the law which is strictly formalistic and lacks spiritual values, it should be substantialised just as Sufis have inspired us to emphasise the esoteric rather than exoteric dimension of Islam.45 However, the term of *Sufitisation* is problematic for Muhammadiyah given that it has been resistant to any concept that contradicts its doctrine of religious puritanism.46 To avoid such a misunderstanding, Muhammadiyah has developed instead the term ‘substantialisation,’ which is justified by the concept of *akhlaq al-ka‘īmah*.

44 Although it is terminologically slightly different, it has similar meaning. See Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Kesalehan Multikultural*, Jakarta: PSAP, 2005, 230.
45 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Neo-Sufisme dan Pudarnya Fundamentalisme di Pedesaan*...
(the glorious ethics or the noble behaviour of Islam).  

In dealing with the effort of substantialising Islam, Muhammadiyah affirms that democratic values are important and relevant to the Islamic ethics of freedom (ḥurriyyah), humanity (insāniyyah), justice (ʿadālah), equality (musāawah), solidarity (takfūl), cooperation (taʿawun) and many others. However, as important as they are, these Islamic values will not undermine the modern concept of democracy, although actually democracy itself does not need to be supported by any religious legitimation. Yet, the compatibility of the two realms – Islam and democracy – is essential, because Muhammadiyah has faced the challenging reality of the trend of formalisation of Shariʿah, the Maududian view of politics, and takfiri thought (judging others as infidels).

Legal-centrism in understanding Islam has led to the trend of formalisation of Shariʿah. This trend has meant avoiding accepting Islam as substantial values (maqāṣid), although the proponents of the formalisation of Shariʿah have frequently claimed that what they have campaigned for is to serve maqāṣid. One of the provinces in Indonesia that has formalised Shariʿah as a regional public law is Aceh. This law regulates moral affairs such as gambling, prostitution, adultery, and small crimes, but serious crime such as corruption and the like. Due to decentralisation in the post-authoritarian era of Indonesia, the central government has allowed some regions to formalise Shariʿah legally. The government has claimed

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47Muhammadiyah has also offered the concept of spiritualisation of Islam, instead of sufisitation. Hasnan Bachtiar (ed.), Diskursus Neo-Sufisme Muhammadiyah...  
that it is important because of the political risks of conflict and political disintegration.\textsuperscript{51} Some Muhammadiyah intellectuals have disagreed with this policy. One of them, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, argues that it will strongly enhance cultural and religious chauvinism which in turn can facilitate political despotism in the name of religious claims.\textsuperscript{52} However, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah issued an official statement that asserts that Muhammadiyah does not oppose the state decision based on considerations of state security, building peace and national integration.\textsuperscript{53} Muhammadiyah’s statement in this regard seems to contradict its effort at theologising democracy. However, it has eyed with concern the larger problem: the destructive impact of the spread of Islamist conservatism due to formalisation of the Sha ri'a. On the one hand, Muhammadiyah has tried to negotiate with the state and has anticipated the problem of national disintegration. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah has given priority to the more essential issue of nurturing Indonesian democracy.

In addition, the Maududian thought that assumes Islam provides its own concept of politics and democracy is also an issue that has been covered by the effort of substantialisation of Islam. Some Muslims have assumed the superiority of Islam.\textsuperscript{54} It has resulted in religious thought that emphasises that Islam contains an Islamic idea of democracy that is different from Western democracy.\textsuperscript{55} In their perspective, because Indonesian democracy has one leg in religious principle and the other in secularisation inspired by the practices of democracy in the West, it

\textsuperscript{52}Muhammad Hilali Basya, Islam, Secularity and the State in Post-New Order Indonesia..., 230-232.
\textsuperscript{53}Muhammad Hilali Basya, Islam, Secularity and the State in Post-New Order Indonesia..., 227-228.
\textsuperscript{54}Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy..., 152.
\textsuperscript{55}Azhar Ibrahim, “Towards Theologising Democracy”...
One idea that can be accepted, however, is theo-democracy, which means democracy that has been produced only by the theological thought of Islam. Some prominent Indonesian Muslims who have a relatively similar Maududian way of thinking have been Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem, and also the legal expert and politician Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Yet Muhammadiyah disagrees with this view, criticising Maududian thinking as ideologically affirming both a formalism of religious identity and cultural nativism that have blurred other acceptable and external political forms. An activist of the Dakwah Division (Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus) of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, Zuly Qodir, for example, clearly criticises Maududian political thought, and argues for the importance of promoting the idea of moderate Islam, rather than political revivalism that tends, in his view, to corrupt the substantial meaning of Islam.

Another problem that has tended to encourage Muhammadiyah to substantialise Islam is the takfiri trend. It has become the current

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58 See Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia..., 60.
60 The position of Yusril Ihza Mahendra has remained unclear as to whether he totally rejects, or does not, the concept of secularisation. But what is really clear here is that his position has been conditioned by his pragmatism in terms of political behaviour to gain political advantage, such as a chairman of the Partai Bulan Bintang (the Moon and Star Party). He was appointed Minister of Justice and Human Rights (1999-2001), Minister of Law (2001-2004), and Minister of the State Secretary (2004-2007). See Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariah Islam: Dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria, Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004, 64.
62 Zuly Qodir, Muhammadiyah Studies...
63 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Tanfidz Keputusan Muktamar Muhammadiyah ke 47...
phenomenon, mainly due to the hardening of conservative religious attitudes. *Takfiri* means the judgment to condemn others as infidels due to their having different identities or religious interpretations. In the *takfiri* point of view, Islam cannot become a source of democracy and democracy itself will never be Islamic.\(^64\) A leading figure of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Abu Bakar Baasyir, for example, states that “…democracy is a polytheistic (*shirk*) political system. …the *Shari'ah* is final… all laws and regulations implemented should express the spirit of *al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar.*”\(^65\) An Islamist group such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) wants to transform the democratic political system of Indonesia to become the *Khilāfah* system.\(^66\) For this group, Pancasila is neither *Shari'ah* nor any concept that derives from Islamic traditions.\(^67\) Although HTI was banned by the state in October 2017 as contradicting the state principle, its ideological influence remains of concern to the state as well as Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah.\(^68\) Thus, through its efforts to substantialise Islam, Muhammadiyah hopes to neutralise the influence of the *takfiri* trend, mainly by promoting an idea of moderate Islam which it believes is fully consistent with the process of substantial democratisation in Indonesia.

However, theologising democracy, which has been represented by both objectification and substantialisation of Islam, is not intended as theological

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\(^{68}\) An interview with Abdul Munir Mulkhan, a leading intellectual within Muhammadiyah. 22 September 2018.
legitimation (ayatisasi) of political interests or realpolitik. In this context, Din Syamsuddin states that Muhammadiyah is a Muslim organisation that has dedicated itself as a dakwah organisation (proselytising) that aims to educate people. It is not, in its self-presentation, a political organisation that aims to gain power. In line with Syamsuddin’s statement, Hajriyanto Thohari argues that political instrumentalisation does not need ijtihād, but educating people in the hope of developing human civilisation does need it. Furthermore, he adds that inviting people to be involved in the process of substantial democratisation is the right path towards achieving Indonesian civilisation.

**Arguments of ijtihād**

The mechanism of theologising democracy implemented by Muhammadiyah is constructed from several arguments: historical, sociological, political and theological.

First, historically, some Muhammadiyah activists gave their important contribution to the nation in terms of conceptualisation of Pancasila. They did so through an institution called Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/BPUPKI). Mainly in the process of reformulating the first principle of Pancasila, these Muhammadiyah activists allowed retention of the phrase, “Belief in the One and only God” (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) and eliminated the words, “with the obligation to carry out Islamic Šari‘ah for Muslim adherents” (dengan Šari‘ah untuk Muslim).
In the congress of BPUPKI, they at first offered a version of the first principle of Pancasila which would have formalised the Shari’ah. In contrast, nationalists challenged their offer. At the first part of the conceptualisation on 1st June 1945, they agreed with the Islamist concept of “Belief in God with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari’ah for Muslim adherents” (Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi para pemeluknya). Yet, at the final part that was held on 18th August 1945, it turned to the secularist concept (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) and all members of the BPUPKI congress agreed. However, this does not mean that Muslims easily accepted the secularist offer. It was, above all, a negotiation, and theologically they had attempted to substantialise the formal articulation of Shari’ah in Pancasila. In other words, Muslims compromised between religious principle and political pragmatism, but claimed an Islamic reading of the words. In considering this part of history, Syaifullah argues that Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa was understood by Muslims not from the secularist viewpoint, but from the primary Islamic belief in tawhīd or God’s Oneness. Moreover, due to their roles, the Minister of Religious Affairs (1978-1983), Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, claims that “Pancasila is the Muslims’ sacrifice and the biggest gift for the national integration of Indonesia and its independence.” Key actors in deciding to accept the phrase, “Belief in the One and only God,” were Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Kahar Muzakkir. Another Muhammadiyah activist in this special moment was Soekarno. The main reason to eliminate the seven crucial words (tujuh kata) in ‘Piagam Jakarta’ was the fear that East Indonesia, where the majority of

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non-Muslims lived, would establish a separate country.\(^{77}\) According to Abdul Munir Mulkhan, although the debate had been intense, Muslim representatives displayed a deep and progressive understanding of Islam.\(^{78}\) They prioritised the importance of national integration rather than run the risk of disintegration, and also respected the values of tolerance, harmony and nationhood (gotong-royong), rather than Islamist nativism. A historian, Anhar Gonggong in considering this period, mentions that Pancasila is a product of a national consensus between secular and Muslim nationalists.\(^{79}\)

In terms of Indonesia as the dar al-shahādah (the state of witness), Muhammadiyah significantly played a major role in the establishment of Indonesian independence in the past, and also has contributed to the development of the nation until now. Through its charity enterprises, Muhammadiyah has helped the government mainly in the fields of education, health, and philanthropy. Besides, the state has also recognised the essential roles of Muhammadiyah and it gave a national honour to the founder of Muhammadiyah, KH. Ahmad Dahlan and his wife, Nyai Walidah, as one of the Muslim women activists in the early period of Indonesian independence. Both were granted honours as Indonesian national heroes.\(^{80}\) Some other Muhammadiyah activists were awarded the same, such as General Sudirman, Ir. Juanda, Dr. Soetomo, KH. Mas


\(^{78}\) Abdul Munir Mulkhan, “Pokok-Pokok Pikiran: Ketuhanan dalam Kehidupan Bernegara”, in Muamaroh and Benni Setiawan (eds.), Negara Pancasila, Darul ‘Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah..., 104-120.


\(^{80}\) Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdi Wa Syahadah..., 11.
Mansur and Agus Salim. In various executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions, Muhammadiyah has also contributed to the state through the roles of their cadres.

Second, sociologically, the majority of Muhammadiyah activists have understood Islam as a moderate religion (wasatiyyah). According to Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, the religious moderatism among its activists can be seen from their attitude and behaviour, mainly when they express their religious ideas in tolerant and respectful ways. Amin Abdullah sees this phenomenon of religious moderatism as displayed by the majority of Indonesian Muslims in general, and asserts that the inclusivist ideas of Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif come from (and are conditioned by) the daily life of Indonesian Muslims. According to Azyumardi Azra, the process of conditioning the moderate character of Nusantara Muslims occurred a long time ago. Thus, it can be said that the Islamic expressions of Indonesian Muslims have been different from their counterparts in the Middle East.

Third, politically, Muhammadiyah argues that the democracy of Pancasila is a manifestation of the political system’s secularisation.
Muhammadiyah thus puts Pancasila in between the doctrines of Islamism and secularism. This effort of negotiation in Zuly Qodir’s term is developing the democratic Shari‘ah (Syariah demokratik), meaning Shari‘ah that respects the values of pluralism, tolerance and humanity. While secularism is actually an effort at eliminating any religious aspiration within a political system, secularisation is a way of human thought that governs the state with all its limitations but without necessarily negating non-secular aspects. This in essence is how Muhammadiyah understands Indonesia—not an Islamic state, but substantially based on Islamic values. A leading figure of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, argues that “The five principles of Pancasila do not contradict the theology of Islam. …But Islam here is Islam which is in line with the noble values of Indonesia and humanity (keindonesiaan dan kemanusiaan).” Borrowing Nurcholish Madjid’s term, what Muhammadiyah means by secularisation is “Islamic secularisation.”

89Zuly Qodir, Syariah Demokratik...
91Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdi Wa Syahadah...
93See further on this concept in Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan, Bandung: Mizan, 2008, 298-301. Unfortunately, a scholar such as Luthfi Assyaukani categorises Amien Rais, an important Muhammadiyah figure, as an opponent of secularisation. See Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia, 108-109. It is true that he rejects secularism and even secularisation. But I think, Assyaukani wrongly understands the deeper meaning that Amien Rais argues for. While he refuses to accept secularism, he does not reject the application of the Islamic principles of democracy such as equality, freedom, justice and accountability. However, Assyaukani’s interpretation on Amien Rais’ argument is understandable due to Amien Rais himself using the term “secularisation” in a negative
means “...detaching taboo or sacredness from the objects which are actually non-taboo and non-sacred.”\(^94\) Consequently, in spite of the fact that Indonesian politics is only a mundane matter, its political process should be dealt with in line with Islamic ethics (\textit{akhlaq al-\textit{kar\'imah}}).\(^95\) Accordingly, secularisation, in the Nurcholish Madjid view, primarily intends to protect the state from the public destructiveness (\textit{fas\'ad fi al-\textit{ard}}) that can be caused by the political manipulation of religion.\(^96\) According to Ahmad Syafii Maarif, both secularism and religious fundamentalism can potentially lead to public destructiveness due to their actors using religion as an instrument of political power, and not as the source of noble virtues.\(^97\) In considering this issue of political instrumentalisation of religion, Moeslim Abdurrahman states that Muhammadiyah aims to fight against the social destructiveness (\textit{kemunkaran sosial}) resulting from political authoritarianism in a religious cloak.\(^98\) Thus, with the perspective of religious secularisation, as Kuntowijoyo reflects, Pancasila can be understood as a theo-democracy, although very different from the Maududian concept.\(^99\) According to Yudi Latif, an intellectual who appreciates Kuntowijoyo’s reformulation, the democracy of Pancasila is the democracy which believes in God, and it puts political power in the hands of God and the people at the same
time. Accordingly, the concept of *khalifatullah fi Indonesia* (Viceregency of God in Indonesia) as initiated by Muhammadiyah elites is relevant in this context.

Fourth, for Muhammadiyah, Indonesian ideas (*keindonesiaan*) and Islamic values (*keislaman*) should be integrated properly. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah advances the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-ʿAhd wa al-Shahādah* as an intellectual confluence of the state principles of Pancasila and of Siyar. Its initiation is based on two foundations of religious thought: (1) theologically, Islam itself provides the values of democracy such as *shūra*, which in turn was adopted in Bahasa Indonesia as *musyawarah*. That is why a Muhammadiyah ideologist such as Hajriyanto Thohari argues that the democracy of Pancasila can be seen from the Islamic point of view and it can be defined as ‘demo-syurokrasi’; (2) Pancasila, which was produced by national consensus, was inspired by the noble values of Islam. These values which are inherent in Pancasila are based on *tawhīd* as a reconfirmation of the concept of the relation between God and man (*ḥabl min Allāh*). The complementary social manifestation (*ḥabl min al-nās*) involves the values of humanistic understanding of each other (*taʿaruf*), cooperation (*taʿawun*), positive thinking (*ḥusnuzan*), moral clarification (*tabayyun*), harmony (*taʿaluf*), agreement (*tawaqquf*),

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brotherhood (\textit{ukhuwwah}) and others.\textsuperscript{105} All these values, according to the official documents of Muhammadiyah, are summarised in the concept of religious humanism (\textit{kemanusiaan religius}).\textsuperscript{106} Furthermore, the idea of reconciliation—or in Nashir’s word, the integration\textsuperscript{107}—of Pancasila and Islam, claimed as a part of \textit{tawhīd}, should be realised and materialised in the life of the nation. In considering this idea, Maarif critically argues that “it is irrelevant to claim that we have believed in \textit{tawhīd} while at the same time we all have witnessed certainly that the justice has been hanged far away in the cloud. Since we have understood that justice should be one of the manifestations of \textit{tawhīd} in the world, it should be concretely materialised in daily life.”\textsuperscript{108} In this context, Din Syamsuddin argues that Muslims need to express two kinds of witness (\textit{shahādah}): the first is theological witness and the second is cultural and civilisational witness.\textsuperscript{109} In dealing with the latter witness, Haedar Nashir argues that Muhammadiyah is not only a religious organisation, but also a social movement that aims to encourage social transformation (\textit{al-harākah al-ījtīhād al-īslāmīyyah}).\textsuperscript{110}

Therefore, theologising democracy is a mechanism of contemporary \textit{ijtihād} within Muhammadiyah, reformulated from foundational arguments. These include the history of the conceptualisation of Pancasila (\textit{dar al-‘ahd}), the history of Muhammadiyah’s contributions to the nation (\textit{dar al-shahādah}), the idea of religious moderatism among the majority of Muhammadiyah activists, its concept of

\begin{footnotes}
\item Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, “Pancasila, Tauhid Sosial dalam Kehidupan Berbangsa dan Bernegara...”, 43-48.
\item Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, \textit{Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdi Wa Syahadah...}, 13.
\item Haedar Nashir, “Muhammadiyah Membangun Integrasi Keislaman dan Kebangsaan Menuju Indonesia Berkemajuan”, in Faozan Amar et.al. (eds.), \textit{Darul-Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah...}, 19-32.
\item Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Pancasila dan Islam sebagai Dasar Negara”, in Muamaroh and Benni Setiawan (eds.), \textit{Negara Pancasila, Darul ‘Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah...}, 75-76.
\item Din Syamsuddin, \textit{Muhammadiyah untuk Semua...}, 131.
\item Haedar Nashir, \textit{Dinamisasi Gerakan Muhammadiyah...}, 257-263.
\end{footnotes}
religious secularisation of Pancasila, and its idea of the social manifestation of tawḥīd.

Conclusion

The key concept that is essential to be emphasised here is, in connecting between the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai and Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, Muhammadiyah conducted ijtihād. However, it is not ijtihād as it was formulated in the classical tradition of Islamic legal thought. What Muhammadiyah has formulated is contemporary ijtihād, which is both collective (jamā‘i) and interdisciplinary.

In conducting this contemporary ijtihād, it has been argued that Muhammadiyah seeks to theologise democracy. Its intent is to transform theological arguments so that democratic values such as shūra (people’s sovereignty or consultation), ō‘adalah (justice), musāwah (equality), and ḥurriyyah (freedom) are seen as fully consistent with Islamic values. Theologising democracy has been undertaken through objectification and substantialisation of Islam. While the former means making Pancasila as an objective language of Islam that can be understood, discussed, debated and affirmed rationally and critically by people beyond their religious, racial, ethnic and cultural identities, the latter means perceiving Pancasila as a manifestation of the central values of Islam.

On the practical level of implementation, the efforts of both objectification and substantialisation of Islam have not always been accepted. Conservative and radical Islamists have been infatuated with the trends of formalisation of Šarī‘ah, Maududian political thought, and takfīri interpretations. These trends have seemed to reject any idea of Western democracy, the Indonesian democracy of Pancasila, and even Islamic democracy as formulated by Muhammadiyah.
However, in implementing its *ijtihađ*, Muhammadiyah has maintained its point of view. As, Moeslim Abdurrahman argues, Muhammadiyah has struggled to fight against the dangers that result from a religiously-moulded authoritarianism. Historically, as we have seen, prominent figures of Muhammadiyah directly contributed to the process of conceptualisation of Pancasila (as *al-‘ahd* or the national consensus). In addition, since its establishment in 1912, Muhammadiyah has been involved in the development of Indonesia, mainly in social, political, cultural, and educational fields (as *al-shahāđah* or witness). Sociologically, the majority of Muhammadiyah activists have agreed with and appreciated moderatism in religious thinking (*wasatiyyah*), although they have not expressed it in particularly loud voices. As a consequence, the notion of *Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahāđah* seems to be accepted by the majority.

In political terms, Muhammadiyah views that the democracy of Pancasila is neither secular nor Islamist, but a democracy inspired by religious understanding. For Muhammadiyah, it is a kind of Islamic secularity. Finally, Muhammadiyah’s theological interpretation joins together the Islamic and the national, the religious and the ‘secular,’ in arguing that Islam contains democratic values and that a pluralist, non-*Shaî‘ah* Pancasila was formulated based on Islamic sources and inspired by Islamic thought.

As a matter of reflection, it is clear, however, that Muhammadiyah’s efforts, both in reconciling Pancasila and *Siyar* and in understanding the relation between its idea of reconciliation and its view of Indonesian democracy, have not always been successful. Important challenges to Muhammadiyah’s core beliefs, and those of the state itself, are present today. Yet, to adapt and control the current challenging realities, it depends on how the progressive groups in the circle of Muhammadiyah activists (those who are pro-democratisation) have dealt with the challenges and

become the winner in struggling for democracy in the country. What has happened remains to be seen and it invites us to conduct further research on the mentioned groups.

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