

# Islamic state utopia: investigating *Khilafatul Muslimin* movement in contemporary Indonesia

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DOI:10.18326/ijims.v13i2.339-367

## Abstract

This article aims to explore the contemporary Islamic state establishment movement in Indonesia namely *Khilafatul Muslimin*. Even though the Islamic state is strictly forbidden by the national constitution, such movements have been endless for a long time in the country. The phenomenon of *Khilafatul Muslimin*, which has recently emerged and surfaced in the realm of politics and religion, indicates that some Muslims initiate to establish a *Khilafah* state under Islamic law. Utilizing qualitative methods with a library and documents research in thorough and depth analysis, this article is designed to excavate and identify the anatomy of the *Khilafatul Muslimin* as the Islamic state movements, which were familiar to the archipelago since its independence. The study reveals that unlike the past-similar movements, which mostly ended in the discourse, this organization has built a set of an Islamic state hierarchy and bureaucracy with complete personnel. In addition, *Khilafatul Muslimin* linked its network to those radical-global Islamic state movements like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which, in turn, challenges *Pancasila* as the national ideology. However, interestingly, the root of *Khilafatul Muslimin* is closely related to *Darul Islam* (DI) and *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Indonesian Islamic State),

the past and utopian Islamic state movement in a huge multicultural Indonesian society. This research will benefit the policymakers in Indonesia to treat other Islamic movements equitably, while maintaining the country in harmony. For further studies, it will be fruitful to involve broader methods in gathering data to have more comprehensive results.

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi gerakan pendirian negara Islam kontemporer di Indonesia yaitu *Khilafatul Muslimin*. Meskipun negara Islam dilarang keras di Indonesia oleh konstitusi nasional, gerakan seperti itu sudah lama tidak ada habisnya di negara ini. Fenomena *Khilafatul Muslimin* yang akhir-akhir ini muncul dan mengemuka di ranah politik dan agama di Tanah Air, menandakan bahwa sebagian umat Islam ingin mendirikan negara Khilafah di bawah syariat Islam. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan kajian pustaka dan dokumen secara mendalam dan mendalam, artikel ini ingin menggali dan mengidentifikasi perbedaan anatomi *Khilafatul Muslimin* dengan gerakan-gerakan serupa sebelumnya yang akrab di Nusantara sejak kemerdekaannya. Kajian ini mengungkap bahwa berbeda dengan gerakan-gerakan sebelumnya yang kebanyakan berakhir pada wacana, organisasi ini telah membangun tatanan hirarki dan birokrasi negara Islam dengan personel yang lengkap. Selain itu, *Khilafatul Muslimin* mengaitkan jaringannya dengan gerakan negara Islam radikal-global seperti Negara Islam Irak dan Syiria (ISIS), yang jaringannya tidak dikenali oleh gerakan negara Islam tradisional. Namun, yang menarik, akar *Khilafatul Muslimin* terkait erat dengan Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), sebuah gerakan negara Islam kuno dan utopis di Indonesia yang sangat multikultural. Penelitian ini akan bermanfaat bagi para pengambil keputusan di Indonesia untuk memperlakukan gerakan Islam lainnya secara bijaksana, dengan tetap menjaga kerukunan negara. Untuk studi lebih lanjut, akan bermanfaat untuk melibatkan metode yang lebih luas dalam mengumpulkan data untuk mendapatkan hasil yang lebih komprehensif.

**Keywords:** *Islamic state; NII; Khilafatul Muslimin; Khilafah Islamiyah*

## **Introduction**

Islamic state establishment has been a hot issue in Indonesia since its independence in 1945. As Muslims are the majority in the country,

the founding fathers had a dilemma to choose between an Islamic or a democratic state. For Islamic state, it is believed to be the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah to realize it. On the other hand, Indonesia is a vast, multicultural country with several religions, hundreds of tribes and ethnicities, and a myriad of local languages and cultures, therefore, a democratic state is more suitable. Eventually, moderate Muslims and the nationalists opted for Indonesia as a democratic state with immense religious influence through *Pancasila*,<sup>1</sup> the nation's basic way of life. However, the strong desire to establish an Islamic state from many Indonesian Muslim parties is unstoppable. For instance, currently, *Khilafatul Muslimin* movement attracts Indonesian and the world with its Islamic state declaration.<sup>2</sup>

This event is a latent phenomenon similar to the previous cases, which generally emerged as dissatisfaction of presidential vote result. Indonesian history records that the founders of this country cannot be separated from the hard-liner Islamic groups who insist on establishing an Islamic state with a system and pattern of government based on Islamic law and rejected the existence of *Pancasila*.

After the fall of President Suharto and his dictatorship regime of *Orde Baru* (New Order) in 1998 through the Reformasi (*Reform*) movement, many Muslims have tried persistently to reclaim their political stage in Indonesia. Moreover, they struggled to dominate the parliament and the house of representative to voice their rights which so far have been silenced by the New Order. In fact, Indonesian Muslims have created at least six

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<sup>1</sup>*Pancasila* (five principles) consist of religiosity, humanity, national unity, democracy, and national justice.

<sup>2</sup>Ayomi Amindoni, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-61733447> See also, Mei-mei, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6534763/3-fakta-pimpinan-khilafatul-muslimin-divonis-10-tahun-penjara>, and Rahel Narda Chaterine, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/06/11/09035461/khilafatul-muslimin-kelompok-yang-diduga-sebar-ideologi-khilafah-untuk>, retrieved on 20 April 2023.

political parties that have an ideology and are based on Islam;<sup>3</sup> they were *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB, National Awakening Party), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party), *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party), *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, National Mandate Party), *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, the Crescent Star Party), and *Partai Bintang Reformasi* (PBR, Reform Star Party).

The presence of these parties has represented the voice of various Islamic organizations in Indonesia as well as reflections of the ideology they profess. PKB and PPP deputize the biggest traditional Muslim organization that is *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). PAN represents the mass base of modernist Muslim groups, particularly *Muhammadiyah*, and the rest goes to PBB and PBR. PKS played a significant role in accommodating both modernist and Islamist groups. In this case, PKS is a strong competitor to the traditional Islamic groups since this party has a discipline and positive regeneration, especially among young Muslims, which will importantly increase its voters in the periodic elections. Ufen says that PKS appearance became the most efficient vehicle for the cadre of Islamist groups, which would later become a monumental party with its fundamental feature on the Indonesian Islamic political scene.<sup>4</sup> The presence of PKS has two significant impacts; on the one hand, this is the loudest party in voicing the rights of Muslims particularly for the fundamental Muslims through parliament. On the other hand, regarding the state constitution, PKS vaguely rejects *Pancasila*, and proposes Islamic law as the national constitution instead.

In fact, after the *Reformasi* in 1998, Indonesia did not only experience an interesting freedom process in the new democratic era but also simultaneously, in that situation, gave birth to fundamental

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<sup>3</sup>Greg Fealy, *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politic in Indonesia*, Singapura: ISEAS, 2008.

<sup>4</sup>Andreas Ufen, "Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between Politik Aliran and 'Philippinisation'", *German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)*, Vol. 37, no. 1 (2006), 1-37.

Muslim organizations movement that voiced the importance of formal implementations of Islamic law in the *Pancasila* state. These groups include Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, the Islamic Defenders Front), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahideen Council), the Islamic Community Forum, *Jamaah Ansor At-Tauhid* (JAT), *Komite Persiapan Penerapan Syari'ah Islam* (KPPSI, the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law), and *Khilafatul Muslimin*. Notably, the embryo of *Khilafatul Muslimin* as an Islamic religious and political movement could be drawn from the first religious movement at the beginning of Indonesian independence.<sup>5</sup>

In the political field, *Khilafatul Muslimin* mobilized its members from the grassroots level to amplify Islamic law in opposing democracy and *Pancasila* ideology. Meanwhile, in terms of religiosity, this movement was more concerned with modern religious understanding, rejecting all forms of *bid'ah* (heresy), superstition, and all forms of the concepts of *tawassuth*,<sup>6</sup> an Islamic fathom of contextualizing Islamic teachings with local cultures, which usually understood by *NU*.

Based on the aforementioned explanation, *Khilafatul Muslimin* has positioned itself in the new religious and political movement in Indonesian political arena with a unique highlight. This movement challenges both traditional and moderate Islam like *NU* and the nationalist after they collaborated in the presidential election and win the competition with Jokowi as the President in 2014.<sup>7</sup> The election result made the Islamist groups, including *Khilafatul Muslimin*, enraged and attacked the government

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<sup>5</sup>R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

<sup>6</sup>Vedi R. Hadiz, *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

<sup>7</sup>Marcus Mietzner, "Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia", *Policy Studies*, no. 72 (2015): 01-61,63-67,69-74,76.

by carrying out the idea of the Islamic state with the common concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* (Islamic emperor). This tendency continues even harder when Jokowi was elected for the second period of his presidency.

In this way, Islamic politics in Indonesia, once again, diversify and create separate tenets and dynamics at the Muslim grassroots. In terms of Islamic *da'wah* (preaching), *Khilafatul Muslimin* becomes the opponent of NU, which is naturally promoting a wise way of proselytizing Islam and adapting it to the local wisdom in Indonesia for a long time. It is because *Khilafatul Muslimin* tries to uphold rigid Islamic teachings which will block its useful instructions which is *li kulli zaman wa makan* (having perpetual adaptation at any time and place).<sup>8</sup>

Various research on the Islamic state movement in Indonesia has been investigated. For example, Wahid studied the illusion of Islamic state establishment in Indonesia.<sup>9</sup> He analyzed that the form of Islamic state in Indonesia is impossible since this country consists of many different cultures and religions. The relationship between *Pancasila* and Islamic state including its problematic issues is studied by Khotimah, Asmaroini, and Octavian.<sup>10</sup> Temby researched *DI* and *Jama'ah Islamiyah* movement, Islamic state movements in Indonesia, and their fundamental network.

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<sup>8</sup>Ilham Mundzir, "Sikap Muslim Terhadap Modernitas: Kasus Gerakan Khilafatul Muslimin Di Lampung", *Afkaruna*, Vol. 9, no. 1 (2013), 65-82; Firman Juliansyah, Yusuf, and Aris Arif Mundayat, "The Government Strategy In Facing Khilafatul Muslimin Movements At Cikembar and Kebon Pedes Sukabumi", *Jurnal Peperangan Asimetris*, Vol. 51, no. 1 (2019), 42-64; P. Wibowo, "Sekuritisasi Wacana Khilafah Di Indonesia", *The Journal of Islamic Studies and International*, Vol. 5, no. 1 (2020): 25-49, <http://journal.insiera.org/index.php/jisiera/article/view/2>.

<sup>9</sup>Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009, 78.

<sup>10</sup>Husnul S Khotimah, "Penerapan Pancasila Perspektif Islam", *Tahdzib Al-Akhlaq: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (2020), 93; Ambiro Puji Asmaroini, "Implementasi Nilai-Nilai Pancasila Bagi Siswa Di Era Globalisasi", *Citizenship Jurnal Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan*, Vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), 444, and Wendy Anugrah Octavian, "Urgensi Memahami Dan Mengimplementasikan Nilai-Nilai Pancasila Dalam Kehidupan Sehari-Hari Sebagai Sebuah Bangsa", *Jurnal Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (2018), 126.

He critically noted several Islamic organizations which were related to and inspired the establishment of both movements.<sup>11</sup> However, there is rarely deep research about the current attractive movement of *Khilafatul Muslimin*. This research argues that in challenging *Pancasila*, *Khilafatul Muslimin* presents a new network and model in the Islamic state bureaucratic hierarchy establishment compare to the previous similar movements.

Based on the aforementioned tenet, this article will be guided by the question on how and why *Khilafatul Muslimin* built its organizational anatomy and the social-political context and landscape to reveal its formation and to look deeper into how the embryo of *Khilafatul Muslimin* is in the realm of politics in the *Pancasila* state and religiosity. In doing so, by using qualitative methods, this study will examine various related critical documents through in-depth analysis and approach.

Indonesia experienced serious challenges from its early establishment in 1945 among the Muslim and Nationalist founding fathers. It was particularly on choosing the form of the state that can accommodate all elements of the societies in Indonesia. Under the first presidency of Soekarno-Hatta, a cabinet was formed which was initially fully responsible to the president. This group contains sixteen ministers, with two genuinely represent Muslims, they were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso from *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) and Wahid Hasyim from NU. Wahid Hasyim's presence was almost a concession to Muslim groups because the nationalists rejected the formation of the Ministry of Religion.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the movement of Muslims was limited in coloring the formation of the Indonesian state. Hence, a group of Muslim intellectuals called for the creation of an institutional body for the Islamic movement.

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<sup>11</sup>Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah", *Indonesia*, Vol. 89, no. 89 (2010), 1-36.

<sup>12</sup>Kevin W. Fogg, *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution*, Uninted Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 248.

For instance, the Muslim youths held meetings to create a mutually agreed upon vision and organization, including a gathering to build *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* (GPII, the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement) and a meeting with senior Islamic leaders in Yogyakarta to conduct a discussion on the general Islamic congress.<sup>13</sup>

The establishment of Islamic organizations like GPII was in conformity with the previous institutional legacy of the Japanese colonialism, which accommodated the Javanese-Sumatra cleric, namely *Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia* (*Masyumi*, Indonesian Muslim Conference Council). *Masyumi* was designed to be adaptable to the new political change without playing practical politics as long as its mission was accomplished. For this, *Masyumi* accommodated its members not only for the large Islamic organizations such as *NU* and *Muhammadiyah* but also for other Islamic organizations. In addition, it had to broaden its territories not only in Java and Sumatra but also in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and so forth.<sup>14</sup> The breakthrough idea of *Masyumi* worked for a short time since it eventually segregated. However, this organization has made and provided a good position for the Muslims interests in the Indonesian government.<sup>15</sup>

Another Islamic movement that was more revolutionary and radical during the early day of Indonesia was called *Darul Islam* (DI, Islamic territory), which was led by SM Kartosuwiryo. This group later inspired the radical movements that developed in Indonesia during the 1990s.<sup>16</sup> This movement became a symbol of the supremacy of the Islamic rebellion in Indonesia which, as a result, framed and created a national impression

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<sup>13</sup>Remy Madinier, *Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Masyumi Party between Democracy and Integralism*, Singapore: NUS Press, 2015, 71.

<sup>14</sup>Kevin W. Fogg, *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution...*

<sup>15</sup>Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, 31.

<sup>16</sup>Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic..."



discourse that all Islamic movements were disreputable and rebellious against the Indonesian state.<sup>17</sup> In fact, DI movement was exceptional in terms of aims, movements, and methods since it followed the spirit of the Indonesian revolution in defending its independence from 1945 to 1949 from the colonialists who were reclaiming Indonesia as their colony. However, DI only has negative images in Indonesian history today.

The elements involved in the Kartosuwiryo's movement were no different from elements of the Islamic movement in any other countries. The Islamic State of Indonesia also uses Islamic calls for action, including religious leaders, Islamic warriors, and even some proactive magical movements tied to Islam.<sup>18</sup> It needs to be underlined that in the time of the Indonesian revolution and this Islamic state movement, the leaders respected each other and they believed from the beginning that they were involved in the same struggle, which is different from the Islamic state movements in 1990s onwards that their leaders are separated.

Based on the explanation above, Formichi stated that *DI* and Kartosuwiryo as the founder were not included as the enemies of the *Pancasila* as it was easily argued by the state between the 1950s and 1980s nor were they the final synthesis of religious escalation and Islamic political achievements, as claimed by Indonesian Islamist groups today.<sup>19</sup> *DI* movement was one part of the Muslim struggle during the Indonesian Revolution. By using the same elements as other Islamic fighters in the revolution, this movement only relied more on Islamic elements and only

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<sup>17</sup>Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam, State and Society in Indonesia Islamic*, New York: Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2018, 75.

<sup>18</sup>Kevin W. Fogg, *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution...*

<sup>19</sup>Chiara Formichi, "Pan-Islam and Religious Nationalism: The Case of Kartosuwiryo and Negara Islam Indonesia," *Indonesia*, no. 90 (2010): 125-146, <http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&page=record&handle=seap.indo/1286985934>.

had little involvement with non-Islamic elements on the other hand.<sup>20</sup>

As an Islamic state movement, *DI* could not be separated from the Islamic army. Kartosuwiryo also formed an Islamic army like the practice of other Islamic state movements in Indonesia. The core source of his army came from the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) he had initially built. In 1945 he turned his *pesantren* into a military training institute. In the same way, other Muslim clerics also organized their students to become combat troops. This devout Muslim army is indeed dedicated only to religion and trajected to enact an Islamic state establishment. This pattern is also copied by other Islamist groups after the Soeharto regime.<sup>21</sup>

Due to his background in Islamic and national politics with positive relationships with many national figures, Kartosuwiryo seemed to know and understand more about the situation occurring at the national political level of the Republic of Indonesia than other Islamic army leaders did. Therefore, Kartosuwiryo declared *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) as a blatant resistance to the national leadership and government and he refused to surrender in 1947 when the government asked him as he was suspected as an insurrectionist. For him, a ceasefire was an un-Islamic act.<sup>22</sup>

### **Embryo of *Khilafatul Muslimin* in Indonesia**

The establishment of the Islamic state spirit that was illuminated by Kartosuwiryo made Islamist groups proclaim and oppose the existence of the *Pancasila* state.<sup>23</sup> This was the root and the embryo of the birth

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<sup>20</sup>Coin Win, "Indonesia (Darul Islam) 1958-1962", *RAND Corporation* (2019), 9-25.

<sup>21</sup>Andreas Ufen, "Political Parties in..."

<sup>22</sup>Al Chaidar, *Pengantar Pemikiran Politik Proklamator NII SM Kartosoewirjo Mengungkap Manipulasi Sejarah Darul Islam/DI-TII Semasa Orde Lama Dan Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999, 69.

<sup>23</sup>Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Idiologi Islam Dan Utopia Tiga Model Negara Demokrasi Di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2011, 25.

of the Islamist groups during the Suharto years, such as *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI, Indonesian Liberation Party), *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council), *Khilafatul Muslimin*, and so on. In 1997, for example, *Khilafatul Muslimin* was proclaimed by Abdul Qadir Baraja, whose fighting spirit could be extended to Kartosuwiryo. Over time, this organization, like *DI*, has built government structures, state structures, social structures, educational systems, and systems for exchanging goods and services.<sup>24</sup>

Like *Masyumi* and *DI*, *Khilafatul Muslimin* promotes reform both in political and religious movements. The political feelings of *Khilafatul Muslimin* were the same as those of *Masyumi* and *DI* in their heyday that is Muslims were not given a proper place to explore their ideas related to the state establishment of Indonesia. However, there is a fundamental difference. In the past, *Masyumi* and *DI* were not polarized with the *Salafi-Wahhabi* movement from the Arab Spring<sup>25</sup> but purely as an Islamic movement, while *Khilafatul Muslimin* was polarized with the radical and fundamental *Salafi-Wahhabi* movements.<sup>26</sup>

### **Socio-religious aspects and religious literalism**

Given ISIS and *Salafi Wahhabism* teachings and understanding, *Khilafatul Muslimin* has an extreme religious understanding. The leader of *Khilafatul Muslimin*, Abdul Qadir Baraja (next, Baraja for short), has a strong belief in the *Khilafah* (Caliphate) system which will be discussed later in the next sub-chapter. Baraja is one of the fundamental Islamic figures, who is quite unknown compared to other fundamental figures such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abu Jibril, Ja'far Umar Thalib, and Habib Rizieq Shihab

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<sup>24</sup>Novita Damayanti, *Terlarang Semua Soal Khilafatul Muslimin Sebab Sudah Jelas Menyimpang*, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-6142144/>, retrieved on 23 June 2022.

<sup>25</sup>R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought...*, 86.

<sup>26</sup>Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam...*

who received extensive attention from mass and social media.

Even though Baraja is the Caliph of his group, he does not have a special bodyguard to keep himself safe. For him, the manifestation of Islam is total surrender to *Allah* (God almighty) in all matters whether life or death. There is no object or creature in the world to be feared other than *Allah*.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, although he was considered a rebel by the government of Indonesia, he felt no need to be afraid of the police, state security, and army. Even when he was arrested in 2022, he felt secure being alone and needed nobody to accompany him.

Regarding his understanding of religion, Baraja and *Khilafatul Muslimin* interpret Islam as the totality of life that he must understand Quran textually and literally. This tenet is unsurprising for fundamental Islam adherents as they commonly read and analyze Quran as the holy book of Muslims literally as it is without necessary exegesis. For them, Quran is *a word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word*.<sup>28</sup> Indonesian Muslims, for this group, are infidel as they reject the implementation of God's law in the Quran in daily life and practice of the government.

Baraja witnesses that Indonesian Muslims follow *Pancasila* and *Undang-undang Dasar 1945* (UUD 1945, national Constitution) as well as *Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana* (KUHP, Criminal Code) to run their positive community's interaction, which, for him, have no foothold in the Islamic teachings.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, he expresses that entire law products applied in Indonesia are completely man-made, which is against Islamic law.

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<sup>27</sup>Husni Mubarak, *Jejak Abdul Qodir Hasan Baraja, Pimpinan Khilafatul Muslimin Yang Disebut Berafiliasi NII*, <https://Sumsel.Suara.Com/Read/2022/06/08/104058/>, n.d., <https://sumsel.suara.com/read/2022/06/08/104058/>, retrieved on 23 June 2023.

<sup>28</sup>Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism: Global, Lokal, Personal*, London: Routledge, 2009, 59.

<sup>29</sup>Compare with the statement of the late Syafi'i Ma'arif, the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah, who says that in fact, Islam and Indonesia are in one breath. The chemistry structure of Islam and Indonesia meets in an integral and intertwined harmony, fulfilling and enriching each other. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam Dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, Jakarta: LP3S, 1985.

Indonesian Muslims, in Baraja's opinion, must implement *shari'a* (Islamic) law, which has been postulated by God in the Quran and *Sunnah* (the Prophet wisdom). Baraja suggested that the Indonesian government must run Islamic laws, such as *Qishash* (retaliation), cutting hands, and so on;<sup>30</sup> otherwise, this regime is suspected to be an unbeliever.<sup>31</sup>

*Khilafatul Muslimin* has black and white views on religious practice. This organization, especially for Baraja, emphasizes that there are only two groups in this world: those who believe and the opposite, those who disbelieve. There is no room for people with moderate opinions. For *Khilafatul Muslimin*, a moderate attitude is hypocrisy since it is an ambivalent position—whether on the right or on the left side. This hypocritical manner will eventually lean toward disbelief and *taghut* (worshipping or obeying other than Allah).

Considering the above reason, *Khilafatul Muslimin* demands a strict and textual act in practicing religious teachings, especially its stand towards government and statehood, which is the main umbrella to run Islamic law.<sup>32</sup> *Khilafatul Muslimin* clearly proposes traditional life in a literal and old-fashioned religious atmosphere. As a consequence, the Islamic state concept carried out by this movement is unable to adapt to the changing civilization and culture. This utopian idea contrasts with the teachings of the Qu'ran and prophetic messages which urge *ummah* (Muslim communities) to be able to assimilate properly to the local cultures and civilization.

In a similar vein, Schneir states that religious people in this modern era should be more inclusive and open to the changing situation at all times

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<sup>30</sup>R. Michael Feener et.al., *Islam and the Limits of the State*, Leiden: Brill, 2016, 13.

<sup>31</sup>Kees Van Dijk et.al., *Islam in Indonesia Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013, 222.

<sup>32</sup>M. Qurtubi, *Khilafatul Muslimin Dan Dua Muka Isu Khilafah*, " <https://www.harakatuna.com/khilafatul-muslimin-dan-dua-muka-isu-khilafah.html>, retrieved on 21 April 2023.

instead of being more exclusive, closing themselves to the transformations happening in global societies. Religious exclusiveness and act intolerant lead to disadvantages for Muslims in the political and economic fields in the state and nationhood.<sup>33</sup> In the political sector, the Islamic parties' struggles to fight for the Muslims' interests through the democratic system in the parliament become useless and have no meaning. It is because in the democratic format, Islamic parties have a chance to subvert the real *thaghut* that is the feudal Caliphate in the *Khilafah* system. In contrast, Islam indeed teaches Muslims to annihilate any forms of *thaghut*.<sup>34</sup>

Unlike *Khilafatul Muslimin* tenet, other groups of Muslims believe that *Pancasila* and UUD 1945, and their derivative laws in the Presidential decision and instruction and its ministerial decrees, have an Islamic teachings spirit. In this case, *Khilafatul Muslimin* challenges *Pancasila*. However, the Muslim majority in Indonesia conceive that Islam and *Pancasila* state do not oppose one another. The latent tension between both supporters is worthy to be discussed.

### **Back to the Caliphate system and rejecting Pancasila**

There is a main motivation as the ultimate encouragement for fundamental Islamic organizations, which is to keep moving and loudly proclaiming the Islamic caliphate and that Islam did not require such the existing democratic system and *Pancasila*. For them, both are a *taghut* system, which they consider to be infidel and, therefore, must be rid of from the earth. Moreover, *Pancasila*-democratic system will impede the totality practice of genuine Islamic teachings.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Edward Schreier, *Muslim Democracy Politics, Religion and Society in Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic World*, New York: Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, 63.

<sup>34</sup>M. Anwar, *Khilafatul Muslimin: Tujuan Khilafah Bukan Merebut Kekuasaan*, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220531102655-20-803064/khilafatul-muslimin-tujuan-khilafah-bukan-merebut-kekuasaan>, retrieved on 23 Februari 2023.

<sup>35</sup>Syaiful Arif, "Kontradiksi Pandangan HTI Atas Pancasila", *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*,

*Khilafatul Muslimin* believes that a system of government and leadership other than or outside the *Khilafah* is outside Islam. And, in turn, it must be opposed and rejected to maintain Islamic law. For *Khilafatul Muslimin*, establishing an Islamic state with a caliphate construct within a *Pancasila*-democratic country like Indonesia is a legal action and is not against the government's law. This is based on the argument that the caliphate system can unite Muslims in one congregation which covers entire Muslims in the world universally, which is unlimited by geographical border and nationality.<sup>36</sup>

In the view of *Khilafatul Islam*, *Pancasila* values have failed in providing state basic principles. This is because *Pancasila* is unable to provide clear derivative rules in inspiring and regulating the constitutional system.<sup>37</sup> Based on this tenet, *Pancasila* as the nation's ideology must be replaced with a caliphate system, a rule system that is absolute from Allah and accommodate all elements of the national life. In addition, fighting the *taghut* is a main obligation and a big mission for Muslims to be accomplished, and is worth a big reward from Allah.

Firstly, individual piety motivates him to strongly stick to *Sharia* law. Secondly, total community participation in following and practicing *Sharia* law. Then, thirdly, an Islamic state establishment implements Islamic *Sharia* law as a whole in an integrated government system. These conditions are unnegotiable in its implementation. Therefore, one term is missing, the *Khilafah* system cannot be realized and is even considered as non-exist.<sup>38</sup>

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Vol. II, no. I (2012), 22.

<sup>36</sup>Johan Wahyudi, "Menelaah Sikap Keagamaan *Khilafatul Muslimin* di Sumbawa Barat", in Eni Puji Utami et al., *Praktik Pengelolaan Keragaman Di Indonesia: Konstruksi Identitas Dan Eksklusi Sosial*, Yogyakarta: CRCS UGM, 2019, 87.

<sup>37</sup>Baidhowi, "Khilafah in the Context of Te State of *Pancasila*", *Law Research Review Quarterly*, Vol. 2, no. 4 (2016), 497.

<sup>38</sup>Oksep Adhayanto, "Khilafah Dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Islam", *Jurnal Ilmu Politik dan Ilmu Pemerintahan*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (2011), 88.

In line with this, the seriousness of *Khilafatul Muslimin* in realizing the ideals of the *Khilafah Islamiyah* is reflected in the efforts of its movement. For instance, this organization created an internal caliphate structure.<sup>39</sup> The highest hierarchy is the leader, who is called the Caliph or *Amirul Mukminin*. Abdul Qadir Baraja sits in this position, and appointed Lampung City in Sumatra Island as the headquarter of *Khalifatul Muslimin*. *Katib al-Khilafah* acts as the deputy or secretary to the Caliph and is in charge of assisting the Caliph or replacing him when the Caliph is absent at the center of government. The Caliph and *Katib al-Khilafah* are the executors of the highest governmental tasks, but above these hierarchies, there is a *mustasyar* position, whose role is to provide positive and productive advice and feedback to maintain good governance.

Like other governments in the world, in the *Khilafatul Muslimin* hierarchical structure, there are also several ministerial positions (*wuzara'*). First is the Minister of Data Collection of the Ummah and Inventory or *wazir tasjil wat taftisy*, which is held by Ghulam Siddiq. This ministry is oversees the updating of data of the citizen with some important notes for the sustainability of the government in the future. Second is the Minister of Da'wah and Community Development or *wazir ad-da'wah wa tadmira al-ummah*, who is held by Aminuddin. This ministry is in charge of providing education and religious guidance to residents. Third, the Minister of Transportation or *vizier muwashalatil ijtimaiyyah* held by Mukliansyah. This ministry has the role of preparing advice and arranging the *Khalifah's* official trips to various regions. Fourth, the Minister of Economy and Income Manager or *wizaratul iqtishadiyah wa tadbiril kasbi* is held by Ammar. This ministry is responsible for developing the micro-economy of citizens and providing education related to the use of natural resources to create jobs. Fifth, the Minister of Health or *wazir ash-shihhah* held by

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
<sup>39</sup>Ilham Mundzir, "Sikap Muslim Terhadap..."



Muhammad Yusuf Abu Qoyyim. This ministry is liable for ensuring the health of the citizens by providing health facilities such as clinics with low and inexpensive financing. In addition, providing easy access to health consultation services and Islamic immunization services for babies. For this purpose, *Khilafatul Muslimin* built health center facilities like Ibnu Qoyyim Medical Center clinic in Tambun Bekasi West Java.

The governance structure of *Khilafatul Muslimin* could be drawn and described in a simple chart as follows:

Figure 1. Structure of the *Khilafah* Government of *Khilafatul Muslimin*  
Source: Mundzir (2013)



The constitution of *Khilafatul Muslimin* is based on the principles of the Quran and Sunnah and aims to create prosperity and well-being in the *ummah*. The implementation of the *shari'a* of Allah and the Prophet is the main foundation in all processes of the *Khilafah* governance. For example, community problems and disagreements are resolved in an Islamic ethical manner and open widely to the public to avoid community suspicion. In the citizenship aspect, *Khilafatul Muslimin* carried out a census by collecting

data and issuing identity cards characterized by two religious' identities: Muslims or *Muslimah* (Muslim women) and non-Muslims. These two identities are meant to be a sign that citizens of *Khilafatul Muslimin* are equally protected by the caliphate, a sign of anti-racial discrimination. Muslims and Muslimah are required to pay *infaq* (charity) and alms to the *Baitul Mal* (charity house), as well as non-Muslims are asked for making contributions to help collective welfare.<sup>40</sup>

In Indonesia, *Pancasila* as the state ideology has a vital position. *Pancasila* has become the identity of the Indonesian nation as contained in the preamble of UUD 1945. The main principles of *Pancasila* form the basis for the formation of fundamental laws and regulations. *Pancasila* as a source of law is emphasized in Article 2 of Law Number 10 of 2004 which reads “*Pancasila* is the source of all sources of the state law.” This indicates that *Pancasila* is a legal ideal (*rechtsidee*) that is the main indicator in the formulation of legislation to achieve the goals of the Indonesian people.<sup>41</sup>

Indonesia has carried out reforms to uphold democracy by developing the principles of constitutionalism. The principle of constitutionalism implies that every government action must be based on the validity of the constitution in a country. The constitution was built on the awareness and political consensus of the people's representatives for the welfare of all Indonesian people.

The consensus guarantees the principle of constitutionalism during the *Reform* period. In this case, there are three agreements. First is agreement on common goals and ideals (common goals of society or general acceptance of philosophy). Second is understanding the rule of law as the basis for administering government or state administration (*Government*). Third is

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<sup>40</sup>Ilham Mundzir, “Sikap Muslim Terhadap...”

<sup>41</sup>Otong Rosadi, “Hukum Kodrat, Pancasila Dan Asas Hukum Dalam Pembentukan Hukum Di Indonesia”, *Jurnal Dinamika Hukum*, Vol. 10, no. 3 (2010), 287.

agreement on institutional forms and procedures for administering the state (formation of institutions and policies).<sup>42</sup>

The first agreement is regarding the common ideals, which will determine the enactment of constitutionalism in a country. In that ideal, the pinnacle of abstraction allows it to reflect the common resistance among all citizens who must live in plurality. Therefore, the *Khilafah* government system, which requires absolute compliance with Islamic law is very irrelevant to the common aspirations of the Indonesian.

Second, the agreement that government is based on the rule of law and the constitution. This agreement is also fundamental because it concerns the basics of constitutional life. This will provide the basis that everything is done in state administration and must be based on the rule of law, which is determined collectively.

The third agreement relates to (1) the development of state organs and the procedures governing their power, (2) the relationship between these state organs to one another, and (3) the relationship between state organs and citizens. Based on this agreement, the contents of the constitution as a concretization of *Pancasila* can be easily formulated because it truly reflects the common desire to design the state. In addition, institutions and mechanisms for administering the state are developed within the framework of a rule of law. These agreements are outlined in constitutional documents, which are expected to become common property for a long time.

After the *Reform* era, Indonesia was encountering many riots and social conflicts. In line with these events, several questions arose in a society that questioned the function and role of *Pancasila* values in providing solutions and solving problems.<sup>43</sup> The existence of these questions indicates that

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<sup>42</sup>Priyo Handoko and Anis Farida, "In the State Administration System of Indonesia: No Space for *Khilafah*!", *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies*, Vol. 77, no. 4 (2021), 1-9.

<sup>43</sup>Aqil Teguh Fathani and Zuly Qodir, "Agama Musuh *Pancasila*? Studi Sejarah Dan Peran Agama Dalam Lahirnya *Pancasila*", *Al-Qalam*, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2020), 119.

there are still many people who do not understand in depth about the values of *Pancasila*.

This is the case with the *Khilafatul Muslimin* group because a partial religious understanding of religious texts and an attitude of isolation (exclusive) to the cultural history of the nation and state which is reflected in *Pancasila* values has resulted in fundamental-radical attitudes and actions. In reality, *Pancasila* is formulated with the nation's noble values and contains substantive Islamic values that are worth fighting for.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, *Pancasila* is a state ideology that is final and has relevance to the condition of a plural nation.

According to Haq, as quoted by Rohman, public awareness of *Pancasila* must be massively grown towards the degradation in practicing *Pancasila* values nowadays. In addition, there is a serious concern about *Pancasila* values that are considered contrary to Islamic teachings. *Pancasila* reflects Islamic values such as justice, tolerance, unity, and so on.<sup>45</sup> In line with this, the reflection of *Pancasila* values reviewed through Islamic teachings can be detailed as follows.

The first precept, Belief in the One and Only God. This precept reflects that Indonesian people recognize and believe in the existence of God. Because accommodating various religions adhered to by the citizen, the first precepts become the meeting point of various religions. This belief thrives in the hearts of Indonesian people because the fields of religion are nurtured in the life of the nation.<sup>46</sup> Religions have their place in Indonesia to develop a spirit of service to God. This shows that Indonesia upholds

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<sup>44</sup>Dzaki Aflah Zamani, "Islam Dan Pancasila Dalam Perdebatan Ormas- Ormas Islam", *Risalah: Jurnal Pendidikan dan Studi Islam*, Vol. 7, no. 1 (2021), 30.

<sup>45</sup>M Saifullah Rohman, "Kandungan Nilai-Nilai Syariat Islam Dalam Pancasila", *Millah*, Vol. 13, no. 1 (2013), 208.

<sup>46</sup>MK Ridwan, "Penafsiran Pancasila Dalam Perspektif Islam: Peta Konsep Integrasi", *Dialogia: Islamic Studies and Social Journal*, Vol. 15, no. 2 (2017), 213.

the values of religious ethics.

Judging from the Islamic teachings, the first precept “Belief in the One and Only God” reflects individual faith and monotheism, where every individual embraces his religion without coercion, but according to one’s conscience. Quran chapter al-Baqarah verse 256 states that “*there is no compulsion in religion.*” Faith and belief are based on awareness and willingness, coercion will not bring someone to faith.<sup>47</sup> Freedom of religion is also supported and affirmed in the state constitution to create religious tolerance.

The second precept, Just and Civilized Humanity. This precept reflects universal human relations not only within one country but also within human relations that reach territorial boundaries among nations. Upholding human dignity in the life of the nation is reflected in an attitude of fairness, tolerance, mutual respect, mutual help, and other human behavior that promotes civilized ethics and morality<sup>48</sup> since humans cannot live alone but need each other. The spirit of humanity is also emphasized in the Quran chapter al-Maidah verse two, which asks Muslims to help, share, and aid each other.

The third precept is Indonesian Unity. The attitude of unity plays an important role in the integrity of the nation. A sense of belonging and a common destiny become the spirit to live side by side, work together and sacrifice together for the sake of realizing the prosperity of a peaceful and integrated nation. The nation’s plural characteristic consists of various tribes and races united by the same name, Indonesia. Based on this, considering the side of equality as a spirit of unity is preferred rather than focusing on the differences which will lead to disintegration.<sup>49</sup> The spirit

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<sup>47</sup>Wahbah Zuhaili, *Tafsir Al-Munir: Aqidah, Syariah, Manhaj*, Jakarta: Gema Insani, 2013, 48.

<sup>48</sup>Wendy Anugrah Octavian, “Urgensi Memahami dan...”

<sup>49</sup>Husnul S Khotimah, “Penerapan Pancasila Perspektif...”

of unity is also taught in Islam that differences in ethnicity, skin color, race, and religion are a form of mutual opportunity for humankind to know each other (*ta'aruf*), respect each other (*tasamuh*), and help each other (Quran chapter al-Hujurat verse 13).

The fourth precept, Democracy Led by Wisdom in Deliberation/Representation. Citizenship is a principal institution in the state which is prioritized as the main subject of the state as is the slogan of democracy "from the people, by the people, and for the people".<sup>50</sup> The people's institution then becomes a forum for deliberation in solving national problems to reach a consensus. In line with deliberative matters, Islam has taught humans as outlined in Quran chapter asy-Syura verse 38 to always consult, discuss, and negotiate in realizing public interest and avoiding any disputes.

The fifth precept is Social Justice for All Indonesian People. Social justice is a complex matter in the life of the nation. Justice is not only in the distribution of national wealth, but it must also cover human rights such as the right to life, the right to security, economic rights, health rights, and other rights that maintain and protect human dignity.<sup>51</sup> In this regard, Islam also teaches about justice as mentioned in Quran chapter al-Maidah verse 8. Justice is a pillar of truth as well as progress in noble national civilization.


To conclude, the values of *Pancasila* have comprehensive relevance both to the condition of the nation and to Islamic teachings. *Pancasila* is religious in every principle of its principles and does not contain aspects that are contradictory to Islamic teachings. In simple terms, the relevance of *Pancasila* principles to Islamic teachings can be seen in the following chart:

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<sup>50</sup>Ambiro Puji Asmaroini, "Implementasi Nilai-Nilai...

<sup>51</sup>R. Samidi and Suharno, "Implementasi Nilai Keadilan Sosial Melalui Pendidikan Perspektif TGKH Zainuddin Abdul Majid", *Fikri : Jurnal Kajian Agama, Sosial dan Budaya*, Vol. 3, no. 2 (2018), 379.

Figure 2. The Linkage between Islam and *Pancasila*



It is worth noting that eventually in 2022, the regime of *Khilafatul Muslimin* was arrested and filed in court and sentenced to jail by the Indonesian government. It is the typical ending of Islamic state movements in this country, and the dream to establish the Islamic state of Indonesia seems to continue as an illusion.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup>Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam...*,

## Conclusion

This article has illustrated the dynamics of Islamic state movements primarily that has existed in Indonesia since the age of colonization until today. When the movements were carried on during the Independence Day period, several Muslim groups felt that they were marginalized from the stage of managing and forming the Indonesian state following the provisions contained in the Quran and *Sunnah*. Thus, it is unsurprising that there have been a lot of resistance movements from Muslim groups towards *Pancasila*, including *Khilafatul Muslimin*.

*Khilafatul Muslimin* tries to alter the representation of the oppressed Muslim community for a long time. Unfortunately, their resistant voice was unlike any of its predecessors. They have been mired within fundamental ideas of Islam, whose chains extend to the *Salafi-Wahhabi*, and even ISIS, which has emerged recently. In addition, one of their ideas related to religious tenets is that they openly rejected the idea of *tawasuth*, which they considered would later lead to disbelief.

The expression desired by *Khilafatul Muslimin* is to replace the *Pancasila* state with an Islamic *Khilafah*. For this movement, the *Pancasila* state model does not exist in Islamic teachings. Those who support the *Pancasila* state with all its regulations are categorized as infidels and must be defeated. This attitude is in contrast with other majority Islamic groups, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, which consider *Pancasila* to be the ideal and final state ideology for multicultural Indonesia, and its principles are found in the Quran and *Sunnah*. This study suggests further study to extend the data collection method through interview and field research to obtain more comprehensive result.



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