The threat of IS proxy warfare on Indonesian Millennial Muslims

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DOI: 10.18326/ijims.v8i2. 199-223

Abstract

So far, terrorism tends to be considered using asymmetric warfare methods rather than proxy warfare methods. Even though some terror attacks around the world carried out by people inspired by terrorism indicate that terrorist groups such as IS are carrying out proxy warfare methods. Based on this problem, the following article will describe the threat of IS terrorism through proxy warfare. The aims of this research to map the threat of IS proxy warfare on Indonesian Millennial Muslims. By using library research methods, this research is expected to have positive implications for the efforts to deradicalize terrorism among Indonesian Millennial Muslims. The conclusion of this research obtained shows that the advancement of communication technology has facilitated IS to spread its terrorism in Indonesia through online magazine propaganda in Bahasa Indonesia. This effort is really a threat for Indonesian Millennial Muslims who are very active in using the internet daily. In this way, IS seeks to influence Indonesian Millennial Muslims to become their proxy in running nikayah operations independently. Thus, the threat of terrorism throughout the world has also evolved from the threat of asymmetric warfare to the threat of proxy warfare, especially to Millennial Muslims.

Sampai sejauh ini, terorisme cenderung dianggap menggunakan metode peperangan asimetris daripada peperangan proksi. Meski begitu, beberapa serangan teror di seluruh dunia yang dilakukan oleh orang-orang yang terinspirasi

terorisme mengindikasikan bahwa kelompok teroris semacam IS sedang menjalankan metode peperangan proksi**.** Berdasarkan permasalahan ini, artikel berikut akan menjelaskan ancaman terorisme IS melalui peperangan proksi. Tujuan dari penelitain ini adalah memetakan ancaman peperangan proksi IS pada Muslim Milenial Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian pustaka, penelitian ini diharapkan dapat berimplikasi positif pada usaha deradikalisasi terorisme pada Muslim Indonesia. Kesimpulan penelitian sendiri menunjukkan bahwa kemajuan teknologi komunikasi telah memfasilitasi IS untuk menyebarkan terorisme di Indonesia melalui propaganda majalah daring dalam Bahasa Indonesia. Upaya ini benar-benar menjadi ancaman bagi Muslim Milenial Indonesia yang sangat aktif menggunakan internet setiap hari. Dengan cara ini, IS berusaha mempengaruhi Muslim Milenial Indonesia untuk menjadi wakil mereka dalam menjalankan operasi nikayah secara mandiri. Dengan demikian, ancaman terorisme diseluruh dunia juga telah berevolusi dari ancaman peperangan asimetris kepada ancaman peperangan proksi khususnya pada Muslim Milenial.

Keywords: *Proxy warfare*; *Millennial Muslims*; *Indonesia*; *IS*; *Terrorism*

Introduction

On August 28, 2016, a 17-year-old teenager carried out an attack on a church in Medan, Indonesia. The perpetrator is a high school fresh graduate teenager. He is considered not a part of the Islamic State (IS) terror network. However, IS propaganda through the internet allegedly inspired the teenager.[1] Sources from the local police also confirmed the allegations.[2] The teenager seemed to try to carry out attacks such as in Paris and Saint-Denis, France. The incidents in Paris and Saint-Denis itself were simultaneous terror attacks that occurred on 13 November 2015 that caused 128 fatalities.[3] IS claimed responsibility for the attack.

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[1] Deutsche Welle Online, "Penyerang Bunuh Diri Di Gereja Katolik Medan Terobsesi Pimpinan Isis Al Baghdadi", in http://www.dw.com/id/penyerang-bunuh-diri-di-gereja-katolik-medan-terobsesi-pimpinan-isis-al-baghdadi/a-19510515 , accessed on 3 June 2018.

[2] Heyder Affan, "Terduga Pelaku Serangan Di Gereja Medan Terinspirasi Teror Prancis", in http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/08/160828_indonesia_medan_penyelidikn, accessed on 3 June 2018.

[3] BBC News Online, "ISIS Mengaku Sebagai Pelaku Serangan Paris", in http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2015/11/151114_dunia_paris_isis, accessed on 3

They also said that the action was carried out by eight Caliphate troops in response to the air strike of the Coalition forces on IS.[4]

Compared to the terror in Paris, the incident in Medan was a single attack that failed to cause damage and loss of life. However, the attack indicated that the internet network could send an inspiring message to carry out acts of terror. Besides Medan, similar attacks also occurred in several other countries. In Australia, Man Haron Manis and Numan Haider carried out the similar attacks. While Martin Couture-Rouleau and Michael Zehaf‑Bibeau did the same action in Canada. Furthermore, Zale Thompson carried out terror attacks in the United States. There was still another attack in France by Bertrand Nzohabonayo.

Except, the attack in Medan, IS recognized those entire terrorist acts as the answers of the Caliphate call to strike those waging war against IS wherever they were.[5] The IS recognition shows that they are carrying out proxy wars outside their territories in Iraq and Syria. The proxy warfare itself is a product of the relationship between the donor and the chosen proxy. Donors can be in a form of state or non-state actors who will distribute funds, weapons and training to the chosen proxy to fight.[6] In simpler language, proxy warfare can be interpreted as a war by using the power of the third party. By using the hands of others, this group seeks to spread terror throughout the world.

Although IS has been indicated to run the war by proxies, terrorism tends to be considered using asymmetrical warfare methods rather than proxy warfare.[7] The terrorist attacks themselves, along with rebellions,

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June 2018.

[4] Islamic State, "Just Terror", *Dabiq*, Issue 12 (November 2015/Safar 1437), 28.

[5] Islamic State, "Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within", *Dabiq*, Issue 6 (December 2014/ Rabi'al Awwal 1436), 3-4.

[6] Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and The Future of Conflict", *The RUSI Journal*, Volume 158, Number 2 (May 2013), 41.

[7] Russell P. Galeti Jr, "Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare", *Landpower Essay*, Number

roadside bombs, weapon proliferation of mass destruction, and sophisticated computer viruses are still classified as part of asymmetrical warfare.[8] This shows the most actual terrorism strategy has evolved from asymmetric warfare to proxy warfare.

The proxy warfare strategy carried out by IS is basically their adaptation to the sophistication of information technology. IS utilizes this sophistication to form a proxy, through information warfare using virtual networks. Information warfare using cyber networks is one of the proxy warfare modes. This cyber mode proxy warfare utilizes community depends on computer networks and makes it an ideal vehicle in proxy formation strategies.[9] With this mode, proxy wars are enough to carry out by disseminating information through the internet to influence internet users to become proxies who will fight against the enemies. However, this mode is a more complex threat to the affected parties, because those who are exposed to the threat of this model will not be easy to identify who the opponent is and where the battlefield is. The difficulty of identifying opponents and battlefields is the cause of terror acts even though the security forces of each country have carried out a high-level terror prevention operation.

The biggest proxies potency formed in this way are the people or groups of people who use the internet in their daily lives. In Indonesia, the penetration of internet users amounted to 143.26 million people. From that figure, 16.68 percent comes from the age group 13-18 years and 49.52 percent came from the age group 19-34 years.[10] Thus, 76 percent of the internet users in Indonesia come from the age group of 13-34 years.

04-3 (October 2004), 2.

[8] David L. Buffaloe, "Defining Asymmetric Warfare", *The Land Warfare Papers*, Number 58 (September 2006), 3.

[9] Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and The Future of Conflict"…, 43.

[10] APJII, *Penetrasi & Perilaku Pengguna Internet Indonesia*, Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia, Survei 2017.

This age group is the Millennials, the generation born between 1981 and 2000.[11] By this fact, Indonesian Millennials are one of the groups that have the most potential as IS proxies.

Based on this issue, the following article aims to describe the threat of IS proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. This study used a literature research method with proxy warfare approach. The results of this study are expected to give positive implications for the de-radicalization of terrorism in Indonesia, especially for Indonesian Millennial Muslims.

IS and proxy warfare

IS embryo is an organization called *Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad*. Abu Mushab al- Zarqawi was the founder of this organization. In the late 1980s, Zarqawi participated in anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Thus, he is one of the Afghan war veterans.[12] In Afghanistan, Zarqawi began a close relationship with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who would become his teacher to study *Jihadi-Salafism* teachings. Between 1994 and 1999, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were imprisoned in Jordan. After his release in 1999, Zarqawi returned to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to establish a training camp in the city of Herat. The training camp serves as a centre for jihadists who are more inclined to tighter *Salafi* theology.

Initially, Zarqawi distanced himself from al-Qaeda, whose main base was in eastern Afghanistan. He also did not give promises of loyalty to Osama bin Laden. Therefore, he and his organization did not submit to the authority of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.[13]   After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi and his associates moved to the

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[11] Leesa Tanner, *Who are the Millennials?* Defence R&D Canada–Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2010, 10.

[12] Islamic State, "Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within"..., 41.

[13] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, Analysis Paper, No. 19,* Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2015, 13.

northern Kurdish region in 2002. There they formed a group called *Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad* (God's Unity and Jihad Group). Only two years later, in 2014, Zarqawi gave allegiance to Osama Bin Laden.[14] With this allegiance, *Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad* is known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[15] However, from 1999 to 2004, the Zarqawi group was only known as *Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad*.[16]

Furthermore, on 15 January 2006, Zarqawi formed the Mujahideen Shura Council, which unites al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) with five other jihadist organizations operating in Iraq. Approximately six months later, a US air strike killed Zarqawi. Nevertheless, his death did not stop the existence of the Mujahideen Shura Council. Even in October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the establishment of an "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI). However, the Mujahideen Shura Council leaders did not consult the formation of the ISI to the leaders of al-Qaeda and immediately caused tensions between the ISI and al-Qaeda. A year later, Zarqawi's successor, Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi proclaimed the dissolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a consequence of support for the ISI. With this dissolution, ISI and al-Qaeda agreed to split up in Iraq.[17] Nevertheless, from 2002 to 2011, the ISI was still regarded as the same organization as al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) and *Jamaat Tawhid Wa al Jihad*.[18]

At the end of 2011, ISI sent the troops to Syria to form a jihadi group called *Jabhat al-Nusra*. *Jabhat al Nusra* later grew into a prominent Sunni

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[14] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State*, 14; and see Islamic State, "Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within"..., 42.

[15] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring And Understanding The Impact of Terrorism*, IEP Report 2014, 58.

[16] Fisher Zulkarnain and Tata Septayuda Purnama, "The ISIS Movement and The Threat of Religious Radicalism in Indonesia", *Mimbar*, Volume 32, Number 1 (June, 2016), 34.

[17] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State...*, 16-21.

[18] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing The Impact of Terrorism from 2002-2011*, IEP Report 2012, 32.

insurgent militant group in the Syrian civil war. However, these two organizations kept their relationship confidentially. When ISI leaders proclaimed the transformation of ISI to ISIS in 2013, they revealed this connection with the words that *Jabhat al-Nushr*a was an extension of the ISI in Iraq.[19] Furthermore, as a consequence of the establishment of ISIS, the ISI leader then dissolved ISI and *Jabhat al-Nushra* at once. Nevertheless, *Jabhat al-Nusra* leaders opposed the decision and immediately declared the organization as a part of the al-Qaeda rather than ISIS.[20]

Further, in early 2014, al-Qaeda confirmed that they had no relationship with ISIS and were not responsible for the group's actions. However, ISIS goes further by expanding the power into western Iraq. In this expansion, ISIS managed to control western Iraq, including the city of Mosul. After that, ISIS proclaimed the establishment of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014. After the proclamation, an ISIS official stated that ISIS had ended since then. Thus, ISIS has transformed into IS. Their goal is no longer limited to control Iraq and Syria but the whole world.[21]

Figure 1. Evolution of IS organization

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[19] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State...*, 24; and see Makrum,"Tracing The Historical and Ideological Roots of ISI: Shi'ite or Sunni?", *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Volume 6, Number 2 (December 2016), 213.

[20] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State...*, 25: and see Mohammed Nuruzzaman, "The Challenge of the Islamic State", *Global Affairs*, Volume1, Issue Number 3 (June 2015), 297-304.

[21] Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State...*, 29-31.

Basically, the unstable security conditions in Iraq and Syria have supported the IS to grow and develop. IS utilizes unstable state conditions to shape what they call *Jamaah Tawhid Wa al-Jihad*. In that place, they will use asymmetric warfare methods. In its strategy, this method attempts to attack targets that are not strong and utilize limited preparation against the threat of attack targets.[22]

In the context of warfare of the 19th and 20th centuries, asymmetric warfare is run by the non-state that represented by local guerrilla groups against the state represented by the colonial states. The purpose of this war is to form a state. Thus, asymmetric warfare of the 19th and 20th centuries can be simplified as a non-state versus state to become state versus state. Admittedly, IS is also practicing this in Iraq and Syria. They carry out asymmetric warfare in order to form an Islamic state. The simplest example of this type of warfare is Indonesian Independence War. During this war, freedom fighter groups acted as non-state actors who fought against the Dutch colonial army who acted as state actors. The freedom fighter groups carried out hit-and-run tactics to face the Dutch army who excelled in all aspects of the military. In the 19th and 20th century asymmetric warfare, hit-and-run became the most famous tactic. Because of its reliability in combat, this tactic became the main principle in guerrilla warfare operations.

Slightly different from the asymmetric warfare in the 19th and 20th centuries, in the 21st century, guerilla warfare operations with the hit-and-run principle has shifted into a terror war with the principle of piracy and bombing. In the 21st century, the terrorist organization represents a non-state actor. Moreover, non-state actors in the 21st century asymmetric warfare do not also make the country in the concept of the nation-state

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[22] Bruce W. Bennet, Christopher P. Twomey, Gregory F. Treverton, *What Are Asymmetric Strategies? Rand Document Briefing*, Monica: RAND, 1999, 3.

as a goal. Instead, they demand power over the whole world. Thus, the ideology of nationality becomes obsolete and looks outdate for them.

Instead, non-state actors in the 21st century asymmetric warfare require an ideology that provides the ability to break national barriers. Therefore, they later adopted religion as their ideological camouflage. Then, what the public knows as the 21st century terrorism is terrorism that carries theological ideology. Using this ideological theology, the 21st century terrorist groups are trying to get a wider support throughout the world. Although camouflage of ideological theology promises broader support, its weakness lies precisely on the territory they will fight for. After the fall of colonialism in the mid-20th century, the power that made the country use more nationalism and nationality platforms as their territorial claim. Thus, the 21st century terror organizations will find it difficult to find their own homeland.

IS has issued a list of places classified as the suitable places for jihad, such as Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Sinai Peninsula, Waziristan, Libya, Chechnya, Nigeria, and parts of Tunisia, Algeria, Indonesia, and the Philippines. However, not all of these regions are always the same as conditions in Iraq or Syria. Thus, asymmetric warfare cannot always be carried out in regions on the list of Islamic countries. Some countries even have very stable security conditions. Therefore, in its strategy, IS is trying to create an unstable security in a region through a *nikayah* attack. The underground IS Mujahid cells will carry out *nikayah* operations to kill, injure and devastate the enemy. This action aims to create chaos in the region so that the local government loses control of security stability in its territory. To achieve this goal, IS uses the Zarqawi method. This method uses car bombs, IEDs and *istishad* bombs. When the area attacked by these *nikayah* operations has been in a very unstable security condition like Iraq, IS will then send its followers and sympathizers to migrate to

the country. In that region, IS will build a base to form *jamaah*, recruit members and train them.[23]

How did IS form underground Mujahid cells?

Usually, IS forms the underground Mujahid cells through the formation of the *jamaah*. After that, IS will train them to do the terror attacks. However, this method becomes increasingly difficult to succeed. Post 9/11, security forces in many countries have taken strict monitoring steps to prevent the formation of the *jamaah*. Radical networks such as IS itself, have begun to see the use of political resources such as establishing official organizations (on the ground) and started to abandon the terrorist tactics to run by closing the (underground) networks.[24]

IS is trying to overcome this difficulty by changing their method from asymmetric warfare to proxy warfare. Reflecting on the experience of the 20th century conflict, the proxy war has been proven to be one of the methods capable of fostering extremism such as terrorism.[25] So that by using proxy warfare, IS no longer tries to form a *jamaah* and recruit Mujahid directly. Instead, IS seeks to foster terrorism throughout the world. With this aim, they have replaced the terrorist recruitment system through a closed and exclusive cell system into the public domain and open access. This method is cheaper, but more effective due to the use of an internet communication network. Thus, this proxy warfare can be classified as warfare by using cyber network. The terrorist groups themselves have long been known to spread their messages and mobilize

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[23] Islamic State, "The Return of Khilafah", *Dabiq*, Issue 1 (July 2014/Ramadan 1435), 36-38.

[24] Muhammad Tito Karnavian, "The Role of the National Police in Countering Insurgencies in Indonesia", *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Volume 9, Issue 9 (September 2017), 8 .

[25] Jon B Alterman, "The Age of Proxy Warfare", *Middle East Notes and Comment*, CSIS Middle East Program (May 2013), 2.

their supporters using the internet and web networks.[26] That is why, they can commit terror that reaches the whole world only through their proxies such as Man Haron Manis, Numan Haider, Martin Couture-Rouleau, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, Zale Thompson, Bertrand Nzohabonayo, Ivan Armadi, and Dita's family. As the consequence, the threats faced by countries in the world are no longer focused on the threat of asymmetric warfare but proxy warfare.

Figure 2. IS warfare method scheme


Threats to Indonesian Millennial Muslims

According to Gatot Nurmantyo, the degradation of moral and nationalistic values, especially for youth, as well as the emerging of religious radicalization and infiltration of foreign cultural values are the proxy war variant to weaken Indonesia.[27] Indirectly, this statement refers to the threat of the IS proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. As one of the IS targets, in fact, Indonesia is in a stable and stronger

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[26] Paul Cornish, David Livingstone, Dave Clemente, Claire Yorke, *On Cyber Warfare*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010, 8.

[27] Keoni Marzuki, "Proxy Wars Narrative: TNI-AD's Quest for Relevance?", *RSIS Commentary*, Number 092 (April 2016).

security condition than the other Southeast Asian countries. However, in the proxy warfare context, Indonesia's position is more vulnerable. This is due to the large Muslim population, the large Millennial Muslims, and abundant natural resources.

Figure 3. IS war phase in Indonesia

Basically, IS requires three things above to be able to grow and develop in a county outside Iraq and Syria. They need a large Muslim population as fertile land to spread terrorism narratives in the camouflage of Islamic teachings. With this camouflage, IS spreads their terrorism narratives through the internet. Meanwhile, the biggest internet users are the Millennial, including Millennial Muslims. Indeed, IS is targeting Millennial Muslims to be their proxy. Through proxies from Millennial Muslims such as Ivan Armadi, IS carried out terror attacks with the aim of creating unstable security conditions in Indonesia. Furthermore, after Indonesia's condition is unstable, IS will carry out asymmetric warfare to control a certain area and take its natural resources. With this natural resource, IS will finance the war and establish an Islamic state affiliated with the Caliphate in Iraq.

Figure 4. Threat factors for Indonesian Millennial Muslims

The proxy warfare that poses a threat to Indonesian Millennial Muslims is a war that aims to form proxies by using the cyber network as a means of transporting the ideology of terrorism. Moreover, this cyber-mode proxy warfare also requires appropriate ammunition. This need can be analogous to an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). As a strategic weapon system, ICBM can be simply divided into two components. Both components are rockets that serve as a transport vehicle and nuclear warheads that function as a destructive ammunition. The nuclear warhead used as ammunition for an ICBM is an option because of its tremendous destructive power. This is proportional to the ability of its transport vehicle that can reach the distance between continents. Due to these two components, an ICBM becomes the weapon with the biggest deterrent effect in the world of defense and security. With ICBM also, North Korea became so feared by the international community even though in general, their military profile is out-of-date.

The proxy warfare of cyber mode also requires two components that are almost the same as an ICBM in order to make it strategic and terrible. These both components are the internet network and the IS doctrine itself. The internet network serves as a transport vehicle that will transmit various IS messages and play the function as a proxy-forming narrator. The proxy-forming narratives via the internet also include psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, and networking, information sharing, and planning.[28] Therefore, in this proxy warfare, mobile phones play a major role. This is in line with the increasingly important and widespread use of cellular phones in the life of the Millennial, especially smartphones.[29] This also happens to Indonesian Millennial Muslims, where the smartphone has made the internet is within their grasp. Thus, the transport vehicle of IS doctrines has become closer to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. Consequently, this condition has made the Millennial Muslims as sleeping proxies for the IS. The sleeping proxy is just waiting for the right moment to become an active proxy. For this reason, IS has played an ingenious battle by making Islam as their brand. They modified the Islamic teachings and designed it into proxy warfare ammunition. The IS ideology combines the Millennial, *takfiri*, *salafi* and sectarian components in its powerful jihadist narrative.[30]

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[28] Imran Awan,"Cyber-Extremism: ISIS and the Power of Social Media", *Society*, volume 54, Issue 2 (April 2017), 138–149.

[29] Cortney Weinbaum, Richard Girven, Jenny Oberholtzer, *The Millennial Generation: Implications fo the Intelligence and Policy Communities*, Washington D.C.: RAND, 2016, 4.

[30] Celso, Anthony, "Dabiq: IS's Apocalyptic 21ˢᵗ Century Jihadist Manifesto", *Journal Political Sciences and Public Affairs*, Volume 2, Issue 4 (January 2014), 1.

Figure 5. The main components of the IS proxy warfare

With the IS name, the whole world will know that it is an Islamic State. Moreover, the IS also needed this brand to build trust in every Millennial Muslims, especially from non-Arabic such as Indonesia. With such a globalized name, Indonesian Millennial Muslims will easier to recognize IS and identify it as a global brand. This is certainly different from al-Qaeda which, although it is popular, but for Indonesian Millennial Muslims, that name will be known and only identified as an Arab terrorist movement. However, with the IS name, Indonesian Millennial Muslims who generally understand English more than Arabic will soon find out that it is an Islamic State. Furthermore, the Indonesian Millennial Muslims will obtain impression that the terrorist movement is open to anyone including them. Consequently, every Millennial Muslim who types the word Islam in an internet search engine on their smartphone will have the possibility to connect with the IS propaganda narrative, directly or indirectly.

Millennial itself is a generation that is less concerned with international terrorism and shows a lower level of support in the war on terrorism.[31] In this condition, IS branding infiltrates globalization

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[31] A.Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, *Millennials and U.S Foreign Policy: The Next Generation's Attitudes toward Foreign Policy and War (and Why They Matter)*, Washington D.C.: CATO Institute, 2015, 10.

and lives side by side with Millennial Muslims. IS as a part of Islamic fundamentalism is basically not an anti-globalization movement, but as a part, participants, and interpreter of globalization itself.[32] Thus, IS has become part of globalization. Moreover, the number of words of terrorism and news about terrorism are heard all over the world every day, has made the IS no longer sound frightening and alarming for Indonesian Millennial Muslims. In other words, IS is also a part of the life of Indonesian Millennial Muslims. Unconsciously, Indonesian Millennial Muslims became friendly with IS. Gradually, it will eliminate resistance to the doctrines of terrorism. Further, IS also tries to find out who has responded or provided other forms of support on their online material. When IS sees support, they will crowd around or at least at an early stage, try to meet the needs of their potential proxy candidates while seducing them further into the terrorist trap.[33]

For Millennial Muslims who spend most of their time exploring and searching the internet, getting information about IS is not difficult. IS has used Twitter, Facebook and Instagram to influence opponents, friends and journalists. These methods have enabled IS to distribute a strong emotional image, with the message of winning the Islamic state. Such images can be used to build support among internet users and recruit new members.[34] In this way, IS campaigns their terror war and exposes it to the world. They are not only trying to spread terror, but also to seek

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[32] Asep Muhammad Iqbal and Zulkifli,"Islamic Fundamentalism, Nation-state and Global Citizenship: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir", *International Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Volume 6, Number 1 (June 2016), 37-38.

[33] Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci, Ahmet S. Yayla, "Defeating ISIS on the Battle Ground as well as in the Online Battle Space: Considerations of the "New Normal" and Available Online Weapons in the Struggle Ahead", *Journal of Strategic Security,* Volume 9, Number 4 (2016), 9.

[34] James P Farwell, "The Media Strategy of ISIS", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Volume 56, Number 6 (December 2014- January 2015), 50.

publicity that can connect them throughout the world.

IS began to develop their publicity after the declaration of the Islamic state or Caliphate in 2014. Since that year, IS started a more massive step to reach publicity. Throughout 2014, they were responsible for six of the twenty deadliest terror attacks worldwide.[35] Furthermore, they ran seven of the twenty deadliest terror attacks during 2015.[36] In the same year, IS began to expand operating wings to various parts of the world. Their attacks began to move out of Iraq and Syria into Bahrain, France, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Palestine.[37] Their acts of terror were becoming increasingly widespread by 2016. During that year, they dominated 13 of the 20 deadliest terror attacks in the world.[38] Through its proxies, IS launched terror attacks in Belgium, Georgia, Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi, Philippines, Turkey, and Yemen. This condition has made IS the deadliest terrorist group in the world. Consequently, IS became the most famous terrorist group in the world and also a terrorist group with the most publicity defeating Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Boko Haram.[39]

With the conditions described above, the world community has been connected with IS either directly or indirectly. In the future, IS may disappear in Iraq and Syria, but their proxies can metamorphose into new terror groups around the world. Thus, the problem will never be completed. Undoubtedly, the greatest danger of the cyber-mode proxy warfare lies here.

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[35] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring And Understanding The Impact of Terrorism*, IEP Report 2015, 12-13.

[36] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring And Understanding The Impact of Terrorism*, IEP Report 2016, 12-13.

[37] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2016...*, 52.

[38] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring And Understanding The Impact of Terrorism*. IEP Report 2017, 12-13.

[39] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2017...*, 72-73.

Building a branding and seizing publicity is important in IS' proxy warfare of cyber mode. However, the main thing of this proxy warfare is the ammunition that able to form the proxy itself. IS has made the teachings of Islam as a camouflage of their organizational ideology. They modified the teachings of Islam and made it become an excuse to combat humans. Through the argumentation of Quran verses and hadiths, IS is trying to convince everyone that their acts of terror are also the same actions performed by the Prophet (PBUH) in the war. Moreover, IS also tries to show every Muslim in the world that their group is the best Muslim group. In this way, IS intimidates Muslims and provides only two choices for Muslims around the world, follow their path of terror or confront them. With this camouflage, IS is trying to infuse their influence on Muslims all over the world.

IS media strategy has been adjusted to prioritize these religious requirements after June 2014. Prior to the declaration of the Caliphate, IS military reports were disseminated through Islamic State News (ISN) magazine, which was first released on May 31, 2014. Meanwhile, IS political reports were disseminated via Islamic State Report (ISR), which was first released on June 3, 2014. Then, IS combined ISN and ISR into a new magazine called Dabiq. This new magazine brings all the propaganda news on IS military, government, and religious activities together.[40] Furthermore, Dabiq is published in a more authoritarian and more religious language than any other terror group publications such as Al Qaeda.[41] This magazine does not only represent more than propaganda

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[40] Harleen K Gambhir, "Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State", *Backgrounder* (August 15, 2014), 3.

[41] Matteo Vergani and Ana-Maria Bliuc, "The Language of New Terrorism: Differences in Psychological Dimensions of Communication in Dabiq and Inspire", *Journal of Language and Social Psychology,* volume 37, issue 5 (January 2018), 523–540.

but also the vision of the Caliphate.[42] Undoubtedly, Dabiq serves as an ammunition of the IS proxy warfare propagated through the Internet network in an effort to attract the sympathy of Muslims around the world. Thus, it is not surprising that this magazine is published in several languages according to the language of their potential proxy candidates. For Indonesian Millennial Muslims, which is one of the potential targets of them, IS has also published Dabiq in Bahasa Indonesia.

The depth of knowledge about Islam makes IS proficient at modifying Islamic teachings into narratives for proxy warfare. That skill can certainly be seen in how they can relate all their actions to the Qur'an, the hadith and the history of the Prophet (PBUH) and the companions of the Prophet (PBUH), and the scholars. Thus, it is quite easy for IS to call Islam as a religion of swords but not as a religion of peace. This opinion they take with postulates on Ali bin Abi Talib who mentioned that the Prophet (PBUH) was sent with four swords to fight the polytheists, scribes, hypocrites, and apostates. Meantime, IS also argued that the opinion is derived from the Islamic root which is not a *salam* which means peace, it refers to Ibn Taymiyyah.[43] Further, IS can also easily demonstrate the legitimacy of an Islamic state. They argue that the Islamic state is the real Imamate. The Imamate is an imamate in politics that is the Caliphate of Islam in *Surah al-Baqarah:124*.[44] In order to protect their actions, IS mentioned that fighting them is fighting the Caliphate and if it is done by fellow Muslims then it is apostasy and disbelief.[45]

Eventually, IS mentioned that the Mujahideen were the most correct

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[42] Haroro J. Ingram, "An analysis of Islamic State's Dabiq Magazine", *Australian Journal of Political Science*, volume 51, issue 3 (2016), 458-477.

[43] Islamic State, "From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of Grayzone", *Dabiq*, Issue 7 (February 2015/Rabi'al Akhir 1436), 20-24.

[44] Islamic State, "The Return of Khilafah"..., 22-29.

[45] Islamic State, "The Law of Allah or The Laws of Men", *Dabiq*, Issue 10 (July 2015/Ramadan 1436), 50.

group of people in the Islamic Aqeedah, where the term Mujahid refers to themselves.[46] Moreover, IS openly call their actions as acts of terrorism. IS even stated that the statement on terrorism was not Islam was a statement of apostasy.[47] With this claim, IS actually tries to introduce terrorism by disguising it as Islamic teachings. In the same way, IS tries to dictate their readers and viewers to obey their will. Thus, it is not surprising that in their publication, there are words that said, there is no life without a jihad and there is no jihad without migration to the land of the Caliphate.[48] Consequently, they also provide guidance and steps for jihad as a step of Hijrah, loyalty, listening, obedience, training, which leads to *ribat* and fight then the Caliphate or martyrdom.[49] For IS, their war against the West was a crusade. Therefore, IS encourages every Muslim to kill the crusaders and the murder is proof of support to IS.[50] If a Muslim does not do what the IS dictates, that Muslim will be classified into a group that is hostile to IS or in other words belonging to a pagan group.

With such narratives being spread via the Internet, IS is trying to seek the views of Muslims around the world. This effort endangers Muslims who are seeking identity and self-development. These kinds of Muslims are young Muslim generations who in the context of the 21st century are often categorized as Millennial Muslims. As the generation that grows and develops along with the development of cyber and information technology, the generation of millennial Muslims is the generation connected to the internet. This means that this generation has an

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[46] Islamic State, "The Flood", *Dabiq*, Issue 2 (July 2014/Ramadan 1435), 24.

[47] Islamic State, "The Murtadd Brotherhood", *Dabiq* (Issue 14, April 2016/Rajab 1437), 14.

[48] Islamic State, "A Call to Hijrah", *Dabiq*, Issue 3 (September 2014/Shawwal 1435), 31.

[49] Islamic State, "The Return of Khilafah"..., 35.

[50] Islamic State, "The Failed Crusade", *Dabiq*, Issue 4 (October 2014/Dhulhijjah 1435), 32-44.

access to the transport vehicle of IS cyber-mode proxy warfare. With this condition, IS proxy warfare ammunition is just waiting to reach its target.

Actually, IS does not solely spread its doctrine on the internet alone. There are at least two dissemination patterns of IS doctrine on the internet. The first pattern is the direct spread in which Millennial Muslims find IS propaganda on the internet by themselves. The second pattern is the indirect spread where the Millennial Muslims get the proxy's narrative from other people. The second pattern is a more complex pattern in which the spread can occur consciously or unconsciously and can be either whole or original narrative or a narrated and modified narrative. The second spreading pattern can form a very long spread chain. With this long chain, the proxy-forming narrative will move wildly so that the possible proxies forming will become more and more difficult to predict. The case of a church attack in Medan by a Muslim Millennial in 2016 indicates how this proxy warfare of cyber-mode formed its proxies wildly. Meanwhile, the use of more open tactics that rely heavily on the internet and social media can make anyone, especially troubled to collect IS propaganda materials and its ideological theology to act for their own importance by making IS as its brand. [51]

Conclusion

The development of the time and technological advances has helped IS adjust their war doctrine in order to reach the world more effectively and efficiently. Cyber-mode proxy warfare is a choice of IS because of its superiority in reach and efficiency in recruiting proxies. Going forward IS will actually use its proxies to perform *nikayah* operations around the world. Consequently, the IS' proxy warfare of cyber-mode will be the

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[51] Naufal Armia Arifin, "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia With Regards to Its Social Media Strategy", *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional*, Volume 13, Number 2 (2017), 155.

world's major security threat. Meanwhile, Indonesia, which has a large number of Millennial Muslims, is a potential target of IS. Thus, the threat of IS' proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims is actually a threat to Indonesia's national security too. Therefore, efforts to protect Indonesian Millennial Muslims from the threat of IS' proxy warfare are part of efforts to combat terrorism and protect Indonesia's national security.

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