

# Pattani central mosque in Southern Thailand as sanctuary from violence<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This article describes the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque to depict another picture of mosques in southern Thailand that has been alleged as an arena for the spreading of Islamic radical ideas and the recruiting of young people into ‘martyrs’ against the Thai Government. It is not doubted, the 2004 *Kruze* Mosque incident reflects the failure of places of worship as a ‘sanctuary from violence’. Consequently, there are questions about the kind of practices taking place in Islamic teaching, mosque management, and the views held by mosque stakeholders (Imam, the preachers, and congregation) toward good governance, human rights and the anticipation of radicalism given the current situation in Pattani. In sum, Pattani Central Mosque instead seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more conservative believers rather than those with radical and extreme tendencies.

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<sup>1</sup> This article is modified of my thesis research “Examining Pattani Central Mosque: Islamic Teaching Practices and Views of Good Governance, Human Rights and Anticipation for Radicalism” for Master of Human Rights and Democratisation of Sydney University, Australia, and Mahidol University, Thailand.

Artikel ini mendeskripsikan kualitas yang nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani untuk mengilustrasikan gambaran lain tentang masjid-masjid di Thailand Selatan yang disinyalir sebagai arena penyebaran ide-ide Islam radikal dan rekrutmen orang-orang muda sebagai “martir” melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Tidak terbantahkan, insiden Masjid *Kru-ze* tahun 2004 merefleksikan kegagalan tempat-tempat ibadah sebagai ‘sanctuary from violence’. Akibatnya, terdapat sejumlah pertanyaan mengenai jenis-jenis praktik pengajaran, manajemen masjid dan pandangan dari para pengelola/takmir masjid (Imam, juru dakwah, and jemaah) terhadap pemerintahan yang baik, hak asasi manusia dan antisipasi atas radikalisme di Pattani dewasa ini. Sebagai kesimpulan, Masjid Raya Pattani tampaknya lebih terbentuk oleh gabungan para pengikut yang moderat dan lebih konservatif dibandingkan mereka yang memiliki tendensi-tendensi radikal dan ekstrem.

**Keywords:** *Mosque; Islamism; Human rights; Good governance; Anticipation for radicalism*

## **Introduction**

In Islam, *masjid* (mosque) is a very important institution not only as a religious place of worship but also as a civil and social institution.<sup>2</sup> As a social institution, a mosque represents a reflection of society. Mosques shape and are shaped by their congregation through a long process of internalising the teachings of religion with their attendant social, political, economic, and cultural factors. Although these elements may be common to all mosques, their architecture, type of congregations, administration, voiced sermons, rituals of worship and activities may be very different.

It is not needed to take examples from far away to show the differentiation of mosques amongst countries and continents. For instance, in

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<sup>2</sup> Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond”, a revised paper originally prepared for the workshop on “South-east Asian Muslim Responses to Globalization”, Tokyo: JICA Research Institute, 2011, 6.

Indonesia itself differentiation of mosques have occurred depending on location (village and city), mosque affiliation to Islamic mass organisations (*Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU), *Muhammadiyah*, etc) and amongst mosques in regions where Muslims are in majority and in those where they are in minority.

Furthermore, differentiation of mosque can be seen from conflict and peace situation. One striking example is the *al-Aqsa* Mosque affected by the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Hence, the mosque is heavily guarded by armed Palestinian soldiers and only Muslims can enter. Because of this, it becomes a demonstration site for Palestine’s fighters for independence and even Muslim pilgrims who come there buy souvenirs in the form of plastic guns.

The horrible picture is completely different from the *al-Hikmah* Mosque in the Hague, the Netherland. The mosque, which belongs to Indonesian Muslim community, was bought from a church. This mosque is located in a majority non-Muslim community. In practice, the mosque is only voicing sermons that encourage peace and tolerance. Thus there are no hatred sermons and Muslim soldiers that guard the mosque. Rather, non-Muslims neighbours are often invited to attend celebration of Islamic big days and open house.

In the light of above, Gaffney<sup>3</sup> stated that mosques everywhere are the same because ‘all convey the recollections of eternal presence’ and at the same time are different from each other ‘in the diversity of historical forces that shape its distinctive personality, its form of solidarity, and its aesthetic inclination’.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that to certain extent *tadika* (kindergarten) attached to mosques, as well as Islamic boarding

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<sup>3</sup> Patrick D. Gaffney, *The Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt*, California: University of California Press, 1994, 13

schools (*pondok*) in southern Thailand are places that allegedly have become an arena in which militant Islamic groups have spread their ideas.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, Chalk<sup>5</sup> described that mosques in southern Thailand have been used by radical Islamic groups to instil radical values and even to recruit Muslim youth to the rebellion against the Thai government.

The *Kru-ze* Mosque incident in 2004 was a striking example of misusing mosque as a vehicle for spreading radical ideas and an arena for recruiting young people as ‘martyrs’ against the Thai government. Adding to this, the mosque itself was bombarded with bullets by the Thai troops leaving the bullets’ trace in the mosque wall as a silent historical witness.<sup>6</sup> Hence, Satha-Anand<sup>7</sup> concluded in ‘Red’ Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond’ that *Kru-ze* Mosque failed in its role as a ‘sanctuary from violence’.

The above phenomenon raises a big question concerning Islamic teaching practices and management of mosques in Pattani. In other words, what is actually wrong with the mosque’s Islamic teaching practices and management? In addition, how mosque’s stakeholder (Imam, preachers and congregation) perceive ideas on good governance, human rights and

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<sup>4</sup> See Crises Group Asia Report May, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad”, N 98, (ICG, 2005); Crises Group Asia Report June, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand”, N 170, (ICG, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Peter Chalk et al., *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009, 23-24.

<sup>6</sup> Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “The Silence of the Bullet Monument: Violence and “Truth” Management, Dusun-Nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004” in Duncan McCargo (ed.), *Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence*, Singapore: NUS Press, 2006; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond”..., 6; Imtyaz Yusuf, “Ethnoreligious and Political Dimensions of the Southern Thailand Conflict” in Amit Pandya and Ellen Laipson (eds.), *Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World*, Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009; Sunungasil Wattana, “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Pattani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks”, *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2006).

<sup>7</sup> Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond”,...6.

anticipation for radicalism. Such issues are pertinent with the situation in Pattani. This article is dedicated to answer these questions by taking Pattani Central Mosque as locus of study.

## Research method

This article actually is based on my thesis research that employed ethnographic approach to comprehend Islamic teaching practices and the views of mosque stakeholders concerning good governance, human rights and anticipation for radicalism. In this thesis research data gathering methods used are in-depth interviews and participant observation. An in-depth interview is essentially a conversation that involves an interviewer with an interviewee to interactively explore the interviewee's perceptions of a particular topic.

In the fieldwork, I used a *semi-structured interview* guide to prompt the data collection. This is one of four activities required to give the interview the necessary depth, which include establishing *rapport* (a trust relationship), asking questions in *an open, emphatic way*, and motivating the interviewee to tell their story by *probing*.<sup>8</sup> In relation to this, Colin<sup>9</sup> stated that semi-structured interviews have predetermined questions, but the order can be modified based upon the interviewer's perception of what seems most appropriate. I can thus omit contextually irrelevant question or add specific contextually relevant questions in the course of the interview.

Observation is a method that enables researchers to observe and record the behaviour, actions and interactions of a community. This method is often used in ethnographic fieldwork to obtain a thick description of a

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<sup>8</sup> MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) *Qualitative Research Methods*, Los Angeles: Sage, 2011, 109.

<sup>9</sup> R Colin, *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner Researchers*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

community.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, in analysing data, I employed a cyclical process of analysis<sup>11</sup> in developing coding, description, comparison, categorisation, conceptualisation and theory development. This research, however, is not intended to develop a theory, but rather to give a profound analysis of the studied mosque.

### **The small narratives of the mosque**

This part tried to reveal a real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in terms of Islamic teaching practices and ideas of the mosque's stakeholders concerning good governance, human rights and anticipation of radicalism. Before discussing those matters, I will start with a brief introduction of the Central Mosque.

#### *Pattani central mosque*

In 1964 *Masjid Jami'* (Central Mosque) was built and located in Yarang, Pattani Municipality. Basically, the mosque's architecture adopted Western style and it looks like the *Taj Mahal* in India. There is a big dome in the centre, and four surrounding small ones with minarets. A big pond is located in front of the mosque and inside there is a large hall and two sided corridors. Also, small trees and various beautiful flowers make the mosque look beautiful and bring peaceful tranquillity for the congregation or tourists especially in the summer season. Hence, it is no exaggeration to claim that this is one of the most beautiful and largest mosques in Thailand. To date, this mosque has become the most important centre for religious activities of Muslims in the South. In addition, the mosque has many activities, ranging from five prayers in a day and *tadika* (kindergarten) to organising demonstration against the Thai government.

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<sup>10</sup> MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) *Qualitative Research Methods*,...201.

<sup>11</sup> MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) *Qualitative Research Methods*,...237.

## *Islamic teaching practices*

### *The five daily prayers (rawatib)*

Mosques everywhere, including in Pattani, southern Thailand, are generally dedicated places of worship, namely for the five daily prayers and the communal Friday prayers. The Pattani Central Mosque is also used for these needs. However, if most big mosques have crowds of worshipers for regular prayers in a day (*shalat rawatib*), in this mosque's sizeable numbers of worshipers are only seen for the midday (*dzuhur*) and late afternoon (*ashar*) prayers and the prayer prior to night (*maghrib*). At this mosque the number of worshippers for *dzuhur*, *ashar* and *maghrib* can reach 200-300 people. However for *isya* prayers (at around 7.44 pm) there are approximately 150 people, and only 20 to 25 people for dawn (*subuh*) prayer.

### *Friday prayers and khutbah (sermons)*

According to the Islamic teaching, Friday prayer is a religious obligation to attend. One *hadis* says 'if a Muslim leaves the Friday prayer three consecutive times without proper reasons he is not Muslim anymore'. This can explain why Friday prayer is always attended by more Muslims than other prayers. Some time a mosque cannot accommodate all Muslims who come to pray because of the big numbers that show up.

Friday prayer in the mosque is usually attended by approximately 1000-1500 Muslims, according to the Imam. This is a brief description of the general process of the Friday prayer. Basically Friday prayer consists from *khutbah* and *shalat*. After the first call for prayer (*adzan*) is done by a caller for prayer (*bilal*), a preacher (*khatib*) that works in the day will be given a toga and a stick and then he climbs to the pulpit. A preacher then says *Assalamu 'alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh* (Peace for you all and blessing and virtue from God) and sits for a while, then the second call for

prayer comes from a loud speaker. After that, the preacher will deliver his first *khutbah* and raise the stick. The first *khutbah* usually takes half an hour, then, the preacher sits for a while and then he stands again for the second *khutbah*.

Usually in the first *khutbah* a *khatib* will tell the congregation to follow Allah and his messenger, Muhammad SAW, totally according to the Qur'an and Sunnah. Meanwhile, in the second *khutbah* the preacher will come to conclusion of the first *khutbah* and end it with *doa* (calling God for good thing). This takes from about seven to ten minutes. After that the preacher will lead the congregation to do the pray together. Finally, the congregation will dismiss after the Imam leads them in reading *doa* and *zikir* (remembering God especially mention his name).

Generally preachers in this mosque use the standard Malay language in delivering *khutbah*. Sometimes they combine it with the local dialect of Pattani. But this is very rare. Because of this, people from Malaysia and Indonesia, like me, to some extent could understand the *khutbah* very well. In terms of the content of *khutbah*, I found that the *khutbah* is only related to religious matter.

No one of the four *khutbahs* that I attended in the mosque talked about political matters. The first *khutbah* talked about how to nurture children according to Islamic teaching. Then, in the second *khutbah* a preacher talked about how to have good attitude (*akhlakul karimah*) and practice it in daily life. The third *khutbah* talked about how to prepare for the next life after this. Finally, the fourth *khutbah* discussed about how to become a good Muslim not only toward other Muslims, but also toward non-Muslims.

The three preachers told me that they are not allowed to discuss political issues, criticise the King and royal family and teach violent *jihad*. Generally speaking, based on interview and observation, materials for



Friday sermon are *tafsir*, *qur'an*, *aqidah* and *hadis*. In short, all materials used concern religious matters. There are no indications that materials are used that try to promote radical Islamic ideas.

Similarly, another informant told me that preachers from other countries, such as Malaysia, are not allowed to give sermons due to concern that the sermon's content may be related to political matters.

One of my informants told me that the preachers sometime talk about *jihād* and the strengthening of Malay identity through their sermons in several mosques in villages. But, it is very rare today. Perhaps preachers are worried because many of them were captured as suspect and finally were sent to jails by the state officials. Some of them, even, were killed. For example, in 2004 there was a preacher gave a sermon on violent *jihād* in one mosque in a village. Then, he was killed in another place. Another informant added that there were at least 20 *uztads* killed during the last ten years.

### *Ramadhan activities*

The month of *Ramadhan* (also called the fasting month) is a special month for Muslims everywhere, including the Muslims in Pattani. No doubt, Muslims compete in doing *amal salih* (good deeds), such as prayer, give *sedekah* (alms giving) and reading the Qur'an. According to Islamic teaching, the first time the Qur'an was brought down to the Prophet Muhammad was in this holy month. This month is also believed to be a blessing month because within it there is a night (*lailatul qadar*) that is worth more than a thousand months because many angels and Gabriel and will go down during the Night by permission of the God. Peace during the Night until the emergence of the Dawn (QS: *Al-Qadar*)

Every time *Ramadhan* comes, the mosque will be filled with many activities. Besides five times prayers in a day, the mosque also provides *sahur* (meals and drinks) before starting fasting, as well as provides *iftar* (meals

and drink to break the fasting) for approximately 200-300 Muslims every day. Also, this mosque conducts *shalat tarawih* (praying together after *isya*) which is attended by approximately 1 thousand until 5 thousand people.

In the last ten days of the fasting month, approximately one (1) thousand Muslims attend *i'tikaf* (stay in the mosque mostly for doing prayer and read the Qur'an) for the last ten days. According to one informant, this activity also is attended by students because they have vacation from their schools in the last ten days. After the end of fasting this mosque also conducts *shalat idul fitri* (prayer at the end of fasting month) which is attended by thousands of Muslims.

### *Religious study group*

Religious study groups are intended to teach Muslim men and women Islamic values. This mosque also provides Islamic study groups for Muslims. Generally speaking, all religious study groups in this mosque are open to all Muslim regardless their *mazhab* (Islamic school of thought).

The types of religious study groups vary, and they are led by different preachers. One religious study group that draws many members is a group that is led by *Uxtad* Ismail Sepanjang. During these sessions up to 700 will attend. In his teaching, the *Uxtad* uses book *Nurul Ihsan*. This group meets regularly on Saturdays between 10 am-12 am. Another religious study group is taught by *Uxtad* Sahabuddin every Sunday. Approximately 400 people attend this group. In both these religious study groups women are included.

For a mosque, contents for religious study groups are important because they will influence the understanding and attitude of the congregation. The Imam said that content of sermons are not determined by him. It means that the preachers are free to decide their sermon themes based on their own initiative as long as they do not teach about some-

thing sensitive, such as *jihad*. In addition, they cannot talk about *ikhtilaf* (opinion dispute about Islamic teaching). Materials for these religious study groups are specific Malay books about *tafsir*, *hadis*, etc.

The method of religious study groups is lecturing. It is conducted in a traditional way, as the preacher talks and discusses about religious matters. In practice, members of the congregation sit together in front of the preacher and listen carefully to the content of the sermon. Based on my observation, the preacher will recite several verses of the Qur'an and give comments and examples. Sometime the preacher makes a joke related to the material of sermons so that the congregation is not bored with the sermon. I observe that written sources of Islamic teaching, such as Islamic bulletins, are not available to be distributed to congregation. In many mosques in Indonesia congregation easily find Islamic bulletins, such as *Al-Islam* that belongs to *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) that strive for establishing [Islamic] caliphate in the world. The only written sources available here are books used in the religious study group, such as the book entitled *Nurul Ihsan* that I mentioned above.

### *Reading quranic verses and quranic reading competitions*

Reading the Qur'an is believed to give happiness and calmness to the readers and will function as a candle or lamp that lightens their burial after death. So, this mosque routinely conducts sessions for reading *Yasin* (Qur'an verses) together every Thursday night. Reading *Yasin*, as the heart of the Qur'an, will give many benefits to the readers, such as strengthening her/his belief.

The mosque also conducts *Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an* (the Quran Reading Competitions) that takes place in August every year. A representative of the Thai royal family will distribute the prizes for the winners. It seems to me that involvement of the Thai royal family here to show

their power in the region, because from the outset the mosque was established by the King and still gets funds from the King.

### *Tadika (kindergarten)*

*Tadika* derived from *taman*, means garden. *Dee* derived from *Dee-de-kan*, means inculcation and *Ka*, derived from *Kana*, means children. Principally, *tadika* provides basic Islamic education for Muslim children outside the elementary school. It is run by communities and is often attached to mosques. Before 2004 *tadikas* did not use standard curriculums in their teaching process. In short, *tadikas* function as supplement for the elementary schools run by the Thai government. According to ICG<sup>12</sup> in the Deep South, ‘*tadika* help re-inforce Malay identity. In 2007, there were 1,343 registered *tadika* with 3,924 teachers and 136,768 students’. Furthermore, ICG<sup>13</sup> stated that there are suspicions that ‘insurgents use *tadika* foundations as fronts to funnel teachers and students into militant groups’.

The Pattani Central Mosque has a *tadika* that is attended by approximately 500 children, according to the Imam. The teachers of this *tadika* come from Islamic boarding schools. I found that the children mostly learn about the Qur’an, especially learn how to read it correctly. During my fieldwork, activity of *tadika* can be found in many mosques and also in houses belong to Muslim.

One interesting temporary *tadika* that I attended took place in a Muslim house. According to its teacher, it was held for 5 days in a week from 9 am-4 pm. There were around 20 children that learned about religious teaching and science. The language of instruction was Thai. The teachers used Thai because children today speak Thai in their daily life. But in

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<sup>12</sup> Crises Group Asia Report June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand”..., 4.

<sup>13</sup> Crises Group Asia Report June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand”..., 5.

villages, based on my interview with one informant, teachings in the *tadikas* are conducted in Malay language. In addition, one informant told me that the *tadikas* in villages is used to teach the identity of the Pattani Malay. In sum, I found that the *tadika* in the Central Mosque concentrates on teaching their students basic Islamic education and not on instilling the identity of the Pattani Malay.

### *Celebration of Islamic holidays*

Another activity of this mosque is the celebration of Islamic big days, such as the birth of Muhammad SAW (*Maulid*), *Isra Mi'raj*, etc. Based on my observation at the Mosque and interviews, the celebration of the Birth of Muhammad is very extravagant event every year. This activity is reported by TV in Thailand and broadcasted to several countries, such as Malaysia. Also, it is aired by radio. This event is attended by thousands of congregation members, as well as important guests, such as representatives for the local governor, head of Thai police, etc. This event is held in the afternoon after *Ashar* prayer. It takes 1 to 2 hours approximately.

The event is led by a master of ceremony who speaks in Thai and Malay. It is started with the reciting of the Qur'an by an international *qari'* (professional reader) and followed by speeches of the local governor and Chularajamontry or *Shaikh al-Islam*, of Thailand. In addition, at this occasion there is a reading of *Barazanji*. The book of *Barazanji* was written by Ja'far Al-Barzinji, and talk about the history of the Prophet Muhammad Saw. and his *mi'raj* to sky. In addition, the interesting part of this activity is distributing money (20 Bath) to the attendants in the forms of small wallet and followed by eating together.

### *Site of demonstration*

This mosque also is used to hold demonstrations. To date two big demonstrations have taken place in the mosque, namely in 1975 and 2007. My

informant told me that the demonstrations were not arranged by managers of the mosque. They only chose this mosque because it is a strategic place to run demonstration in. He added that these demonstrations were organised by Muslim students from Pattani and Bangkok. The Imam himself told me that he and its team did not involve with the last demonstration. In other word, neither they openly support nor prohibit using the mosque as site of demonstration. However, it seems that the Imam and its team supported the demonstration by not prohibiting it.

Meanwhile, a few of the former prominent figures of the last demonstration that I interviewed have perceived that this region will be an independent in the future and they are working on that. Also, this young generation are interested with the independence of the East Timor from Indonesia and have dreamed that in the future this land of Pattani is free and become one country like the East Timor.

Regarding the demonstration in 2007, my informant told me that the background was a response to the Thai Government policy, because three years after the incident in *Kruze* Mosque the Pattani people, including *uxtads*, imams and women faced killings, rape and oppression. In this regard, Tengku Chik<sup>14</sup> stated 'Suspicion of the imam's role in anti-Thai insurgency has been the focus of Thai intelligence who wishes to have the issue of religious scholar exclusively in their hands'.

Furthermore, one of the most significant tragedies amongst the many was death of Imam Mustafa Yusof in the district of Sungai Padi. An-unknown person or persons shotted him in the district of Sungai Padi. To some extent, this occurred due to the Thai government enacted the martial law and emergency degree. Hence, this demonstration aimed to criticise and demand the Thai Government to lift the martial law and

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<sup>14</sup> Tengku Chik, TIT & TAT Chik, *Pattani Cradle of the East: A History of Pattani*, Thailand: Muslim News, 2011, 178.

emergency decree.

Human rights watch<sup>15</sup> notes that in responding to the January 4, 2004 raid, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra instructed, on January 5, 2004, the application of the martial law for all districts of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Supported by this law the Thai soldiers and police can arrest suspects in the name of public order as well as without a judicial warrant.

Meanwhile, 'Emergency Decree' was enacted by Section 218 of the 1997 Constitution.<sup>16</sup> The Decree basically declared an emergency situation in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat on July 19, 2005. Adding to this, the Decree emerged to respond to the King's pressure and public criticism of martial law. Also, a judge criticised the Decree due to provide justification for arresting suspects up to 100 days without trial.<sup>17</sup> One of the striking victims of the law of enforcement of the martial law and the emergency decree was Imam Yapa Kaseng, killed during detention by Army Special Task Force 39 of the Thai Government.<sup>18</sup>

The price of these laws is high. In short, there are several special laws had been enacted in the Deep South and four districts in Songkhla including Na Thawi, Chana, Thepha and Saba. They are: 1) Martial Law Act B.E. 2457 (1914) (declarative effective from 5 January 2004-19 July 2005 and 19 September 2006 – present); 2) The Emergency Decree on Government Administration in States of Emergency B.E. 2548 (2005) (declared effective from 19 September 2006 – present, renewed every three months) just to be applied for the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat; and 3) National Security Act B.E. 2550 (2007) is stated to be

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<sup>15</sup> Human Right Watch, "No One Is Safe Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces", Vol.19, No. 13 (C), (2007), 33.

<sup>16</sup> Kwanravee Wangudom, "Thailand's States of Emergency: April – May 2010" (article pending publication).

<sup>17</sup> Kwanravee Wangudom, "Thailand's States of Emergency".

<sup>18</sup> T Haberkorn, T., "When Torture is a Duty: The Murder of Imam Yapa Kaseng and the Challenge of Accountability in Thailand" (article pending publication).

enforced there. Furthermore, it has created confusion amongst the population to which the laws are applied. For instance, to hold in custody those suspected to have committed of offence, the officials may use Martial Law for detention up to seven days. The detainees can be hold for another 30 days maximum under the Emergency Decree.<sup>19</sup>

Back to the point, the last demonstration was attended by 7000 persons. These were people coming from many parts of the city, as well as surrounding villages. In the action, most of them, including students, used masks to hide their faces. Interestingly, the demonstration remained non-violent and was ended peacefully.

In addition, Satha-Anand<sup>20</sup> noted that:

The demonstration led by Muslim university students had ten demands which include: withdraw the troops and rangers, lift the curfew in the area, lift the emergency laws covering the four southern provinces, hold government officials who had committed crime against the locals accountable, and refrain from arresting the innocents.

Furthermore, he regards that choosing this mosque as demonstration site replicate the success of the peaceful demonstration 1975 and legitimise that mosque as sanctuary against violence in southern Thailand.

## **View on good governance and human rights**

Theoretically speaking, good governance according to Hope<sup>21</sup> means that:

Predictable, open, and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; a strong civil society participating in

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<sup>19</sup> Cross Cultural Foundation, *Ayah di Tangkap* (My father was arrested), Thailand: CrCF, 2009, 37-38.

<sup>20</sup> Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond"..., 10.

<sup>21</sup> Hope cited in Michael Humphrey, HRTD 6904 "Democracy Theory and Practice on Good Governance", (Lecture 2, 2011).



public affairs; adherence to the rule of law; respect for basic human rights and freedoms; judicial independence; and consistent traditions and predictable institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a given nation-state.

I asked my informants about their views concerning the existing governmental system in Thailand, and its implementation in terms of rule of law and justice.

Generally, the majority of stakeholders agree with the existing system of government in Thailand. In other word, they agree that there is nothing wrong in the Thai system of government now. However, they have criticised the implementation of it, in terms of the rule of law and justice. In addition, one informant mentioned that democracy (or well-known as constitutional monarchy) and its implementation in Thailand only benefits the Central Government and marginalises the periphery such as Pattani.

As a result, people fell oppressed by the existing system. In addition, he added that the public space in society is closed. In other words, there is no freedom of opinion or to articulate their opinion. And lastly, he stated that Islamic law cannot be fully implemented in this system.

In terms of rule of law and justice, a few of my informants stated that their implementation is weak. In practice, they perceive that law (read: the martial law) is implemented in Pattani only to repress and suppress the people. As an example, they told me that some *uxtads* were captured and sent to the jail without trial. In addition, there is no enforcement of law when it comes to the perpetrators who have killed Muslims during various incidents (*Kru-ze* Mosque, *Takbai*, etc).

Regarding human rights, in the preamble of the UDHR it is written that all of the UN members will strive to build up one new world based on 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,

justice, and peace in the world'.<sup>22</sup>

I asked my informants about equality of people, non-Muslim rights and women's rights. In terms of values of human rights such as equality and rights of non-Muslims, all informants agree that there is no difference between people regardless of their religion, gender and race. So, they argue that Muslims have no problem to live with non-Muslims in harmony. In other words, religious tolerance is implemented here.

According to my informant, basically Muslims and Buddhists can live together in harmony and peace. However, he added that in certain villages when there are violent conflicts between the insurgent and Thai government, the relationship between the groups becomes bad. In other words, there are suspicions and prejudice amongst people of different religion.

Furthermore, there are a few informants who have an extreme understanding about the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Pattani. One informant said that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims cannot be fully reached, because according to Islamic teaching, Buddhists are *kafir* (infidels). But, he added that in terms of living together in daily life, for example trading with each other there is no problem at all as long as they do not attack Muslims.

All informants argue that Muslimahs (women) have the same rights with Muslims (man). They see women in Pattani now playing more significant roles in social and economic life than before. They do not see the phenomenon of women working outside their house as bad. Today, many women have a good position in the government office and at the university in Pattani.

### **View of anticipation for radicalism**

In southern Thailand, since the 1990s, the emergence of Islamic radical-

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<sup>22</sup> Ann E. Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights Tradition and Politics*, USA: Westview Press, 1999, 40-41.

ism has strongly brought elements of separatist movement. The emergence was influenced by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the involvement of foreign troops in many Muslim societies have radicalised many Muslims in Thailand and raised their consciousness of global Muslim grievances.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, from 2001 to 2003, militant groups in Pattani started to build up a tactic to coordinate attacks on Thai government targets, and finally this tactic peaked in the incident of 28 April 2004. On that day, insurgents attacked 15 security posts and police stations in Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala at the same day. This reflected insurgents applied coordination attack that has not happened before.

Concerning anticipation for radicalism, I asked a question to the Imam and the three preachers I interviewed in the mosque if they have any specific strategies to anticipate radicalism in this mosque.

To date, there is no specific strategy in anticipating the rise of radicalism in this mosque. The management only emphasises moderate Islamic teaching through Friday *khutbahs* and the materials (content) of the religious study groups. With regards to this, the Imam said that this mosque provides Islamic teaching only related to religious matter. There is no space for political matters or talking about *ikhtilaf*. Also, teaching about *jihād* is not allowed in this mosque. In a similar vein, three preachers I interviewed said that they only teach about religious issues. It means they did not teach about violent *jihād* in this mosque. In addition, the preachers usually promote religious tolerance in their sermons.

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<sup>23</sup> Sunungasil Wattana, "Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihād di Pattani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks"..., 133.

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